

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Vol. III

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SAMKHYA AND YOGA

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY
F. MAX MULLER

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THE SIX SYSTEMS

VOLUME TWO
VEDANTA AND PURVA-MIMAMSA

VOLUME THREE
SAMKHYA AND YOGA

VOLUME FOUR
NAYA AND VAISESHIKA

SAMKHYA AND YOGA

BY
FRIEDRICH MAX MULLER



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CHAPTER VI

Samkhya-Philosophy

HAVING explored two of the recognised systems of Indian philosophy, so far as it seemed necessary to a general survey of the work done by the ancient thinkers of India, we must now return and enter once more into the densely entangled and almost impervious growth of thought from which all the high roads leading towards real and definite systems of philosophy have emerged, branching off in different directions. One of these and, as it seems to me, by far the most important for the whole intellectual development of India, the Vedanta, has been mapped out by us at least in its broad outlines.

It seemed to me undesirable to enter here on an examination of what has been called the later Vedanta which can be studied in such works as the Panchadasi or the Vedanta-Sara, and in many popular treatises both in prose and in verse.

Later Vedanta mixed with Samkhya

It would be unfair and unhistorical, however, to look upon this later development of the Vedanta as simply a deterioration of the old philosophy. Though it is certainly rather confused, if compared with the system as laid down in the old Vedanta-Sutras, it represents to us what in the course of time became of the Vedanta, when taught and discussed in the different schools of philosophy in medieval and modern India. What strikes us most in it is the mixture of Vedanta ideas with ideas borrowed chiefly, as it would seem, from Samkhya, but also from Yoga, and Nyaya sources. But here again it is difficult to decide whether such ideas were actually borrowed from these systems in their finished state, or whether they were originally common property which in later times only had become restricted to one or the other of the six systems of philosophy. In the Panchadasi, for instance, we meet with the idea of Prakriti, nature, which we are accustomed to

consider as the peculiar property of the Samkhya-system. This Prakriti is said there to be the reflection, or, as we should say, the shadow of Brahman, and to be possessed of the three Gunas or elements of goodness, passion, and darkness, or, as they are sometimes explained, of good, indifferent, and bad. This theory of the three Gunas, however, is altogether absent from the original Vedanta; at least, it is not to be met with in the purely Vedantic Upanishads, occurring for the first time in the Svetasvatara Upanishad. Again in the later Vedanta works Avidya and Maya are used synonymously, or, if distinguished from one another, they are supposed to arise respectively from the more or less pure character of their substance¹. The omniscient, but personal Isvara is there explained as a reflection of Maya, but as having subdued her, while the individual soul, Prajna or Jiva, is represented as having been subdued by Avidya, and to be multiform, owing to the variety of Avidya. The individual soul, being endowed with a causal or subtle body, believes that body to be its own, and hence error and suffering in all their variety. As to the development of the world, we are told that it was by the command of Isvara that Prakriti, when dominated by darkness, produced the elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth, all meant to be enjoyed, that is, to be experienced by the individual souls.

In all this we can hardly be mistaken if we recognise the influence of Samkhya ideas, obscuring and vitiating the monism of the Vedanta, pure and simple. In that philosophy there is no room for a Second, or for a Prakriti, nor for the three Gunas, nor for anything real by the side of Brahman.

How that influence was exercised we cannot discover, and it is possible that in ancient times already there existed this influence of one philosophical system upon the other, for we see even in some of the Upanishads a certain mixture of what we should afterwards have to call the distinctive teaching of Vedanta, Samkhya, or Yoga-philosophy. We must remember that in India the idea of

¹ I translate Sattva here by substance, for the context hardly allows that we should take it for the Guna of goodness.

private property in any philosophic truth did hardly exist. The individual, as we saw before, was of little consequence, and could never exercise the same influence which such thinkers as Socrates or Plato exercised in Greece. If the descriptions of Indian life emanating from the Indians themselves, and from other nations they came in contact with, whether Greek conquerors or Chinese pilgrims, can be trusted, we may well understand that truth, or what was taken to be truth, was treated not as private, but as common property. If there was an exchange of ideas among the Indian seekers after truth, it was far more in the nature of co-operation towards a common end, than in the assertion of any claims of originality or priority by individual teachers. That one man should write and publish his philosophical views in a book, and that another should read and criticise that book or carry on the work where it had been left, was never thought of in India in ancient times. If A. referred to B. often, as they say, from mere civility, Pujartham, B. would refer to A., but no one would ever say, as so often happens with us, that he had anticipated the discovery of another, or that some one else had stolen his ideas. Truth was not an article that, according to Hindu ideas, could ever be stolen. All that could happen and did happen was that certain opinions which had been discussed, sifted, and generally received in one Asrama, hermitage, Arama, garden, or Parishad, religious settlement, would in time be collected by its members and reduced to a more or less systematic form. What that form was in early times we may see from the Brahmanas, and more particularly from the Upanishads, i.e. *Seances*, gatherings of pupils round their teachers, or later on from the Sutras. It cannot be doubted that these Sutras presuppose, by their systematic form, a long continued intellectual labour; nay it seems to me difficult to account for their peculiar literary form except on the ground that they were meant to be learnt by heart and to be accompanied from the very beginning by a running commentary, without which they would have been perfectly unintelligible. I suggested once before that this very peculiar style of the Sutras would receive the best historical explanation, if it could be proved that they represent the first

attempts at writing for literary purposes in India. Whatever the exact date may be of the introduction of a *sinistrorsum* and *dextrorsum* alphabet for epigraphic purposes in India (and in spite of all efforts not a single inscription has as yet been discovered that can be referred with certainty to the period before Asoka, third century B.C.), every classical scholar knows that there always is a long interval between an epigraphic and a literary employment of the alphabet. People forget that a period marked by written literary compositions requires a public, and a large public, which is able to read, for where there is no demand there is no supply. Nor must we forget that the old system of a mnemonic literature, the Parampara, was invested with a kind of sacred character, and would not have been easily surrendered. The old mnemonic system was upheld by a strict discipline which formed the principal part of the established system of education in India, as has been fully described in the Pratisakhyas. They explain to us by what process, whatever existed at that time of literature, chiefly sacred, was firmly imprinted on the memory of the young. These young pupils were in fact the books, the scribes were the Gurus, the tablet was the brain. We can hardly imagine such a state of literature, and the transition from it to a written literature must have marked a new start in the intellectual life of the people at large, or at least of the educated classes. Anybody who has come in contact with the Pandits of India has been able to observe the wonderful feats that can be achieved by that mnemonic discipline even at present, though it is dying out before our eyes at the approach of printed books, nay of printed editions of their own sacred texts. I need hardly say that even if Buhler's idea of the introduction of a Semitic alphabet into India by means of commercial travellers about 800 or 1000 B.C. were more than a hypothesis, it would not prove the existence of a written literature at that time. The adaptation of a Semitic alphabet to the phonetic system as elaborated in the Pratisakhyas may date from the third, possibly from the fourth century B.C., but the use of that alphabet for inscriptions begins in the middle of the third century only; and though we cannot deny the possibility of its having been used for literary purposes

at the same time, such possibilities would form very dangerous landmarks in the chronology of Indian literature.

But whatever the origin of the peculiar Sutra-literature may have been—and I give my hypothesis as a hypothesis only—all scholars will probably agree that these Sutras could not be the work of one individual philosopher, but that we have in them the last outcome of previous centuries of thought, and the final result of the labours of numerous thinkers whose names are forgotten and will never be recovered.

Relative Age of Philosophies and Sutras

If we keep this in mind, we shall see that the question whether any of the texts of the six philosophies which we now possess should be considered as older than any other, is really a question impossible to answer. The tests for settling the relative ages of literary works, applicable to European literature, are not applicable to Indian literature. Thus, if one Greek author quotes another, we feel justified in taking the one who is quoted as the predecessor or contemporary of the one who quotes. But because Jaimini quotes Badarayana and Badarayana Jaimini, and because their systems show an acquaintance with the other five systems of philosophy, we have no right to arrange them in chronological succession. Kanada, who is acquainted with Kapila, is clearly criticised by Kapila, at least in our Kapila-Sutras. Kapila, to whom the Samkhya-Sutras are ascribed, actually adopts one of Badarayana's Sutras, IV, 1, 1, and inserts it *totidem verbis* in his own work, IV, 3. He does the same for the Yoga-Sutras I, 5 and II, 46, which occur in II, 33, III, 34, and VI, 24 in the Samkhya-Sutras which we possess. Kanada was clearly acquainted with Gotama, while Gotama attacks in turn certain doctrines of Kapila and Badarayana. It has been supposed, because Patanjali ignores all other systems, that therefore he was anterior to all of them¹. But all such conclusions, which would be perfectly legitimate in Greek and Latin literature, have no weight whatever in the literary history of India,

¹ Rajendralala Mitra, l.c., p. xviii.

because during its mnemonic period anything could be added and anything left out, before each system reached the form in which we possess it.

Age of Kapila-Sutras

The Sutras of Kapila, which have come down to us, are so little the work of the founder of that system, that it would be far safer to treat them as the last arrangement of doctrines accumulated in one philosophical school during centuries of Parampara or tradition. It is easy to see that the Yoga-philosophy presupposes a Samkhya-philosophy, but while Patanjali, the reputed author of Yoga-Sutras has been referred to the second century B.C., it is now generally admitted that our Samkhya-Sutras cannot be earlier than the fourteenth century A.D. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the six philosophies as so many channels of thought, and the Sutras which embody their teachings and have been handed down to us as the earliest documents within our reach. Yoga, as a technical term, occurs earlier than the name of any other system of philosophy. It occurs in the Taittiriya and Katha Upanishads, and is mentioned in as early an authority as the Asvalayana-Grihya-Sutras. In the Maitray. Up. VI, 10 we meet even with Yogins. But it by no means follows that the Yoga, known in those early times, was the same as what we possess in Patanjali's Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy. We look in vain in the so-called classical Upanishads for the names of either Samkhya or Vedanta, but Samkhya occurs in the compound Samkhya-Yoga in the Svetasvatara Up. VI, 13 and in several of the minor Upanishads. It should be observed that Vedanta also occurs for the first time in the same Svetasvatara VI, 22, and afterwards in the smaller Upanishads. All such indications may become valuable hereafter for chronological purposes. In the Bhagavad-gita II, 39 we meet with the Samkhya as the name of a system of philosophy and likewise as a name of its adherents, V, 5.

As to our Samkhya-Sutras their antiquity was first shaken by Dr. FitzEdward Hall. Vachaspati Misra, the author of the Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi, who, according to Professor Garbe, can be safely referred to about 1150 A.D.,

quotes not a single Sutra from our Samkhya-Sutras, but appeals to older authorities only, such as Panchasikha, Varshaganya, and the Rajavartika. Even Madhava about 1350 A.D., who evidently knew the Sutras of the other systems, never quotes from our Samkhya-Sutras; and why not, if they had been in existence in his time?

But we must not go too far. It by no means follows that every one of the Sutras which we possess in the body of the Samkhya-Sutras, and the composition of which is assigned by Balasastrin to so late a period as the sixteenth century, is of that modern date. He declares that they were all composed by the well-known Vijnana-Bhikshu who, as was then the fashion, wrote also a commentary on them. It is quite possible that our Samkhya-Sutras may only be what we should call the latest recension of the old Sutras. We know that in India the oral tradition of certain texts, as, for instance, the Sutras of Panini, was interrupted for a time and then restored again, whether from scattered MSS., or from the recollection of less forgetful or forgotten individuals. If that was the case, as we know, with so voluminous a work as the Mahabhashya, why should not certain portions of the Samkhya-Sutras have been preserved here and there, and have been added to or remodelled from time to time, till they meet us at last in their final form, at so late a date as the fourteenth or even the sixteenth century? It was no doubt a great shock to those who stood up for the great antiquity of Indian philosophy, to have to confess that a work for which a most remote date had always been claimed, may not be older than the time of Des Cartes, at least in that final literary form in which it has reached us. But if we consider the circumstances of the case, it is more than possible that our Sutras of the Samkhya-philosophy contain some of the most ancient as well as the most modern Sutras, the utterances of Kapila, Asuri, Panchasikha and Varshaganya, as well as those of Isvara-Krishna and even of Vijnana-Bhikshu.

Samkhya-karikas

But if we must accept so very modern a date for our Kapila-Sutras, we are fortunate in being able to assign a much earlier and much more settled date to another work which

for centuries seems to have formed the recognised authority for the followers of the Samkhya in India, the so-called Samkhya-karikas or the sixty-nine or seventy *Versus memoriales* of Isvara-Krishna (with three supplementary ones, equally ascribed to that author). That these Karikas are older than our Sutras could easily be proved by passages occurring among the Sutras, which are almost literally taken from the Karikas¹.

Alberuni, who wrote his account of India in the first half of the eleventh century, was well acquainted not only with Isvara-Krishna's work, but likewise, as has been shown, with Gaudapada's commentary on it². Nay, we can even make another step backward. For the Samkhya-karikas exist in a Chinese translation also, made by Kan-ti (lit. true truth), possibly Paramartha, a Tripitaka law-teacher of the Khan dynasty, A.D., 557 to 589 (not 583). Paramartha came to China in about 547 A.D. in the reign of the Emperor Wu-ti of the Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 502 to 557 A.D.³, and was followed by the Khan dynasty. He lived till 582 A.D.; and there are no less than twenty-eight of his translations now in existence, that of the *Suvarna-Saptati-sastra* being the twenty-seventh (No. 1,300 in B. Nanjio's Catalogue). The name given to it in Chinese, 'the Golden Seventy Discourse,' is supposed to refer to the number of verses in the Karika. Kan-ti was not considered a good Chinese scholar, and his translation of the *Abhidharma-Koshasastra*, for instance, had in consequence to be replaced by a new translation by Hienuen-thsang.

But though we are thus enabled to assign the Samkhya-karika to the sixth century A.D., it by no means follows that this work itself did not exist before that time. Indian tradition, we are told, assigns his work to the first century B.C.

Date of Gaudapada

But even here new difficulties arise with regard to the age of Gaudapada, the author of the commentary on the Karikas.

¹ See Hall, *Samkhya-Sara*, p. 12; Deussen, *Vedanta*, p. 361.

² Garbe, *Samkhya und Yoga*, p. 7.

³ See Mayer's *Chinese Reader's Manual*, which gives the exact dates.

This commentary also, so we were informed by Beal, had been translated into Chinese before 582 A.D.; but how is that possible without upsetting the little we know of Gaudapada's date? Samkara is represented as the pupil of Govinda who was the pupil of Gaudapada. But Samkara's literary career began, as is generally supposed, about 788 A.D. How then could he have been the literary grandson of Gaudapada, and son or pupil of Govinda? As Mr. Beal could no longer be consulted I asked one of my Chinese pupils, the late Mr. Kasawara, to translate portions of the Chinese commentary for me; but the specimens he sent me did not suffice to settle the question whether it was really a translation of Gaudapada's commentary. It is but right to state here that Telang in the *Indian Antiquary*, XIII, 95, places Samkara much earlier, in 590 A.D., and that Fleet, in the *Indian Antiquary*, Jan., 1887, assigns 630 to 655 as the latest date to King Vrishadeva of Nepal who is said to have received Samkara at his court, and actually to have given the name of Samkaradeva to his son in honour of the philosopher. In order to escape from all these uncertainties I wrote once more to Japan to another pupil of mine, Dr. Takakusu, and he, after carefully collating the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit commentary of Gaudapada, informed me that the Chinese translation of the commentary was not, and could not in any sense be called, a translation of Gaudapada's commentary. So much trouble may be caused by one unguarded expression! Anyhow this difficulty is now removed, and Samkara's date need not be disturbed. The author of the *Karikas* informs us at the end of his work that this philosophy, proclaimed by the greatest sage, i.e. Kapila, had been communicated by him to Asuri, by Asuri to Panchasikha, and, as the *Tattva-samasa* adds, from Panchasikha to Patanjali¹, and had been widely taught until, by an uninterrupted series of teachers, it reached even Isvara-Krishna². He calls it the *Shashti-tantra*, the Sixty-doctrine. A similar account is given by Paramartha in his comment on the first verse, 'Kipila (Kapila),' he says, 'was a Rishi descended from the sky

¹ This would seem to place the *Tattva-samasa* later than Patanjali.

² See *Karika*, vv. 70, 71.

and was endowed with the four virtues, dutifulness (Dharma), wisdom (Prajna), separation from desires (Vairagya), and freedom (Moksha). He saw a Brahman of the name of O-shu-li (Asuri) who had been worshipping heaven or the Devas for a thousand years, and said to him: "O Asuri, art thou satisfied with the state of a Grihastha or householder?" After a thousand years he came again, and Asuri admitted that he was satisfied with the state of a Grihastha. He then came a third time to Asuri, whereupon Asuri quitted the state of a householder and became a pupil of Kapila.' These may be mere additions made by Paramartha, but they show, at all events, that to him also Kapila and Asuri were persons of a distant past.

Tattva-samasa

But however far the Karikas of Isvara-Krishna may go back, they are what they are, a metrical work in the style of a later age, an age that gave rise to other Karikas like Bhartrihari's (about 650 A.D.) Karikas on grammar. Everybody has wondered, therefore, what could have become of the real Samkhya-Sutras, if they ever existed; or, if they did not, why there should never have been such Sutras for so important a system of philosophy as the Samkhya. There is clearly a great gap between the end of the Upanishad period and the literary period that was able to give rise to the metrical work of Isvara-Krishna. In what form could the Samkhya-philosophy have existed in that interval?

To judge from analogy we should certainly say, in the form of Sutras, such as were handed down for other branches of learning by oral tradition. The Karikas themselves presuppose such a tradition quite as much as the much later Sutras which we possess. They are both meant to recapitulate what existed, never to originate what we should call new and original thoughts. When we see the Karikas declare that they leave out on purpose the Akhyayikas, the illustrative stories contained in the fourth book of our Sutras, this cannot prove their posteriority to the Sutras as we have them; but it shows that at Isvara-Krishna's time there existed a body of Samkhya-philosophy which contained such stories as we find in our modern

Sutras, but neither in the Karikas nor in the Tattva-samasa. Besides these stories other things also were omitted by Isvara-Krishna, comprehended under the name of Paravada, probably controversies, such as those on the necessity of an Isvara.

Under these circumstances I venture to say that such a work in Sutras not only existed, but that we are in actual possession of it, namely in the text of the much neglected Tattva-samasa. Because it contains a number of new technical terms, it has been put down at once as modern, as if what is new to us must be new chronologically also. We know far too little of the history of the Samkhya to justify so confident a conclusion. Colebrooke¹ told us long ago that, if the scholiast of Kapila² may be trusted, and why should he not? the Tattva-samasa was the proper text-book of the Samkhya-philosophy. It was a mere accident that he, Colebrooke, could not find a copy of it. 'Whether that Tattva-samasa of Kapila be extant,' he wrote, 'or whether the Sutras of Panchasikha be so, is not certain.' And again he wrote: 'It appears from the Preface of the Kapila-bhashya that a more compendious tract in the form of Sutras or aphorisms, bears the title of Tattva-samasa, and is ascribed to the same author, i.e. to Kapila.

I admit that the introductory portion of this tract sounds modern, and probably is so, but I find no other marks of a modern date in the body of the work. On the contrary there are several indications in it of its being an earlier form of the Samkhya-philosophy than what we possess in the Karikas or in the Sutras. When it agrees with the Karikas, sometimes almost verbatim, it is the metrical text that seems to me to presuppose the prose, not the prose the metrical version. In the Sutras themselves we find no allusion as yet to the atheistic or non-theistic doctrines which distinguish the later texts of the Samkhya, and which are still absent from the Samkhya-karikas also. The so-called Aisvaryas or superhuman powers, which are recognised in the Tattva-samasa, might seem to presuppose

¹ Essays, I, p. 244.

² Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya, pp. 7, 110.

the recognition of an Isvara, though this is very doubtful; but the direct identification of Purusha with Brahman in the Tattva-samasa points certainly to an earlier and less pronounced Nirisvara or Lord-less character of the ancient Samkhya. It should also be mentioned that Vijnana-Bhikshu, no mean authority on such matters, and even supposed by some to have been himself the author of our modern Samkhya-Sutras, takes it for granted that the Tattva-samasa was certainly prior to the Kapila-Sutras which we possess. For why should he defend Kapila, and not the author of the Tattva-samasa, against the charge of Punarukti or giving us a mere useless repetition, and why should he have found no excuse for the existence of the Kapila-Sutras except that they are short and complete, while the Tattva-samasa is short and compact¹?

Not being able to find a MS. of the Tattva-samasa Colebrooke decided to translate instead the Samkhya-karikas, and thus it came to pass that most scholars have been under the impression that in India also this metrical version was considered as the most authoritative and most popular manual of the Samkhya-philosophy. This is the way in which certain prepossessions arise. We have learnt since from Ballantyne² that at Benares, where he resided, these Karikas were hardly known at all except to those who had seen Professor Wilson's English edition of them, while the Tattva-samasa was well known to all the Indian assistants whom he employed. Nor can we doubt that in the part of India best known to Ballantyne it was really an important and popular work, if we consider the number of commentaries written on it³, and the frequency of allusions to it which occur in other commentaries. The commentary published by Ballantyne is, if I understand him rightly, anonymous. It gives first what it calls the Samkhya-Sutrani, and then the Samasakhya-sutra-vrittih. Hall, l. c., p. 13, quotes one commentary by Kshemananda, called Samkhya-kramadipika, but it is not quite clear to

¹ Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya, Introduction.

² Drift of the Samkhya, p. 1.

³ Five are mentioned by Hall in his Preface, p. 33.

me whether this is the same as the one published by Ballantyne, nor have I had access to any other MSS.

We must not forget that in modern times the Samkhya-philosophy has ceased to be popular in several parts of India. Even in the sixteenth century Vijnana-Bhikshu, in his commentary on the Samkhya-Sutras (v. 5), complains that it has been swallowed up by the sun of the time, and that but a small part of the moon of knowledge remained; while in the Bhagavata Purana I, 3, 10, the Samkhya is spoken of as Kala-vipluta, destroyed by time. Professor Wilson told me that, during the whole of his intercourse with learned Indians, he met with one Brahman only who professed to be acquainted with the writings of this philosophical school, and Professor Bhandarkar (l. c., p. 3) states that the very name of Samkhya-pravachana was unknown on his side of India. Hence we may well understand that Samkhya MSS. are scarce in India, and entirely absent in certain localities. It is possible also that the very smallness of the Tattva-samasa may have lowered it in the eyes of Indian scholars, and that in time it may have been eclipsed by its more voluminous commentaries. But if we accept it as what it professes to be, and what, up to the time of Vijnana-Bhikshu at least, it was considered to be in India, it seems to me just the book that was wanted to fill the gap to which I referred before. By itself it would fill a few pages only. In fact it is a mere enumeration of topics, and, as such, it would agree very well with the somewhat puzzling name of Samkhya, which means no more than enumeration. All other derivations of this title seem far-fetched¹ as compared with this. According to Vijnana-Bhikshu in his commentary on the Sutras (pp. 6, 110, ed. Hall), both the Samkhya-Sutras and the Yoga-Sutras are really mere developments of the Tattva-samasa-Sutras. Both are called therefore Samkhya-pravachana, exposition of the Samkhya, the latter adding the peculiar arguments in support of the existence of an Isvara or

¹ They are mentioned in the Preface to Hall's edition of the Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya, 1856. Some of them are mere definitions without any attempt at etymology.

Supreme Lord, and therefore called Sesvara, in opposition to the Samkhya, which is called An-isvara, or Lord-less.

And here it is important to remark also that the name of Shashti-tantra, the Doctrine of the Sixty, which is given by Isvara-Krishna, or at all events by the author of the 72nd of his Karikas, should occur and be accounted for in the Tattva-samasa, as containing the 17 (enumerated in 64 and 65), and the 33, previously exhibited in 62 and 63, together with the 10 Mulikarthas or fundamental facts which together would make up the sixty topics of the Shashti-tantra. At the end of the 25 great topics of the Tattva-samasa we find the straightforward declaration : 'Iti tattva-samasakhya-samkhya-sutrani,' Here end the Samkhya-Sutras called Tattva-samasa.

At first sight, no doubt, Samasa seems to mean a mere abstract ; but Samasa may be used also in opposition to Brihat, and there is no other work in existence of which it could be called an abstract, certainly not either of the Karikas or of the modern Sutras, such as we possess them. The whole arrangement is different from the other and more recent treatments of Samkhya-philosophy. The three kinds of pain, for instance, which generally form the starting-point of the whole system, are relegated to the very end as a separate topic. We meet with technical subjects and technical terms which are not to be found at all in other and, as it would seem, more modern Samkhya works. The smallness of the Tattva-samasa can hardly be used as an argument against its ever having been an important work, for we find similar short, yet old Sutra-works, for instance, the Sarvanukrama and other Anukramanis described in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature¹. However, in matters of this kind we must avoid being too positive either in denying or asserting the age and authenticity of Sanskrit texts. All I can say is that there is no mark of modern age in their language, though the commentary is, no doubt, of a later date. What weighs with me is the fact that Indian Pandits evidently con-

¹ These Anukramas have been very carefully published in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia* by Professor Macdonell, to whom I had handed over my materials.

sidered the Tattva-samasa-Sutras as the original outlines of the Samkhya-philosophy, while the idea that they are a later spurious production rests, as far as I can see at present, on no real argument whatever.

Anteriority of Vedanta or Samkhya

It must be clear from all this how useless it would be, with the limited means at our disposal, to attempt to prove the anteriority either of the Vedanta or of the Samkhya, as systems of philosophy, and as distinguished from the Sutras in which we possess them. External or historical evidence we have none, and internal evidence, though it may support a suggestion, can but seldom amount to positive proof. We can understand how, out of the seeds scattered about in the Upanishads, there could arise in time the systematic arrangement and final representation of systems such as have been handed down to us in the Sutras of the Vedanta, the Samkhya, and the other schools. It cannot be denied that in the Upanishad period Vedantic ideas are certainly more prevalent than those of the Samkhya. I go even a step further and admit that the Samkhya-philosophy may have been a kind of toning down of the extreme Monism of the Advaita Vedanta. I think we can enter into the misgivings and fears of those who felt startled by the unflinching Monism of the Vedanta, at least as interpreted by the school which was represented rather than founded by Samkara. Now, the two points which are most likely to have caused difficulty or given offence to ordinary consciences, would seem to have been the total denial of what is meant by the reality of the objective world, and the required surrender of all individuality on the part of the subject, that is, of ourselves. These are the points which seem most startling even to ourselves, and it is quite possible that they may have given rise to another system free from these startling doctrines, such as we find in the Samkhya. They certainly formed the chief stumbling-block to Ramanuja and those who had come before him, such as Bodhayana and other Purvacharyas, and led them to propound their own more human interpretation of the Vedanta, though sacrificing the Isvara in order to save the reality of each Purusha.

These conflicting views of the world, of the soul, and of God, emerge already in the Upanishads; and in a few of them, the Svetasvatara, Maitray., and Katha Upanishads, for instance, there are utterances that come very near to what we know as Samkhya rather than Vedanta doctrines. Vedanta ideas preponderate, however, so decidedly in the Upanishad literature, that we can well understand that in the oral tradition of the schools the Samkhya doctrines should have exercised a limited influence only, whatever favour they may have found with those who were repelled by the extreme views of the monistic Vedanta. The followers of Kapila had an advantage over the Vedantists in admitting a Prakriti, or a something objective, independent of Brahman or Purusha, though called into life and activity by the look of Purusha only, and disappearing when that look ceased. They were also less opposed to the common consciousness of mankind in admitting the reality of individual souls. Dualism is always more popular than rigorous Monism, and the Samkhya was clearly dualistic when it postulated nature, not only as the result of Avidya or Maya, but as something real in the ordinary sense of that word, and when it allowed to the individual souls or Jivas also an independent character. It should be remembered that the denial of an Isvara or personal Lord did not probably form part of the original Samkhya, as presented to us in the Tattva-samasa. It would seem therefore that on these very important points the Samkhya was more conciliatory and less defiant to the common sense of mankind than the Vedanta, and though this is far from proving that it was therefore posterior to the Vedanta in its severest form, it might well be accepted as an indication that these two streams of thought followed parallel courses, starting from a common fund of ancient Vedic thoughts, but diverging afterwards, the Vedanta unflinchingly following its straight course, the other, the Samkhya, avoiding certain whirlpools of thought which seemed dangerous to the ordinary swimmer. To the people at large it would naturally seem as if the Vedanta taught the oneness of all individual souls or subjects in Brahman, and the illusory character of all that is objective, while the Samkhya allowed at all events the temporary reality of the objective

world and the multiplicity of individual souls. Of course, we must leave it an open question for the present whether the extreme monistic view of the Veda was due to Samkara, or whether, like Ramanuja, he also could claim the authority of Purvacharyas in his interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras. If that were so, the difference between the two systems would certainly seem to be irreconcilable, while minor differences between them would in India at least admit of a friendly adjustment.

Atheism and Orthodoxy

EVEN on what seems to us so vital a point in every philosophy as theism or atheism, Indian philosophers seem to have been able to come to an understanding and a compromise. We must remember that in the eyes of the Brahmans the Samkhya is atheistic and yet orthodox. This seems to us impossible ; but the fact is that orthodoxy has a very different meaning in India from what it has with us. What we mean by orthodoxy was with them not much more than a recognition of the supreme authority of the Veda. The Samkhya, whatever we may think of its Vedic character, never denies the authority of the Veda in so many words, though it may express a less decided submission to it. Whether in its origin the Samkhya was quite independent of the Veda, is difficult to say. Some scholars think that the recognition of the supreme authority of the Sruti was an afterthought with Kapila, a mere stroke of theological diplomacy. But if so, we should be forced to admit that the Samkhya philosophers wished, by means of this diplomacy, to be raised to the same position which others, such as the Vedantists, had occupied before them ; and so far it might seem to indicate the posteriority of the Samkhya, as a system of philosophy.

It is important here to remember that the Samkhya not only declared for the authority of the Veda, but had never openly rejected it, like Brihaspati or Buddha. It is quite another question whether it really carried out the spirit of the Veda, particularly of the Upanishads. That Samkara, the great defender of Vedantism, should deny the correctness of the interpretation of the Veda, adopted by Kapila, proves after all no more than that a difference of opinion

existed between the two, but it would show at the same time that Kapila, as well as Samkara, had tried to represent his philosophy as supported by passages from the Veda. To judge from a passage in the beginning of the Samkhya-karikas it might seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy above the Veda. But he really says no more there than that certain remedies for the removal of pain, enjoined by the Veda, are good, and that other remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good ; but that of the two the latter are better, that is, more efficacious (Tattva Kaumudi, v. 2). This does not affect the authority of the Veda as a whole, as compared with philosophy or human knowledge. We must not forget that after all it is Sruti or revelation itself which declares that all remedies are palliative only, and that real freedom (Moksha) from all suffering can be derived from philosophical knowledge only, and that this is incomparably higher than sacrifices or other meritorious acts (Samkhya-pravachana I, 5).

Authority of the Veda

WHAT authority Kapila assigns to the Veda may be gathered from what he says about the three possible sources of knowledge, perception, inference, and Aptavachana, that is the received, correct, or true word, or, it may be, the word of a trustworthy person. He explains Aptavachana in v. 5 by Aptasruti, which clearly means received revelation or revelation from a trustworthy source. However the commentators may differ, Sruti can here mean the Veda only, though, no doubt, the Veda as interpreted by Kapila. And that the Veda is not only considered as equal to sensuous perception and inference, but is placed by him on an even higher pedestal, is shown by the fact that Kapila (Sutras V, 51) declares it to be self-evident, Svatah-pramanam, while perception and inference are not, but are admitted to be liable to error and to require confirmation.

Though it is true, therefore, that with the true Samkhya philosopher the Veda does not possess that superhuman authority which is ascribed to it by Badarayana, I cannot bring myself to believe that this concession on the part of Kapila was a mere artifice to escape the fate which, for instance, befell Buddha. There are many passages where

Kapila appeals quite naturally to Sruti or revelation. In I, 36 he appeals to both Sruti and Nyaya, reasoning, but in many places he appeals to Sruti alone. That revelation is to be looked upon as superior to experience or sensuous perception is stated by him in so many words in I, 147, where we read 'There is no denial of what is established by Sruti.' Again, when the Nyaya philosophy tries to establish by reasoning that the organs of sense are formed of the elements, Kapila squashes the whole argument by a simple appeal to Sruti. 'They cannot be so formed,' he says, 'because Sruti says that they are formed of Ahamkara, self-consciousness (II, 20)¹.'

Other passages where the authority of Sruti is invoked as paramount by Kapila, or supposed to be so by the commentator, may be found in Samkhya-Sutras I, 36 ; 77 ; 83 ; 147 ; 154 ; II, 20 ; 22 ; III, 15 ; 80 ; IV, 22 ; &c.

Samkhya hostile to Priesthood

THERE is one passage only in which a decidedly hostile feeling towards the Brahmanic priesthood may be discovered in Kapila's Sutras, and it seems full of meaning. Among the different kinds of bondage to which men are liable, but ought not to be, is one called Dakshina-bandha, bondage arising from having to offer gifts to priests, which seems to be condemned as superstitious and mischievous². As springing from the great mass of philosophic thought accumulated in the Upanishads, the Samkhya, like the Vedānta-philosophy, was probably at first considered as neither orthodox nor unorthodox. It was simply one out of many attempts to solve the riddle of the world, and even the fact that it did not appeal to a personal Lord or creator, was evidently at first not considered sufficient to anathematise it as unorthodox or un-Vedic. It was probably at a much later time when the Vedānta and other systems had already entrenched themselves behind revelation, or the Veda, as the highest authority even on philosophical questions, that other systems, having been proved un-Vedic, came to be considered as objectionable or unor-

¹ But are not the elements mere Vikaras of Ahamkara ?

² See Tattva-samasa 22 ; Samkhya-karikas 44.

thodox, while the Vedanta, as its very name implied, was safe under the shadow of the Veda. I know that other scholars maintain that with the Samkhya any appeal to the Veda was an afterthought only, and not an essential part of the original system, nay, not even quite honest. We may admit that the Samkhya has no need of the Veda, but why should it appeal to it even on indifferent questions, if the Veda had not been considered by it as of supreme authority? It is possible that there may have been originally a difference between Sruti, revelation as not human, and Aptavachana, authoritative tradition as human, and that with Kapila the Veda was treated at first as coming under Aptavachana. But however this may be, unless our conception of the development of Indian philosophy, as we catch glimpses of it now and then in the course of centuries, is entirely wrong, it must be clear that, in the present state of our knowledge, to call one channel of philosophic thought, whether Samkhya or Vedanta, in the form in which it has reached us, more ancient than the other, would be mere playing with words.

Parallel development of Philosophical Systems

THE result of this desire to fix dates, where dates are impossible, has often proved most mischievous. Scholars of recognised authority have arrived at and given expression to convictions, not only widely different, but diametrically opposed to each other. The chief cause of this confusion has been that by a very natural tendency, we always wish to arrange things *Nacheinander* or in causal connection, instead of being satisfied with taking things as *Nebeneinander*, parallel and formed under similar conditions, springing from a common source and flowing on side by side in the same direction.

A reference to the history of language may make my meaning clearer. No one would say that Greek was older than Latin. Greek has some forms more primitive than Latin, but Latin also has some forms more primitive than Greek. It is true that we know literary productions in Greek at a much earlier time than literary productions in Latin, nor would any Sanskrit scholar, deny that the Sutras of Badarayana are older than the Samkhya-Sutras,

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as we now possess the two. But for all that, Greek, as a language, cannot be a day older than Latin. Both branched off, slowly it may be and almost imperceptibly at first, from the time when the Aryan separation took place. In their embryonic form they both go back to some indefinite date, far beyond the limits of any chronology. In India we may learn how, like language, religion, and mythology, philosophy also formed at first a kind of common property. We meet with philosophical ideas of a Vedantic character, though as yet in a very undecided form, as far back as the hymns of the Rig-veda; they meet us again in the Brahmanas and in some of the Upanishads, while the Samkhya ideas stand out less prominently, owing, it would seem, to the ascendancy gained at that early period already by the Vedanta. Instead of supposing, however, that passages in support of Samkhya ideas occurring in certain of the older Upanishads were foisted in at a later time, it seems far more probable to me that they were survivals of an earlier period of as yet undifferentiated philosophical thought.

Buddhism subsequent to Upanishads

WHAT remains of the chronological framework of Indian philosophy is in the end not much more than that both Vedanta and Samkhya ideas existed before the rise of historical Buddhism. The very name of Upanishad, for instance, is so peculiar that its occurrence in ancient Buddhist texts proves once for all the existence of some of these works before the rise of Buddhism.

The recognition of mendicant friars also, as a social institution, seems to me simply taken over from the Brahmans. The very name of Bhikkhu, applied to the members of the Buddhist fraternity, comes from the same source. It is true, no doubt, that the name of Bhikshu does not occur in the classical Upanishads, but the right of begging, whether in the first or the third of the Asramas (Brahmacharin or Vanaprastha), is fully recognised, only that the third and fourth Asramas are not so clearly distinguished in early times as they are in Manu and afterwards. In the Kaush. Up. II, 2 we read of a man who has begged through a village and got nothing (Bhikshitva); in the Chhand. Up. IV,

3, 5, a Brahmacharin is mentioned who has begged. The technical term for this begging is Bhikshacharya in the Brih. Ar. Up. III (V), 5, 1, and exactly the same compound, Bhikchhacharya, occurs in the Dhammapada 392; Bhaikshacharya occurs also in the Mundaka I, 2, 11, so that the fact that the substantive Bhikshu does not occur in the classical Upanishads can hardly be used as an argument to prove that the status of the mendicant friar was not known before the spreading of Buddhism. It is true that in its social meaning Asrama, the name of the three or four stages, does not occur in the classical Upanishads; but, as we find Asramin in the Maitray. Up. IV, 3, we can hardly doubt that the three or four stages (Brahmachari, Gahattho, Vanapattho, Bhikkhu) were known before the rise of Buddhism, and taken over by the Buddhists from the Vedic Brahmans. Socially, the only Asramas that remained among the Buddhists were two, that of the Grihins and that of the Bhikkhus.

That many of the technical terms of the Buddhists (Upashadha, &c.) could have come from the same source only, has long been known, so much so that it has been rightly said, Without Brahmanism no Buddhism.

The institution of the Vasso¹, for instance, the retreat during the rainy season, is clearly taken over from the Varshas, the rainy season, as kept by the Brahmans, and so is the quinquennial celebration of the Panchavarsha-parishad, and many other customs adopted by the Buddhists.

Lalita-vistara

I have explained before why at present I attribute less importance than I did formerly to the occurrence of a number of titles, including Samkhya, Yoga, Vaiseshika, and possibly Nyaya, in the Lalita-vistara. If the date assigned by Stanislas Julien and others to certain Chinese translations of this work could be re-established, the passage so often quoted from the twelfth chapter would be of considerable value to us in forming an idea of Indian literature as it existed at the time when the Lalita-vistara was originally composed. We find here the names not only of the Vedic glossary (Nighantu?) the Nigamas (part of Nirukta),

¹ S.B.E., vol. viii, p. 213.

Puranas, Itihasas, Vedas, grammar, Nirukta, Siksha, Chandas, ritual (Kalpa), astronomy (Jyotisha), but, what would be most important for us, the names of three systems of philosophy also, Samkhya, Yoga, and Vaiseshika, while Hetuvidya can hardly be meant for anything but Nyaya. But until the dates of the various Chinese translations of the Life of Buddha have been re-examined, we must abstain from using them for assigning any dates to their Sanskrit originals.

Asvaghosha's Buddha-charita

WE may perhaps place more reliance on Asvaghosha's Buddha-charita, which, with great probability, has been ascribed to the first century A.D. He mentions Vyasa, the son of Sarasvati, as the compiler of the Veda, though not of the Vedanta-Sutras; he knows Valmiki, the author of the Ramayana, Atreya as a teacher of medicine, and Janaka, the well-known king, as a teacher of Yoga. By far the most important passage in it for our present purpose is the conversation between Arada and the future Buddha, here already called Bodhisattva in the twelfth book. This Arada is clearly a teacher of Samkhya-philosophy, it may be of Samkhya in an earlier state; and, though the name of Samkhya does not occur, the name of Kapila does (XII, 21), and even a disciple of his is mentioned. Here then we have in a poem, ascribed to the first century A.D., a clear reference to that philosophical system which is known to us under the name of Samkhya, and we have actually the name of Kapila, the reputed author of that system. The name of Kapila-vastu¹ also occurs, as the birthplace of Buddha and as the dwelling of the famous sage Kapila. No reference to the Vedanta has been met with in Asvaghosha's Buddha-charita, though the substitution of the Vedantic name of Brahman for the Samkhya name of Purusha deserves attention.

Buddhist Suttas

IF we consult the Buddhist Suttas, which, whatever the

¹ I write Vâstu, because that alone means dwelling-place, while Vastu means thing. Vastu became Vatthu in Pali, and was then probably retranslated into Sanskrit as Vastu.

date of their original composition may have been, were at all events reduced to writing in the first century B.C., and may be safely used therefore as historical evidence for that time, we find there also views ascribed to the Brahmans of Buddha's time which clearly breathe the spirit of the Samkhya-philosophy. But it would be very unsafe to say more, and to maintain that such passages prove in any way the existence of fully developed systems of philosophy, or of anything very different from what we find already in certain Upanishads. All we can say is that there are a number of terms in the Suttas which are the very terms used in Vedanta, Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies, such as Atman, Sasvata, Nitya (?Anitya), Akshobhya, Brahman, Isvara, Dharma, Parinama, and many more; but, so far as I know, there is not one of which we could say that it could have been taken from the Sutras only, and from nowhere else.

We should remember that in the Buddhist Canon we find constant mention of Titthiyas or Tirthakas and their heretical systems of philosophy. Six contemporaries of Buddha are mentioned, one of them, Nigantho Nataputta, being the well-known founder of Jainism, Purana Kassapa, Makkhali, Ajita, Pakudha and Sanjaya¹. Nor are the names of the reputed authors of the six systems of Brahmanic-philosophy absent from the Tripitaka. But we hear nothing of any literary compositions ascribed to Badarayana, Jaimini, Kapila, Patanjali, Gotama or Kanada. Some of these names occur in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts also, such as the Lankavatara where the names of Kanada, Kapila, Akshapada, Brihaspati are met with, but again not a single specimen or extract from their compositions.

Asvalayana's Grihya-Sutras

Another help for determining the existence of ancient Sutras and Bhashyas may be found in the Grihya-Sutras of Asvalayana and Samkhayana, works belonging to the age of Vedic literature, though it may be to the very end of what I call the Sutra-period. Here, as I pointed out in

¹ Samanna-Phala-Sutta 3.

1859 in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, we find not only the Rig-veda with all its subdivisions, but such names as Sumantu, Jaimini, Vaisampayana, Paila, Sutrās, Bhashyas, Bharata¹, Mahabharata, teachers of the law, Jananti, Bahavi, Gargya, Gautama, Sakalya, Babhravya, Mandavya, Mandukeya, Gargi Vachaknavi, Vadava Prati-theyi, Sulabha Maitreyi, Kahola Kaushitaka, Mahakaushitaka, Paimgya, Mahapaimgya, Suyajna Samkhayana, Aitareya, Mahaitareya, the Sakala (text), the Bashkala (text), Sujatavaktra, Audavahi, Mahaudavahi, Saujami, Saunaka, Asvalayana. The Samkhayana Grihya-Sutras IV, 10, give the same list, though leaving out a few names and adding others. The most valuable part in both sets of Grihya-Sutras is their testifying at that early and probably pre-Buddhistic time, not only to the existence of Sutras, but of Bhashyas or commentaries also, without which, as I said before, neither the philosophical, nor the grammatical, nor any other Sutras would ever have been intelligible, or even possible.

Did Buddha borrow from Kapila?

I may seem very sceptical in all this, but I cannot even now bring myself to believe that the author of Buddhism borrowed from the Samkhya or any other definite system of philosophy, as known to us in its final Sutra form, in the sense which we ourselves assign to borrowing. Buddha, it seems to me, had as much right to many of the so-called Samkhya or Vedanta ideas as Kapila or anybody else. Who would say, for instance, that his belief in Samsara or migration of souls was borrowed from Badarayana or Kapila? It belonged to everybody in India as much as a belief in Karman or the continuous working of deeds. In the great dearth of historical dates it may no doubt be excusable, if we lay hold of anything to save us from drowning while exploring the chronology of Indian literature. Our difficulties are very great, for even when the

¹ How careful we must be, we may learn from the fact that instead of Bharata and Mahabharata, other MSS. read Bharatadharmacharyas; while in the Samkhayana Grihya-Sutras IV, 10, 4, Bharata, Mahabharata and Dharmacharyas are left out altogether.

names of the principal systems of philosophy and the names of their reputed authors are mentioned, how do we know that they refer to anything written that we possess? Unless we meet with *verbatim* quotations, we can never know whether a certain book of a certain author is intended, or simply the general Parampara, that is, the tradition, as handed down in various Asramas, two things which should be carefully distinguished.

It is strange to see how often our hopes have been roused and disappointed. We were told that in Professor Hardy's most valuable edition¹ of the Anguttara a number of philosophical sects were mentioned which existed at the time of Buddha's appearance, such as (1) Ajivakas, (2) Niganthas, (3) Mundasavakas, (4) Jatilakas, (5) Paribbajakas, (6) Magandikas, (7) Tedandikas, (8) Aviruddhakas, (9) Gotamakas, and (10) Devadhammikas. But not one of these names helps us to a real chronological date. Ajivakas and Niganthas are the names of Jaina ascetics, the latter belonging to the Digambara sects, which could hardly have been established long before Buddha's appearance, while Mundasavakas, i.e. pupils of the shaveling, the Buddha, and Gotamakas would seem to be schools which owed their existence to Buddha himself. The other names Jatilakas, ascetics, Paribbajakas, religious mendicants, Tedandikas, i.e. Samnyasins carrying the three staves, would be applicable both to Brahmanic and Buddhist sects. Magandikas, if meant for Magadhikas, people of Magadha, would be Buddhists again. Aviruddhakas, a name not clear to me, may have been intended for ascetics no longer impeded by any desires, while Devadhammikas are clearly worshippers of the ancient national Devas, and therefore Brahmanic, and possibly Vedic. We get no historical dates from the names of any of these schools, if schools they were. All they teach is that at the time Brahmanic and Buddhist sects were existing side by side in large numbers, but by no means, as is commonly supposed, in constant conflict with each other². Of the six recognised systems of philosophy, of their

¹ The Pali Text Society, vol. iii, p. 276.

² Cf. Rhys Davids, J. R. A. S., Jan., 1898, p. 197.

eponymous heroes or their written works, we do not hear a single word.

Bana's Harshacharita

Not even in later works, which have been referred to the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries A.D., do we meet with actual quotations from our Sutras of the six Darsanas. Bana, in his Life of King Harsha, knows indeed of Aupanishadas, Kapilas, Kanadas; and if the Kapilas are the followers of the Samkhya, Kanadas the followers of the Vaiseshika school, the Aupanishadas can hardly be meant for anybody but the Vedantins. Varaha-Mihira also, in the sixth century A.D., mentions Kapila and Kanabhuj (Vaiseshika), but even this does not help us to the dates of any Sutras composed by them.

The Chinese translator of the Karikas, likewise in the sixth century, informs us that these Karikas contain the words of Kapila or of Panchasikha, the pupil of Asuri, who was the pupil of Kapila. We are told even that there were originally 60,000 Gathas, and all that Isvara-Krishna did was to select seventy of them for his seventy or seventy-two Karikas.

That Madhava (1350 A.D.), while mentioning the Sutras of the other systems, should not have mentioned those of the Samkhya, is no doubt, as I pointed out before, a strong argument in support of their non-existence in his time. But it is no proof, as little as we may conclude from the fact that Hiouen-thsang translated the Vaiseshika-nikaya-dasapadārtha-sastra by Gnanachandra, and not the Vaiseshika-Sutras by Kanada, that therefore these Sutras did not exist in his time. We cannot be too careful in such matters, for the unreserved acceptance of a purely conjectural date is very apt to interfere with the discovery of a real date. Hiouen-thsang likewise mentions a number of Nyaya works, but not Gotama's Nyaya-Sutras. Does that prove that Gotama's Sutras were unknown in the seventh century? It may or may not. He relates that Gunamati defeated a famous Samkhya philosopher of the name of Madhava, but again he tells us no more. His own special study, as is well known, was the Yoga-philosophy. And here again, though he speaks of a number of Yoga works, he says not

a word of the most important of them all, the Sutras of Patanjali¹. Yet I doubt whether we may conclude from this that these Sutras did not exist at his time.

The Tattva-samasa

If then I venture to call the Tattva-samasa the oldest record that has reached us of the Samkhya-philosophy, and if I prefer to follow them in the account I give of that philosophy, I am quite aware that many scholars will object, and will prefer the description of the Samkhya as given in the Karikas and in the Sutras. Both of them, particularly the Karikas, give us certainly better arranged accounts of that philosophy, as may be seen in the excellent editions and translations which we owe to Professor Garbe, and I may now add to Satish Chandra Banerji, 1898. If, as I believe, the Tattva-samasa-Sutras are older than our Samkhya-Sutras, their account of the Samkhya-philosophy would always possess its peculiar interest from a historical point of view; while even if their priority with regard to the Karikas and Sutras be doubted, they would always retain their value as showing us in how great a variety the systems of philosophy really existed in so large a country as India.

These Samasa-Sutras, it is true, are hardly more than a table of contents, a mere Samkhyam or Pari-samkhya, but that would only show once more that they presuppose the existence of a commentary from the very first. What we possess in the shape of commentaries may not be very old, for commentaries may come and go in different schools, while the Sutras which they intend to explain, would remain unchanged, engraved on the memory of teachers and pupils. How tenacious that philosophical Parampara was we can see from the pregnant fact that the Akhyayikas or stories, though left out in the Karikas, must surely have existed both before and after the time of Isvara-Krishna, for though absent in the Tattva-samasa and in the Karikas, they reappear in our Samkhya-Sutras. Where were they during the interval if not in Sutras or Karikas, now lost to us?

¹ M. M., India, p. 362.

The commentary on the Tattva-samasa, the publication of which we owe to Ballantyne, begins with an introduction which sounds no doubt, like a late tradition, but reminds us in some respects of the dialogue at the beginning of the Chinese translation of the commentary on the Samkhya-karikas. But though it may sound like a late tradition, it would be very difficult to prove that it was so. Chronology is not a matter of taste that can be settled by mere impressions.

A certain Brahman, we are told, overcome by the three kinds of pain, took refuge with the great Rishi Kapila, the teacher (not necessarily the originator) of the Samkhya¹, and having declared his family, his name, and his clan in order to become his pupil, he said : 'Reverend Sir, What is here on earth the highest (the *summum bonum*)? What is truth? What must I do to be saved?'

Kapila said, 'I shall tell thee.' Then follow the topics which are twenty-five in number :

List of Twenty-five Tattvas

- | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|------------------------------------|---|--|---|--------------------------|
| <p>I. The eight Prakritis (primary and productive elements),</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Prakriti as Avyakta (the non-differentiated or undeveloped principle); 2. The Buddhi (intellect), of eight kinds; 3. The Ahankara (the subject), of three kinds (Vaikarika, Taijasa, Bhutadi); 4.-8. The five Tanmatras (essences) of sound, touch, colour, savour, and odour. <p>II. The sixteen Vikaras (modifications),</p> <table border="0" style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td>9-13. The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive organs);</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td>14-18. The five Karmendriyas (active organs);</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td>19. Manas (central organ or mind);</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td>20-24. The Mahabhutas (material elements);</td> </tr> </table> <p>III. 25. The Purusha (Spirit or Self).</p> | { | 9-13. The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive organs); | { | 14-18. The five Karmendriyas (active organs); | { | 19. Manas (central organ or mind); | { | 20-24. The Mahabhutas (material elements); | } | The twenty-five Tattvas. |
| { | 9-13. The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive organs); | | | | | | | | | |
| { | 14-18. The five Karmendriyas (active organs); | | | | | | | | | |
| { | 19. Manas (central organ or mind); | | | | | | | | | |
| { | 20-24. The Mahabhutas (material elements); | | | | | | | | | |

¹ In the Bhagavata-purana I, 3, 11, Kapila is said to have *revived* the Samkhya (Samkhya-Sara, ed. Hall, p. 7, note).

- IV. The Traigunya (triad of forces).
- V. The Sankara (evolution).
- VI. The Pratisankara (dissolution).
- VII. The Adhyatma
- VIII. The Adhbbhuta
- IX. The Adhidaivata
- X. The five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions), five acts of Buddhi or the Indriyas.
- XI. The five Karmayonis (sources of activity).
- XII. The five Vayus, winds or vital spirits.
- XIII. The five Karmatmans, kinds of Ahamkara.
- XIV. Avidya (Nescience), fivefold, with sixty-two subdivisions.
- XV. Asakti (weakness), twenty-eightfold (nine Atushtis and eight Asiddhis).
- XVI. Tushti (contentment), ninefold.
- XVII. Siddhi (perfection), eightfold.
- XVIII. Mulikarthas (cardinal facts), eight.
- XIX. Anugrahasarga (benevolent creation).
- XX. Bhutasarga (creation of material elements), fourteen.
- XXI. Bandha (bondage), threefold.
- XXII. Moksha (freedom), threefold.
- XXIII. Pramana (authorities), threefold.
- XXVI. Duhkha (pain), threefold.

I have given these titles or headings in Sanskrit, and shall often have to use these Sanskrit terms, because their English equivalents, even when they can be found, are too often unintelligible or misleading without a commentary. This commentary which follows immediately on the Sutra, is meant to elucidate their meaning, and it does so on the whole satisfactorily, but the English word seems never to square the Sanskrit terms quite accurately.

The commentator begins by asking, 'Now what are the eight Prakritis?' and he answers, again in technical terms which will have to be explained: I. '1. The Avyakta (chaos), 2. Buddhi (light or perception), 3. Ahamkara (subjectivity), and 4-8, the five Tanmatras (transcendental elements).'

The Avyakta

He then continues: 1. 'Here then the Avyakta, neuter (the undeveloped), is explained. As in the world various objects such as water-jars, cloth, vases, beds, &c., are manifest, not so is the Avyakta manifest. It is not apprehended by the senses, such as the ear, &c. And why? Because it has neither beginning, middle, nor end, nor has it any parts. It is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, eternal, without savour and odour. The learned declare it to be without beginning and middle, to be beyond what is great¹, unchanging, pre-eminent. And again, this Avyakta is subtle, without attributes, without beginning or end, producing (Prasuta), but alone of all the eight Prakritis unproduced (Aprasuta), without parts, one only, but common to all. And these are its synonyms, that is to say, words applicable to the Avyakta, under certain circumstances: Pradhana (principal), Brahman², Pura (abode), Dhruva (unchanging), Pradhanaka (chief), Akshara (indestructible), Kshetra (field, object), Tamas (darkness), Prasuta (productive).'

Buddhi

2. 'And what is called Buddhi (intellect)? Buddhi is Adhyavasaya (ascertainment). It is that through which there is in regard to a cow, &c., the conviction (Pratipatti), "This is so and so, not otherwise, this is a cow, not a horse; this is a post, not a man." Such is Buddhi, the most wonderful phase of Prakriti.'

Buddhi is generally taken here in its subjective or psychological sense, but whatever Indian and European authorities may have to say, it is impossible that this should have been its original meaning in the mind of Kapila. If Buddhi

¹ Mahat in the sense of mind, and Pradhana in the sense of nature, seem hardly to be appropriate here.

² Brahman seems out of place here, and to be synonymous with Purusha or Atman rather than with the Avyakta. It is given as a synonym of Purusha further on, but strictly speaking Prakriti also would, from a Vedantic point of view, fall to Brahman as being what is called the substantial cause of the world, but of an immaterial world, as it would seem.

meant only determination (*Adhyavasaya*), even in its widest sense, it would clearly presuppose the later phases, not only *Ahamkara*, *Manas*, *Indriyas*, as subjective, but likewise something that is knowable and determinable, such as *Mahabhutas*, or at least *Tanmatras*. Though this psychological acceptation is the common acceptation of *Buddhi* among Indian writers on *Samkhya*, yet sense is more important than commentaries. The *Buddhi* or the *Mahat* must here be a phase in the cosmic growth of the universe, like *Prakriti* in the beginning, and the senses and the other organs of the soul; and however violent our proceeding may seem, we can hardly help taking this Great Principle, the *Mahat*, in a cosmic sense. Now the first step after *Avyakata*, the undeveloped, dull, and as yet senseless *Prakriti*, can only be *Prakriti* as lighted up, as rendered capable of perception, and no longer as dull matter. If taken in a psychological sense, it supplies, no doubt, in a later stage, the possibility of individual perception also, or of the determination of this and that. But originally it must have been meant as *Prakriti* illuminated and intellectualised, and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of *Ahamkara* (distinction of subject and object), *Manas*, mind, and *Indriyas*, apprehensive senses. Only after *Prakriti* has become lighted up or perceptive, only after mere material contact has become consciousness, can we imagine the distinction, whether general or individual, between subject and object (*Ahamkara*), and their new relation as perceiver and perceived, as 'I' on one side and 'this' and 'that' on the other.

This may seem a very bold interpretation, and a complete forsaking of Indian guidance, but unless a more reasonable and intelligible account can be given of *Buddhi*, there seems no escape from it.

What Indian interpreters have made of *Buddhi* may be seen in all their commentaries, for instance, *Vachaspati-Misra's* commentary on *Karika* 23 : 'Every man uses first his external senses, then he considers (with the *Manas*), then he refers the various objects to his Ego (*Ahamkara*), and lastly he decides with his *Buddhi* what to do.' This may be quite right in a later phase of the development of *Prakriti*, it cannot possibly be right as representing the

first evolution of Prakriti from its chaotic state towards light and the possibility of perception. It could not be the antecedent of Ahmakara, Manas, and even the Tanmatras, if it were no more than the act of fixing this or that in thought. I am glad to find that Mr. S. C. Banerji on p. 146 of his work arrives at much the same conclusion.

There are eight manifestations of this Buddhi (intellect), (1) Dharma, virtue, (2) Jnana, knowledge, (3) Vairagya, dispassionateness, (4) Aisvarya, superhuman power.

As each of these requires explanation, he explains them by a very favourite process, namely, by contrasting them with their opposites, and saying that (1) Dharma, virtue, is the opposite of Adharma, vice, and is enjoined by Sruti and Smriti, revelation and tradition. It is not opposed to, nay, it is in harmony with, the practice of the best people, and has happiness for its outward mark.

(2) Jnana or knowledge, the opposite of Ajnana or ignorance, is explained as the understanding of the twenty-five subjects (Tattvas), the states of thought (Bhava), and the elements (Bhuta).

(3) Vairagya, dispassionateness, is the opposite of passion, and consists in not being dependent on or influenced by external objects, such as sound, &c.

(4) Aisvarya, superhuman power, is the opposite of powerlessness, and consists of the eight qualities such as Animan, extreme minuteness, i.e. being able to assume the smallest form and weight, &c.¹

These four kinds of intellect (Buddhi) are classed as Sattvika.

Their opposites are classed as Tamasa, dark or bad.

Through virtue, as a means, there takes place going upward, through knowledge there arises liberation, through dispassionateness men are absorbed in Prakriti (Prakriti-laya ?), through superhuman power there comes unfettered movement.

Thus has Buddhi in its eight forms been described.

¹ These Aisvaryas are believed in by Samkhya and Yoga, and are acquired by Yogins by means of long and painful practices.

Synonyms of Buddhi are, Manas, mind, Mati, thought, Mahat, the great, Brahma¹, masc., Khyati, discrimination, Prajna, wisdom, Sruti, inspiration, Dhriti, firmness, Prajnanasantati, continuity of thought, Smriti, memory, and Dhi, meditation.

It is quite clear that in all these explanations Buddhi is taken as intellect, and as personal intellect, and that the idea of a cosmic stage of intellectuality has been entirely forgotten. Thus only can we account for the statement that this Buddhi, if dominated by Sattva (Guna of purity) is said to assume the form (Rupa) of virtue, knowledge, dispassionateness, and superhuman powers, while, if dominated by Tamas (Guna of darkness), it takes the four opposite forms of vice, &c. How could this be possible before the distinction between subject and object has been realised by Ahamkara, and before Buddhi has assumed the character of sense-perception (Buddhindriyani)? We have, in fact, to read the Samkhya-philosophy in two texts, one, as it were, in the old uncial writing that shows forth here and there, giving the cosmic process, the other in the minuscule letters of a much later age, interpreted in a psychological or epistemological sense.

Ahamkara

3. Now, he asks, What is called Ahamkara? And he answers, 'It is Abhimana, assumption or misconception, and this consists in the belief that I am in the sound, i.e. I hear, I feel, I see, I taste, and I smell, I am lord and rich, I am Isvara, I enjoy, I am devoted to virtue, by me a man was slain, I shall be slain by powerful enemies, &c.'

Samkara in his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras gives, though from a different point of view, some more instances, as when a man, because his wife and children are unhappy, imagines that he is unhappy, or that he is stout, thin, or fair, that he stands, walks, or jumps, that he is dumb, impotent, deaf, blind, that he has desires, doubts, or fears,

¹ This also seems out of place here, unless the Samkhyas give their own meaning both to Brahman and Brahma. In later times Buddhi, taken collectively, becomes the Upadhi or mental limitation of Brahma or Hiranyagarbha.

whereas all these things do not pertain to him at all, but to Prakriti only.

‘Synonyms of Ahamkara, or rather modifications of it, are Vaikarika, modifying, Taijasa, luminous, Bhutadi, the first of elements, Sanumana, dependent on inference, Nir anumana, not dependent on inference.’

Here we must distinguish again between Ahamkara, as a cosmic power, and Ahamkara as a condition presupposed in any mental act of an individual thinker. Ahamkara was so familiar in the sense of Egoism that, like Buddhi, it was taken in its ordinary rather than in its technical Samkhya sense. I quite admit that this is a somewhat bold proceeding, but how to get without it at a proper understanding of the ancient Samkhya, the rival of the Vedanta, I cannot see. We must remember that Ahamkara, whatever it may mean in later times, is in the Samkhya something developed out of primordial matter, after that matter has passed through Buddhi. Buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object, without the introduction of the Ego or I, which again is impossible without a Non-Ego, or something objective. After that only do we watch the development of what is objective in general into what is objectively this or that (the Tanmatras). But while the creation of what is subjective and objective is the only possible meaning of the cosmic Ahamkara, its psychological interpretation is far more easy. Thus we are told that there are three or four modifications of the Ahamkara, (1) the Vaikarika, dominated by the Sattva-guna, helps to do good works; (2) the Taijasa, dominated by the Rajasguna, helps to do evil works; (3) the Bhutadi, dominated by the Tamas-guna, helps to do hidden works; (4) the Sanumana Ahamkara is responsible for unintentional good; (5) the Nir anumana, for unintentional evil works. This division, though rather confused, shows at all events that the Ahamkara is here treated as simply a moral agent, dominated by the Gunas, but no longer as a cosmic *potentia*. These five modes of Ahamkara are spoken of as Karmatmans also, i.e. the very essence of our acts, while in another place the Tattva-samasa itself explains that Ahamkara should be taken as an act of Buddhi directed towards the perception of the

nature of what is Self (subjective) or Not-Self (objective). Though Ahamkara means only the production of Ego, yet the production of Ego involves that of the Non-Ego, and thus divides the whole world into what is subjective and objective.

Five Tanmatras

4-8. If it is asked, What are the five Tanmatras (substances) ? he answers, The five substances or essences as emanating from Ahamkara, the essence of sound, contact, colour, savour, and odour.

The essences of sound are perceived in sounds only. Differences of sound, such as acute, grave, circumflexed, and the notes of the gamut, such as Shadja, C, Rishabha, D, Gandhara, E, Madhyama, F, Panchama, G, Dhaivata, A, Nishada, B, are perceived ; but there is no difference in the essence of sound.

The essences of touch are perceived in touch only. Differences of touch, such as soft, hard, rough, slippery, cold, and hot, are perceived, but there is no difference in the essence of touch.

The essences of colour are perceived in colour only. Differences of colour, such as white, red, black, green, yellow, purple, are perceived, but there is no difference in the essence of colour.

The essences of savour are perceived in savour only. Differences of savour, such as pungent, bitter, astringent, corrosive, sweet, acid, salt, are perceived, but there is no difference in the essence of savour.

The essences of odour are perceived in odour only. Differences of odour, such as sweet and offensive, are perceived, but there is no difference in the essence of odour.

Thus have the essences been indicated; and their synonyms, though sometimes very inaccurate ones, are said to be: Avisesha, not differentiated, and therefore not perceptible, Mahabhutas(?), the great elements; Prakritis, natures, Abhogya, not to be experienced, Anu, atomic, Asanta, not-pleasurable, Aghora, not-terrible, Amudha, not-stupid; the last three being negations of the qualities of the Maha-

bhutas, according to the three Gunas preponderating in each. And if it is asked why these eight Prakritis only, from Avyakta to the Tanmatras, are called Prakritis, the answer is because they alone Prakurvanti, they alone bring forth, or evolve.

Sixteen Vikaras

II. If it be asked 'Which are the sixteen Vikaras or evolutions?' the answer is, 'the eleven sense organs (including Manas), and the five elements.'

Five Buddhindriyas

9-13. 'Now the organs are set forth; the ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose, constitute the five Buddhindriyas, or perceptive organs.

The ear perceives as its object sound, the skin touch, the eye colour, the tongue savour, the nose odour.'

Being produced from the Tanmatras, the senses, as perceiving, are represented as being of the same nature as the objects perceived, a view of considerable antiquity.

Five Karmendriyas

14-18. 'The five Karmendriyas or organs of action, voice, hands, feet, the organ of excretion, and the organ of generation, perform each its own work. The voice utters words, the hands work, the feet perform movement, the organ of excretion evacuation, the organ of generation pleasure.'

Manas

19. 'Manas, mind, both perceptive and active, performs its acts of doubting and ascertaining.'

Central organ of the senses or *koinon aistheterion* might be the nearest approach to the meaning of Manas; but mind may do, if we only remember its Samkhya definition, as perceptive, like the other organs, and at the same time active like the Karmendriyas.

'Thus have the eleven organs been explained. Their synonyms are Karana, instruments, Vaikarika, changing,

Niyata, special, Padani, appliances¹, Avadhritani, kept under(?), Anu, atomic, Aksha², organ.

Five Mahabhutas

20-24. 'The Mahabhutas, or gross elements, are earth, water, light, air, and ether.'

Here the earth, we are told, helps the other four, by being their support. Water helps the other four by moistening. Light helps the other four by ripening. Air helps the other four by drying. Ether helps the other four by giving space.

'Earth is possessed of five qualities, sound, touch, colour, savour, and odour. Water is possessed of four qualities, sound, touch, colour, and savour. Light is possessed of three qualities, sound, touch, and colour. Air is possessed of two qualities, sound and touch. Ether has one quality, sound. Thus are the five Mahabhutas explained.

Their synonyms are : Bhutas, elements, Bhuta-viseshas, special elements, Vikaras, modifications, Akritis, species, Tanu, skin, (or body?), Vighraha, shapes, Santa, pleasurable, Ghora, fearful, Mudha, stupid. Thus have the sixteen Vikaras been described.'

Purusha

III. 25. Now it is asked, 'What is the Purusha?' and the answer is, 'Purusha is without beginning, it is subtle, omnipresent, perceptive, without qualities, eternal, seer, experiencer, not an agent, knower of objects, spotless, not producing. Why is it called Purusha? Because of its being old (Puranat), because it rests in the body (Puri-sayate), and because it serves as Purohita (Director).' These are, of course, fanciful etymologies; and we can hardly doubt that we have, in the name of Purusha, a recollection of the Vedic Purusha, one of the many names of the supreme deity, by the side of Visvakarman, Hiranyagarbha, Prajapati, &c. Like Brahman when conceived as Atman, Purusha also was probably used both for the divine and for the human side of the same power. It is the multi-

¹ Garbe, Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 257.

² Or Akshara, imperishable?

plicity only of the Purusha which is peculiar to the Samkhya-philosophy.

'And why is the Purusha without beginning? Because there is no beginning, no middle, and no end of it.' This is not a very satisfactory answer, but it is probably meant for no more than that we never perceive a beginning, middle, or end of it. Why is it subtle? Because it is without parts and supersensuous. Why omnipresent? Because, like the sky, it reaches everything, and its extent is endless. Why perceptive? Because it perceives (that is, for a time) pleasure, pain, and trouble. Why without qualities? Because the qualities of good, indifferent, and bad are not found in it. Why eternal? Because it was not made, and cannot be made. Why seer? Because it perceives the modifications of Prakriti. Why enjoyer? Because being perceptive it perceives (for awhile) pleasure and pain. Why not an agent? Because it is indifferent and without the qualities (Gunas). Why the knower of body or of objects? Because it knows the qualities of objective bodies. Why spotless? Because neither good nor evil acts belong to the Purusha. Why not producing? Because it has no seed, that is, it can produce nothing. Thus has the Purusha of the Samkhya been described.

The synonyms of Purusha are, Atman, Self, Puman, male, Pumgunajantujivah, a male living creature, Kshetrajna, knower of objects or of the body, Nara, man, Kavi, poet, Brahman, Akshara, indestructible, Prana, spirit, Yahkah¹, anybody, Sat, He.

Thus have the twenty-five substances been described, viz., the eight Prakritis, the sixteen Vikaras, and the Purusha. He who knows these twenty-five substances, whatever stage of life he may be in, and whether he wear matted hair, a topknot, or be shaven, he is liberated, there is no doubt. This verse is often quoted by Samkhya philosophers. Here, it seems, the first part of the Tattva-samasa is ended, containing a list of the twenty-five Tattvas, in the three divisions of Prakritis, Vikaras, and Purusha.

¹ As yah, the relative pronoun could hardly be used as a name, I supposed it might be meant for the indefinite pronoun yahkah, but this is doubtful.

Purusha (subject).

1. Prakriti (object).

Avyakta (chaos).

2. Mahat or Buddhi (light and intelligence as Samashti, not yet individualised).

3. Ahamkara (subjectivation).

5 Tanmatras (Sattvika) 10 Indriyas, organs (Rajasa) + 1 Manas (mind) (subtle elements). (5 Buddhindriyas, 5 Karmendriyas, and Manas).

Tanmatras.

Buddhindriyas.

Karmendriyas.

1. Sound, Sabda.

1. Srotra, hearing in ear.

1. Speaking in tongue.

2. Touch, Sparsa.

2. Tvach, touch in skin.

2. Grasping in hands.

3. Colour, Rupa.

3. Chakshus, seeing in eye.

3. Moving in feet.

4. Savour, Rasa.

4. Jihva, tasting in tongue.

4. Evacuating in Payu.

5. Odour, Gandha.

5. Ghrana, smelling in nose.

5. Generating in Upastha.

5 Mahabhutas (Tamasa).

1. Akasa, ether (sabda).

2. Vayu, air (sabda + sparsa).

3. Tejas, fire (sabda + sparsa + rupa).

4. Ap, water (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa).

5. Prithivi, earth (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa + gandha).

Is Purusha an Agent ?

Now follow a number of special questions, which seemed to require fuller treatment. The first is, Is the Purusha an agent, or is he not ? If Purusha were an agent, he would do good actions only, and there would not be the three different kinds of action. The three kinds of action are (1) Good conduct, called virtue (Dharma), which consists in kindness, control and restraint (of the organs), freedom from hatred, reflection, displaying of supernatural powers.

(2) Brute passion, anger, greed, fault-finding, violence, discontent, rudeness, shown by change of countenance, these are called indifferent conduct.

(3) Madness, intoxication, lassitude, nihilism, devotion to women, drowsiness, sloth, worthlessness, impurity, these are called bad conduct.

We see here once more that the three Gunas must have had originally a much wider meaning than is here described. They are here taken as purely moral qualities, whereas originally they must have had a much larger cosmic sense. They are not qualities or mere attributes at all; they are on the contrary ingredients of Prakriti in its differentiation of good, indifferent, bad; bright, dim and dark; light, mobile, heavy. We see here the same narrowing of cosmical ideas which we had to point out before in the case of Buddhi and Ahamkara, and which, it seems to me, would render the original conception of the Samkhya-philosophy quite unmeaning. We must never forget that, even when the Samkhya speaks of moral qualities, these qualities belong to nature as seen by the Purusha, never to Purusha apart from Prakriti.

Three Gunas

WHENEVER this triad is perceived in the world it is clear that agency belongs to the Gunas, and it follows that Purusha is not the agent.

Deceived by passion and darkness, and taking a wrong view of these Gunas which belong to Prakriti, not to himself, a fool imagines that he himself is the agent, though in reality he is unable by himself to bend even a straw. Nay, he becomes an agent, as it were, foolish and intoxicated by vain imagination and saying, 'All this was made by me and belongs to me.'

And then it is said (in the Bhagavad-gita III, 27) : 'Acts are effected by the qualities (Gunas) of Prakriti in every way, but the Self (Atman), deluded by the conceit of the I (Ahamkara), imagines that the I is the agent.'

Ibid. XIII, 31 :

'This imperishable supreme Self, from being without beginning and devoid of qualities, neither acts nor suffers, even while staying in the body.'

And XIII, 29 :

'He sees (aright) who looks upon actions as in all respects performed by Prakriti alone, and upon the Self as never an agent.'

Is Purusha one or many ?

Now comes the important question, Is that Purusha one or many ? The answer to this question divides the Samkhya from the Vedanta-philosophy. The Samkhya answer is that the Purusha is clearly many, because of the variety in the acts of pleasure, pain, trouble, confusion and purifying (of race), health, birth and death; also on account of the stages in life (Asrama) and the difference of caste (Varna). If there were but one Purusha, as the Vedantins hold, then if one were happy, all would be happy; if one were unhappy, all would be unhappy, and so on in the case of people affected by trouble, confusion of race, purity of race, health, birth and death. Hence there is not one Purusha, but many, on account of the manifoldness indicated by form, birth, abode, fortune, society, or loneliness. Thus Kapila, Asuri, Panchasikha and Patanjali, and all other Samkhya teachers describe Purusha as many.

Vedanta Sayings

BUT teachers who follow the Vedanta, such as Harihara, Hiranyagarbha, Vyasa and others, describe Purusha as one. And why so ? Because (as the Vedanta says),

1. 'Purusha is all this, what has been and what is to be, he is lord of that immortality which springs up by (sacrificial) food, that is, he is beyond the immortality of the ordinary immortal gods¹.

2. That is Agni, that is Vayu, that is Surya, that is Chandramas, that is pure, that is Brahman, that is water and Prajapati².

3. That is true, that is immortal, it is liberation, it is the highest point, it is indestructible, it is the glory of the sun ;

4. Higher than which there is nothing else, nothing smaller, and nothing greater, the One stands like a tree

¹ These verses are meant to represent the views of the Vedanta, and they are mostly taken from the Upanishads. The first from Svet. Up. III, 15, occurs also Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 1, and in the Rig-veda X, 90, 2, where we should read, Yat annenadhirohati, see Deussen, Geschichte, I, p. 152.

² Mahanar. Up. I, 7 ; cf. Vaj. Samh. 32, 1.

planted in the sky ; by him and by the Purusha, all this is filled¹.

5. Having hands and feet everywhere, having mouth, head and eyes everywhere, hearing everywhere in this world, it stands covering everything ;

6. Shining² through the qualities (Guna) of all the senses, and yet free from all the senses, the master of all, the Lord, the great refuge of all ;

7. He is all substances everywhere, the Self of all, the source of all ; that in which everything is absorbed, that the sages know as Brahman.

8. For³ there is but one Self of beings, settled in everybody, it is seen as one and as many, like the moon in the water.

9. For he alone, the great Self, dwells in all beings, whether moving or motionless, he by whom all this was spread out.

10. This Self of the world is one—by whom was it made manifold ? Some speak of the Self as several, because of the existence of knowledge, &c. (because knowledge is different in different people).

11. Wise⁴ people see the same (Atman) in the Brahman, in worms and insects, in the outcast, in the dog and the elephant, in beasts, cows, gadflies, and gnats.

12, 13. As one and the same string passes through gold, and pearls, jewels, corals, porcelain, and silver, thus is one and the same Self to be known as dwelling everywhere in cows, men, and in elephants, deer, &c.

We see in these extracts a mixture of Vedanta and Samkhya terms and ideas ; and in verse 10 the two views of Brahman being one, and the Purusha being many, are given in the same breath.

Early Relation between Vedanta and Samkhya

THE relation between Samkhya and Vedanta during the Upanishad-period is by no means clear. Most scholars seem to regard it as a kind of syncretism, but it may also

¹ Svet. Up. III, 9 ; Mahanar. Up. X, 20.

² Svet. Up. III, 17 ; cf. Bhag. Gita XIII, 14.

³ Brahmabindu Up.: 12.

⁴ Cf. Bhag. Gita V, 18.

represent to us a period of philosophic thought when these two views of the world were not yet finally differentiated, and were not felt to be altogether incompatible. Though there is in the Upanishads which we possess a decided preponderance of a Vedantic interpretation of the world, the Samkhya philosophers are not altogether wrong when they maintain that their view also can be supported by Vedic authority. All these views were at first no more than guesses at truth, gropings in the dark; but the idea that if the one was right the other must be wrong, belongs decidedly to a later period, to that of systematised and controversial philosophy. There are certain technical terms, such as Purusha, Buddhi, Gunas, &c., which are looked upon as the peculiar property of the Samkhya, and others, such as Atman, Brahman, Avidya, Maya, &c., which remind us at once of the Vedanta-philosophy; but even these terms are used far more freely in the Brahmanas and Upanishads than in the Darsanas, nor are they always used in the same sense or in the same order by earlier and later authorities.

Thus we read in the Kathaka Up. III, 10, 11:

‘Beyond the senses are the objects (Artha), beyond the objects is the mind (Manas), beyond the mind is intellect (Buddhi), the Great Self (Mahan Atma) is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped (Avyakta), beyond the undeveloped there is the Purusha. Beyond the Purusha there is nothing, that is the goal, the highest point.’

In the same Upanishad, VI, 7, 8, we read:

‘Beyond the senses is the mind, beyond the mind the highest being (Sattvam Uttamam), higher than that being is the great Self (Mahan Atma), beyond this great (Self) is the highest, the Undeveloped.’

Beyond the Undeveloped is the Purusha, the all-pervading and imperceptible. Every creature that knows him is liberated, and obtains immortality.’

The successive development, as here described, is not in strict accordance with the systematic Samkhya, but still less does it represent to us Vedantic ideas. Even the two accounts, as given in the same Upanishad, vary slightly, showing to us how little of technical accuracy there was as yet during the Upanishad-period. We get—

III, 10, 11.

1. Indriyas.
2. Arthas.
3. Manas.
4. Buddhi.
5. Mahan Atma.
6. Avyakta.
7. Purusha.

VI, 7, 8.

- Indriyas.
-
- Manas.
Sattvam Uttamam.
Mahan Atma.
Avyakta.
Purusha.

The omission of the Arthas as objects would not signify, because, as Indriyarthas, they are implied by the Indriyas or senses. But why should Buddhi, generally the first emanation of Prakriti in its undeveloped (Avyakta) state, be replaced by Sattvam Uttamam, the Highest Being? The word may be meant for Buddhi, for Buddhi is often called Mahat, the Great, but why it should be called Great is difficulty to say. It is certainly not an equivalent of the Phœnician Mot, as Professor Wilson conjectured many years ago¹. Mahan Atma looks like a Vedantic term, but even then it would only occupy the place of Jivatma, the individualised Self, and how could this be said to emanate from the Avyakta?

Another passage which reminds us of Samkhya rather than of Vedanta-philosophy occurs in the Maitray. Up. II, 5, where we read: 'He who has the name of Purusha, and is very small, intangible, invisible, dwells of his own will² here in part³, as a man who is fast asleep awakes of his own will. And this part, which is entirely intelligent, present in every single man, knowing the body, attested by conceiving (Manas), willing (Buddhi), and belief in subject and object (Ahamkara) is Prajapti, called Visva. By him, the intelligent, is the body made intelligent, and he is the driver thereof.'

¹ See Samkhya-Sutras I, 61, 71; the Ekadasakam is Sattvikam, cf. II, 18, that is the five Buddhindriyas, the five Karmendriyas, and the Manas; see Garbe, Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya, p. 188.

² The Anubhuti-prakasa reads Buddhipurvam; Deussen translates Abuddhipurvam.

³ As to the idea of parts (Amsa), see Vedanta-Sutras II, 3, 43, and Thibaut's remarks in his Introduction, p. xcvi.

This passage does not contain much of Samkhya thought, yet the words Purusha and possibly Buddhipurvam seem to allude to Kapila's ideas rather than to those of Badarayana. Other words also, such as Samkalpa, Adhyavasaya and Abhimana, in the sense of Ahamkara, point to the same source. The whole passage, however, is obscure, nor does the commentator help us much, unless he is right in recognising here the germs of the later Vedantic ideas of a Prajapati, called Visva or Vaisvanara (Vedanta-sara, 138), Taijasa and Prajna.

One more passage of the Maitray. Upanishad. III, 2, may here be mentioned, as reminding us of Samkhya doctrines. There we read: 'There is indeed that other different one, called the elemental Self (Bhutatma) who overcome by the bright and dark fruits of action, enters on a good or evil birth, so that his course is upward or downward, and that overpowered by the pairs (the opposites) he roams about. And this is the explanation. The five Tanmatras (of sound, touch, light, taste, and smell) are called Bhuta (elements), and the five Mahabhutas (gross elements) also are called Bhuta. Then the aggregate of all these is called Sarira, body, and he who dwells in that body is called Bhutatman (the elementary Atman). True, his immortal Atman (Self) remains untainted, like a drop of water on a lotus-leaf; but he, the Bhutatman, is in the power of the Gunas of Prakriti. Then, thus overpowered, he becomes bewildered, and because thus bewildered, he sees not the creator, i.e. the holy Lord, abiding within him. Carried along by the Gunas, darkened, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of devices, vacillating, he enters into Abhimana (conceit of subject and object), believing "I am he, this is mine," &c. He binds himself by himself, as a bird is bound by a net, and, overcome afterwards by the fruits of what he has done, he enters on a good or evil birth, downward or upward in his course, and, overcome by the pairs, he roams about.'

Here we see again a mixture of Samkhya and Vedanta ideas, the Samkhya claiming such terms as Prakriti and Gunas, the Vedanta such terms as Atman and possibly Bhutatman. This Bhutatman, however, is by no means so clear as has sometimes been imagined. It is a term peculiar

to the Maitray. Upanishad,* and seems to have been borrowed from it when it occurs in some of the later Upanishads. If, like many other things in the Maitray. Upanishad, it is to be looked upon as belonging to the Samkhya-system, we must remember that Atman, though quoted sometimes as a synonym of Purusha, cannot be supposed to stand here for Purusha. A compound such as Bhuta-Purusha would be impossible. The Maitray. Up. III, 1 itself says that the Atman of Bhutatman is another, though likewise called Atman, and that he dwells in the body, Sarira, which is a compound of Tanmatras, Bhutas, and Mahabhutas. It would therefore correspond to the Vedantic Jivatman. But if this Bhutatman is said to spring from Prakriti, it could not possibly stand for the Purusha of the Samkhya, because their Purusha does not spring from Prakriti, as little as Prakriti springs from him. Nor could any Atman be said to be purely objective. In fact, strictly speaking, this Bhutatman fits neither into the Vedanta, nor into the Samkhya-philosophy, and would rather seem to belong to a philosophy in which these two views of the world were not yet finally separated.

Another difficult and rather obscure expression in the Maitray. Upanishad is Niratman (*selbstlos*), an expression which would be impossible in the Vedanta-philosophy, and is certainly perplexing even in the Samkhya.

A similar mixture of philosophical terms meets us in the Svetasvatara Upanishad. In verse I, 10, for instance, we have Pradhana, which is Samkhya, and Maya, which is Vedanta, at least the later Vedanta, while in IV, 10 Maya is directly identified with Prakriti. Purusha occurs in III, 12, where it evidently stands for Brahman, IV, 1. But though in this Upanishad Samkhya ideas would seem to prevail, Vedanta ideas are not excluded. The very name of Samkhya¹ and Yoga occurs (VI, 13), but the name of Vedanta also is not absent, VI, 22. In all this we may possibly get a glimpse of a state of Indian philosophy which was, as yet, neither pure Samkhya nor pure Vedanta, unless

¹ Samkhya should be here taken as the title of the two systems, Samkhya and Yoga, or better still as one word, Samkhyayoga. It cannot well mean *Prufung*.

we look on these Upanishads as of a far more modern date, and on their philosophy as the result of a later syncretism.

Traigunya

IV. If now we return to the Tattva-samasa, we meet first of all with some more remarks about the three Gunas, Sattva, explained as virtue, purity, goodness ; Rajas, explained as dust, mist, passion, movement, and Tamas, darkness, as ignorance. Colebrooke had already warned us against taking the Gunas of the Samkhya in the sense of qualities. 'These three qualities,' he says, 'are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence, and enter into its composition like different rivers forming one stream, though for a time retaining their different colours.' Constituent 'parts' might be a better rendering, but for the present it is best to retain Guna, there being neither thought nor word in English corresponding to Guna, as defined in the Samkhya. We ourselves have inherited our ideas of substance and quality from Greek and medieval philosophers, but even with us a definition of inherent qualities is by no means easy, considering that our substances never exist without qualities, nor our qualities without substances. Our commentary continues:

He now asks, What is the triad of Gunas? and the answer is, the triad consists of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness. The triad of Gunas means the three Gunas.

Goodness (Sattva) is of endless variety, such as calmness, lightness, complacency, attainment of what is wished for, contentment, patience, joy, &c. In short it consists of happiness.

Passion is of endless variety, such as grief, distress, separation, excitement, attainment of what is evil, &c. In short it consists of pain.

Darkness is of endless variety, such as covering, ignorance, disgust, misery, heaviness, sloth, drowsiness, intoxication, &c. In short it consists of trouble or madness.

Thus far has the triad of the Gunas been explained. Let it be known that goodness is all that is bright, passion all that excites, and darkness all that is not bright. This is what is named Traigunya.

These Gunas have been again and again explained as Dravyani, matter ; quality and what is qualified being considered in the Samkhya as inseparable. The four sides of a cube, for instance, would be called its Gunas as much as the blue of the sky. These Gunas act a very prominent part in Indian philosophy, and have quite entered into the sphere of popular thought. We can best explain them by the general idea of two opposites and the middle term between them, or as Hegel's thesis, antithesis and synthesis, these being manifested in nature by light, darkness, and mist ; in morals by good, bad, and indifferent, with many applications and modifications. If the Samkhyas look on certain objects as happy instead of happifying, &c., we should remember that we also call sugar sweet, meaning that it calls forth the sensation of sweetness in us. The Hindus look upon the state of equilibrium of the three Gunas as perfect, and they see in the preponderance of any one of them the first cause of movement and activity in Prakriti or nature, in fact the beginning of creation.

Sankara and Pratisankara

V, VI. Then comes the question, What is Sankara and what is Pratisankara? The answer is, Sankara is evolution, Pratisankara dissolution or re-involution. Evolution is as follows : From the Avyakta (undeveloped Prakriti) before explained, when superintended by the high and omnipresent Purusha (Spirit), Buddhi (intellect) arises, and this of eight kinds. From this Buddhi, the substance of intellect, arises Ahamkara (conceit of I, or subjectivity). Ahamkara is of three kinds, Vaikarika, modified, that is, modified of Sattva¹ ; Taijasa, luminous, as under the influence of Rajas producing the Buddhindriyas ; and Bhutadi (first of elements). From the modified or Vaikarika Ahamkara, which under the influence of Tamas produces the gross material elements, spring the gods and the senses ; from the first of elements, Bhutadi, the Tanmatras (essences) ; from the luminous, Taijasa, both. From the Tanmatras, essences, are produced the material elements. This is the development or Sankara. Pratisankara or dissolution is as follows : The material

¹ Garbe, *Samkhya-Philosophie*, p. 236.

elements are dissolved into the essences, Tanmatras, the essences and senses into Ahamkara, Ahamkara into Buddhi (intellect), Buddhi into Avyakta (the undeveloped), all being different forms of Prakriti. The Undeveloped is nowhere dissolved, because it was never evolved out of anything. Know both Prakriti and Purusha as having no beginning. Thus has dissolution been explained.

Adhyatma, Adhibhuta, and Adhidaivata

VII-IX. Now it is asked, What is meant by Adhyatma (subjective), Adhibhuta (objective), and Adhidaivatā (pertaining to deity)? To this it is answered, Intellect is subjective, what is to be perceived is objective, Brahma is deity. Ahamkara is subjective, what is to be received and perceived by it is objective, Rudra is the deity. Manas, mind, is subjective, what is to be conceived is objective, Chandra, moon, is the deity. The ear is subjective, what is to be heard is objective, Akasa, ether, is the deity. The skin is subjective, what is to be touched is objective, Vayu, wind, is the deity. The eye is subjective, what is to be seen is objective, Aditya, the sun, is the deity. The tongue is subjective, what is to be tasted is objective, Varuna¹ is the deity. The nose is subjective, what is to be smelled is objective, Earth is the deity. The voice is subjective, what is to be uttered is objective, Agni, fire, is the deity. The two hands are subjective, what is to be grasped is objective, Indra is the deity. The feet are subjective, what has to be gone over is objective, Vishnu is the deity. The organ of excretion is subjective, what is to be excreted is objective, Mitra is the deity. The organ of generation is subjective, what is to be enjoyed is objective, Prajapati, lord of creatures, is the deity. Thus in the case of each of the thirteen instruments is there what is subjective, what is objective, and the deity.

Whoever has properly learnt the substances, the forms of the qualities (Gunasvarupani), and the deity (Adhidaivatam) is freed from evil and released from all his sins; he experiences the qualities (Gunas), but is not united to

¹ Evidently taken already as god of the waters.

them. Here ends the discussion of the Tattvas (substances)¹.

Abhibuddhis (5)

X. Now what are the five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions)? The answer is, They are Vyavasaya, ascertainment, Abhimana, conceit, Ichchha, desire, Kartavyata, determination to act or will, Kriya, action.

The apprehension that this has to be done by me is ascertainment; an act of the intellect. Abhimana, conceit, is directed towards the perception of the nature of Self and not-Self, it is Ahamkara, an act of the intellect. Ichchha, desire, is wish, an idea of the mind, an act of the intellect. Kartavyata, the will of doing such acts as hearing, &c., performed by the senses that have sound, &c., for their objects, is an act of the intellect pertaining to the Buddhindriyas. Kriya, the act of the intellect, such as speaking, &c., pertaining to the Karmendriyas, is action². Thus have five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions) been explained.

Karmayonis (5)

XI. What are the five Karmayonis? The answer is that they are Dhriti, energy, Sraddha, faith or faithfulness, Sukha, bliss, Avividisha, carelessness, Vividisha, desire of knowledge.

The character of Dhriti or energy is when a man resolves and carries out his resolution. Sraddha, faith or faithfulness, is said to consist in study of the Veda religious studentship, sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be performed, penance, giving and receiving proper gifts, and making Homa-oblations.

¹ I ought to say that in this and the subsequent paragraphs I had often to be satisfied with giving the words such as they stand, without being myself able to connect any definite ideas with them. I did not like to leave them out altogether, but while they may be safely passed over by philosophical readers, they may, I hope, elicit from Sanskrit scholars some better elucidation than I am able to give. At present most of them seem to me to consist of useless distinctions and hair-splitting definitions of words.

² The text is somewhat doubtful.

But Sukha or bliss arises when a man, in order to obtain blessedness, devotes himself to knowledge, sacrifices and penance, being always engaged in penitential acts.

Avividisha or carelessness consists in the heart's being absorbed in the sweetness of sensual pleasures.

Vividisha or desire of knowledge is the source of knowledge of thoughtful people. What has to be known is the oneness (belonging to Prakriti), the separateness (of Purusha and Prakriti), &c., (Prakriti) being eternal, and not-percipient, subtle, with real products, and not to be disturbed; and this is Vividisha....It is a state belonging to Prakriti destroying cause and effect. Thus have the five Karmayonis been explained (?).

Some portions of these verses are obscure, and the text is probably corrupt. I have taken Jneya for Jneyam, referring to each of the subjects with which Vividisha, the desire of knowledge, is concerned. The construction is very imperfect, but may be excused in what is after all no more than an index. I separate Sukshmanam and take it in the sense of Sukshmatvam. Satkaryam refers to the Satkaryavada. The third line is quite unintelligible to me, and Ballantyne has very properly left it altogether untranslated. It may mean that Vividisha is a state belonging to Prakriti which helps to destroy cause and effect by showing that they are one and the same, but this is a mere guess.

Vayus (5)

XII. What are the Vayus (winds)? They are Prana, Apana, Samana, Udana, and Vyana, i.e. the winds in the bodies of those who have bodies. The wind called Prana is superintended by mouth and nose, and is called Prana because it leads out or moves out. The wind called Apana is superintended by the navel, and is called Apana because it leads away and moves downward. The wind called Samana is superintended by the heart, and is called Samana because it leads equally and moves equally. The wind called Udana is superintended by the throat. It is called Udana because it goes upward and moves out. Vyana is the all-pervader. Thus have the five winds been explained.

The real meaning of these winds has never been dis-

covered. If they are rendered by vital spirits, nothing is gained except explaining *obscurum per obscurius*. They may have been intended to account for the vital processes which make the action of the senses (Indriyas) and of other organs of the body also, possible, but their original intention escapes us altogether. They form a kind of physical organism or Antahkarana, but their special functions are often stated differently by different authors.

Karmatmans (5)

XIII. What are the five Karmatmans, the (Ego as active)? They are Vaikarika, Taijasa, Bhutadi, Sanumana, and Nir anumana. The Vaikarika, modifying, is the doer of good works. The Taijasa, luminous, is the doer of bad works. The Bhutadi¹, first of elements, is the doer of hidden works. If associated with inference (Sanumana), the Ahamkara is the doer of what is good and reasonable; if not associated with inference (Nir anumana) it is the doer of what is not good and not reasonable. Thus have the five Karmatmans been explained.

Avidya, Nescience (5)

XIV. What is the fivefold Avidya (Nescience)? It is Tamas, darkness, Moha, illusion, Mahamoha, great illusion, Tamisra, gloom, Andhatamisra, utter gloom. Here darkness and illusion are again each eightfold, great illusion is tenfold, gloom and utter gloom are eighteenfold. Tamas, darkness, is the misconception that Self is identical with things which are not Self, namely with Prakriti, Avyakta, Buddhi, Ahamkara, and the five Tanmatras. Moha, illusion, is the misconception arising from the obtainment of supernatural powers, such as minuteness and the rest. Mahamoha, great illusion, is when one supposes oneself to be liberated in the ten states with regard to the objects of sound, colour, &c., whether heard or, seen, &c. Gloom is unrestrained hatred, directed against the eightfold superhuman powers, such as minuteness, &c., and against the

¹ Bhutadi is used in the sense of Manas, because the Bhutas, though springing from the Tanmatras, are due to it.

tenfold world of sense causing threefold pain. Utter gloom is that distress which arises at the time of death after the eightfold human power has been acquired, and the tenfold world of sense has been conquered. Thus has ignorance with sixty-two subdivisions been explained.

Asakti, Weakness (28)

XV. What is called the twenty-eightfold weakness? The faults of the eleven organs of sense and the seventeen faults of the intellect. First, with regard to the organs of sense, there is deafness in the ear, dullness in the tongue, leprosy in the skin, blindness in the eye, loss of smell in the nose, dumbness in the voice, crippledness in the hands, lameness in the feet, constipation in the organ of excretion, impotence in the organ of generation, madness in the mind; these are defects of the eleven organs. The seventeen defects of the intellect are the opposites of the Tushtis, contentments and of the Siddhis, perfections.

Atushti and Tushti

XVI. First then the opposites of the Tushtis or the contentments. They are Ananta, the conviction that there is no Pradhana (Prakriti); Tamasalina, consisting in recognising the Atman in the Mahat (Buddhi, intellect); Avidya, the non-recognition of the Ego (Ahamkara); Avrishti, the denial that the Tanmatras, essences, are the causes of the elements; Asutara, occupation in acquiring the objects of the senses; Asupara, occupation in their preservation; Asunetra, occupation for wealth, without seeing that it is liable to be lost; Asumarichika, addiction to enjoyment; Anuttamambhasika, engaging in enjoyment without seeing the evil of injury (to living beings). Thus have the nine opposites of Tushti, contentment, been explained.

Asiddhis and Siddhis

XVII. Next follow the opposites of Siddhi, perfection, which are also called Asiddhis, non-perfections: Atara, when diversity is mistaken for phenomenal unity; Sutara, when, after hearing words only, the opposite is understood, as, for instance, when after hearing that a man who knows

the various principles (tattvas) is liberated, a man understands the opposite, that such a man is not liberated; Atarata, ignorance, when a man, though devoted to hearing and studying, does not succeed in knowing the twenty-five principles, owing either to his obtuseness or to his intellect being impaired by false doctrines. If a man, though overcome by mental suffering, is not anxious to know, being careless as to transmigration, so that knowledge is no pleasure to him, this is Apramoda. Thus the next pair also of Apramudita (mutually not delighted) and Apramodamana (mutually not delighting) should be considered. Ignorance of a man of undecided mind even with regard to what has been taught him by a friend is Arasya. But failure of an unfortunate man in obtaining knowledge, either because of bad instruction or disregard on the part of the teacher, is Asatpramuditam. Thus have the eight Asiddhis, the opposite of the Siddhis or perfections, been explained, and the twenty-eightfold Asakti (weakness) is finished.

Tushtis and Siddhis

Next follow the Tushtis and Siddhis themselves, but as their opposites have already been examined we may dispense with their enumeration here. Some of these technical terms vary in different texts, but they are of very small importance¹. I am afraid that even what I have given of these long lists, which are so characteristic of the Samkhya-philosophy, may have proved very tedious, and not very closely connected with the great problems of philosophy. I confess that in several cases many of these subdivisions seemed to me entirely meaningless, but I thought that they were of some importance historically, and for a right appreciation of the methods of Indian philosophy. The long lists of the instruments and the acts of intellect, of the sources of activity, of Nescience with its sixty-two

¹ The names of the nine Tushtis or contentments are: Ambhas, water, Salila, Ogha, Vrishti, Sutara, Supara, Sunetra, Sumarichika, Uttama Sattviki. The names of the eight Siddhis are: Tara, Sutara, Tarayanti, Pramoda, Pramudita, Pramodamana, Ramyaka, Satpramudita.

subdivisions, &c., though certainly meaningless to my mind, may possibly serve to show how long and how minutely these philosophical questions must have been discussed in order to leave such spoils behind. This large number of technical terms is certainly surprising. Some of them, as, for instance, Suchi, Pada, Avadharita, &c., are not mentioned either in the Karikas or in the Sutas, and this, which has been taken for a sign of their more recent date, seems to me, on the contrary, to speak in favour of an early and independent origin of the Tattva-samasa and its commentary. If these technical terms were modern inventions, they would occur more frequently in modern works on the Samkhya-philosophy, but as far as I know, they do not.

Mulikarthas

XVIII. We have still to examine, though as briefly as possible, the Mulikarthas or eight cardinal facts, that is, the most important subjects established by the Samkhya¹. They are with regard to Prakriti or Pradhana, its reality (Astitva), its oneness (Ekatva), its having an object or an intention (Arthavattva), and its being intended for some one else (Pararthya). They are with regard to Purusha his being different from Prakriti (Anyatva), his not being an agent (Akartritva), and his being many (Bahutva). They are with regard to both Prakriti and Purusha, their temporary union and separation, while Sthiti, durability, is said to refer to the Sukshma- and Sthula-sarira, the gross and the subtle bodies. Astitva, reality, might seem to belong to both Prakriti and Purusha, but it is meant as the reality of Prakriti only, which the Samkhya is chiefly concerned with establishing as against the Vedantins who deny it with regard to all that is objective, keeping it for the subject only, whether he is called Purusha or Atman. The commentator, however, and Prof. Garbe also, connect Astitva with Purusha as well as with Prakriti. The matter is of little consequence, unless Astitva is taken in the sense of phenomenal or perceptible reality. The highest reality of the Purusha or the Atman has of course never been

¹ See Samkhya-tattva-kaumudi, p. 59.

doubted by Samkhya or Vedanta philosophers, but that is more than mere Astitva.

Shashti-tantra

It should be added that the commentator in this place accounts once more for the name of Shashti-tantra, the Sixty-doctrine, but this time by adding the 17 Tushtis and Siddhis, the 33 (Avidya 5 + Asakti 28) and 10, not 8, Mulikarthas, and thus arriving at 60 topics. The Chinese name presupposes a Saptati-sastra, or Seventy-treatise, probably with reference to the original number of verses in the Karika.

Anugraha-sarga

XIX. But even here the Tattva-samasa is not yet finished, for it goes on to explain the Anugraha-sarga, lit. the creation of benevolence, which is explained as the production of external objects from the five Tanmatras or subtle essences *for the sake* of the Purusha. Brahma, after seeing these (the organs of sense?) produced, but as yet without a sphere in which their measuring or perceiving power could find scope, created for them the so-called benevolent creation, shaped from the Tanmatras¹.

Bhuta-sarga

XX. After this follows the Bhuta-sarga in fourteen divisions. The divine creation has eight divisions, consisting of good and evil spirits and gods, such as Pisachas, Rakshas, Yakshas, Gandharvas, Indra, Prajapati, and Brahma. The animated creation consists of domestic animals, birds, wild animals, reptiles, and immovable things or plants. The human creation consists of one, of man only, from Brahmans down to Chandalas. Domestic animals are from cows down to mice; birds from Garuda down to gnats; wild animals from lions down to jackals; reptiles from Sesha (world-serpent) down to worms; immovable things from the Parijata-tree (in paradise) down to grass. This

¹ This passage is very doubtful, unless we connect Mana with Tanmatra, and take measuring in the sense of perceiving, so that the creation would be represented as made for man.

is the threefold creation, consisting of gods, men, and animals, the animals, i.e. living beings, forming again five classes.

Bandha, Bondage.

XXI. If it be asked what the threefold bondage (Bandha) consists in, it is replied, In the eight Prakritis, in the sixteen Vikaras, and in Dakshina (gifts to priests). There are eight Prakritis, as often described before and as long as a man considers these as the highest, he is absorbed in Prakriti and bound by Prakriti. The bondage of the sixteen Vikaras applies both to ascetics and to men of the world, if they are subdued by the senses, which are Vikaras, if they are devoted to objects of sense, if their organs of sense are not in subjection, if they are ignorant and deluded by passions.

Dakshina-bondage, Gifts to Priests

The priestly bondage applies to those, whether householders, students, mendicants or anchorites, whose minds are overcome by passions and delusions, and who from misconception bestow sacrificial gifts on priests. A verse is quoted here in support: 'Bondage is spoken of by the name of Prakriti-bondage, Vikara-bondage, and thirdly bondage through priestly gifts.' This last bondage seems to me very important, and it is strange that it should never have been pointed out as marking the unecclesiastical and unorthodox character of the Samkhya-philosophy¹. What would have become of the Brahmans without their Dakshinas or fees, the very name of a Brahman being Dakshiniya, one to be fee'd? In the Aitareya-Brahmana already we read of Yatis who condemned sacrifices, but they are said to have been thrown to the jackals. That this feeing of a priest should have been considered one of the three bondages shows at all events that the followers of Kapila were above superstition, and looked upon sacrifice and priestcraft as hindrances rather than as helps to true freedom and Moksha of the spirit.

¹ See, however, Karika 44.

Moksha

XXII. This Moksha, the highest aim of Kapila's philosophy, is again of three kinds, according as it arises from increase of knowledge, from the quieting of the passions of the senses, or lastly from the destruction of the whole. From increase of knowledge and quieting of the passions of the senses there arises the destruction of all that is commonly considered as merit and demerit; and from the destruction of merit and demerit there arises final beatitude consisting in complete detachment from the world, and in concentration of the Purusha in himself.

Pramanas

XXIII. The three Pramanas which follow next require little explanation here, as they have been fully examined before. Still each system of philosophy takes its own view of them, and the character of each is more or less determined by the view taken of the real nature of knowledge. What is most creditable is that each system should have recognised the importance of this question, as a preliminary to every philosophy. This distinguishes Indian philosophy very favourably from other philosophies. All systems of philosophy in India admit Pratyaksha or perception of the senses as the first of Pramanas. The Vedanta, however, looks upon the Veda as the only source of true knowledge, and actually applies to it the name of Pratyaksha. The ordinary three or six Pramanas of the Mimamsa would apply to the world of Avidya or nescience only, never to the true world of Brahman. See Vedanta-Sutras II, 1, 14. The names vary sometimes, but the meaning is the same. Sensuous perception, if it is meant for what is perceived, is sometimes called Drishtam, what is seen; and instead of Veda we meet with Sabda, word, and Apta-vachana (Samkhya), right affirmation. Anumana, inference, is illustrated by the usual examples, such as, inference of rain from the rising of clouds, inference of water from the appearance of cranes, inference of fire from the rising of smoke. Whatever cannot be proved by either sense or inference has to be accepted as Apta-vachana, as, for instance, the existence of Indra, the king of the gods, the Northern Kurus, Meru, the golden mountain, the Apsaras,

or nymphs of Svarga, &c. For all these things, Munis such as Vasishta must be accepted as authorities. Apta is explained as a name for a man who is assiduous in his work, free from hatred and passion, learned, and endowed with all virtues, and who can therefore be relied upon. These three Pramanas, or measures, are so called because in the same way as in common life grains are measured by measures such as a Prastha, and sandalwood, &c., weighed by a balance, the Tattvas also, the principles, the Bhavas (their modifications), and the Bhutas, elemental substances, are measured or proved by the Pramanas.

Duhkha

XXIV. The last paragraph in the Tattva-samasa points back to the first. We saw in the beginning how a Brahman was introduced who, overcome by threefold pain, took refuge with the great Rishi Kapila. If we ask what was meant by that threefold pain, the answer is that it is Adhyatmika, Adhibhautika, and Adhidaivika. Adhyatmika is pain arising from the body, whether produced by wind, bile, or phlegm, &c., and from the mind (Manas), such as is due to desire, anger, greed, folly, envy, separation from what is liked, union with what is disliked, &c. Adhibhautika is pain that arises from other living beings, such as thieves, cattle, wild beasts, &c. Adhidaivika is pain that is caused by divine agents, as pain arising from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, &c., all under the direction of the Vedic Devas. If a Brahman is affected by this threefold pain, a desire to know (the reason) arises in him, as a desire for water arises in a thirsty man. Freedom from pain, or final beatitude, is to be gained, as we are told, from a study of the Tattva-samasa. Whoever knows the philosophy which is contained in the Tattva-samasa, is not born again. This is the doctrine of the great sage Kapila, and thus is finished the commentary on the Sutras of the Tattva-samasa.

The True Meaning of the Samkhya

In giving an account of the Samkhya, I have followed entirely the Tattva-samasa, without mixing it up with the Karikas or Sutras. I was quite aware that the Karikas or

the Sutras might have supplied us with a clearer and better-arranged account of that philosophy. But if I am right, that the Tattva-samasa is older than either, it seemed to me more important that we should know what the Samkhya really was in its original form. By comparing the Tattva-samasa with the Karikas and Sutras, we can easily see how this dry system was developed in later times. But though the Karikas and Sutras give us a more systematic account of the Samkhya, all that is essential can be found in the Samasa, if only we try to arrange the dry facts for ourselves. It must be confessed, no doubt, that neither in the Sutras, the Karikas, nor in the Tattva-samasa, do we find what we most value in every philosophy, an insight into the mind and heart of the founder of that philosophical system. If we were asked why such a system should ever have been imagined and elaborated, or what kind of comfort, whether intellectual or moral, it could have afforded to any human being, we should indeed have little to answer. All we can learn is that a man crushed by the burden of what is called the threefold misery, and seeing no hope of relief either by means of good actions or of sacrifices, which can promise no more than a temporary happiness on earth or in Heaven, should seek advice from a philosopher, such as Kapila, believing that he could procure for him entire freedom from all his troubles.

Nature of Pain

Here we come across something like a really human sentiment. We can well understand why pain, not only as actual suffering, but as an apparent anomaly or imperfection in the universe, should have opened man's eyes to the fact that there was something wrong or limited in his nature, and in the world in which he found himself; and it is quite intelligible that this consciousness of his limitation should have acted as the first impulse to an inquiry for the cause of it. This would naturally lead either to a religious or to a philosophical solution, and it certainly did so in India. A religion must have existed already before this question of the origin of suffering could well have been mooted: but religion seems rather to have increased the difficulty of the questioner than solved it. The

gods or god, even in their imperfect conception, were generally supposed to be good and just. How then could they be the authors of human suffering, particularly of that suffering, bodily or mental, for which the individual was clearly not responsible, such as being 'born blind, or deaf, or dumb, or mad.' This seems to have been keenly felt by the ancient Indian philosophers, who shrink from charging any divine power with injustice or cruelty towards men, however low an opinion they may otherwise have formed of Indra and Agni, nay even of Prajapati, Visvakarman or Brahma.

Here then it was that philosophy was called in, nay was first brought to life, and the answer which it gave as to the origin of suffering or, in a wider sense, the origin of evil, was that all that seemed wrong in the world must have been the effect of causes, of deeds done, if not in this, then in a former life. No deed (Karman) good or bad, small or great, could ever be without its effect, its reward or punishment. This was the fundamental principle of their ethics, and an excellent principle it was. It was but another version of what we mean by eternal punishment, without which the world would fall to pieces; for it has rightly been observed that eternal punishment is in reality but another name for eternal love. This idea of eternal love, however, cannot hang in the air, it presupposes an eternal lover, a personal God, a creator and ruler of the world: but even this idea Indian philosophers would not have taken for granted. In some cases, though allowing deeds to have their effects, they went so far as to admit at least the superintending care of a Divine Being, just as the giver of rain enables seeds to grow, though the seeds themselves were the deeds performed by men, as independent actors, and therefore liable to take all their consequences upon themselves, whether good or evil.

But though this ought to have sufficed to convince men that the world was exactly as it ought to be, and could not have been otherwise, because man himself had made it what it was, whether as an individual or as a member of a class, there arose a new question which could not well be suppressed, namely, Whether it was beyond the power of man ever to put an end to the unbroken and irresistible

sequence of the effects of the deeds of himself and of his fellow creatures; whether, in fact, the cycle of life and death, or what was called Samsara, would go on for ever. And here the bold answer was, Yes, the Samsara can be stopped, man's former acts can be shaken off and annihilated, but by one means only, by means of knowledge or philosophy. In order to achieve this deliverance from all suffering, from all limitation, from all the bondage of the world, man must learn what he really is. He must learn that he is not the body, for the body decays and dies, and with it all bodily sufferings might seem to end. But this is again denied, because through an invisible agency (Adrishta or Apurva) a new Ego would spring up, liable to suffer for its former acts, just as it was in this life. A man must learn therefore that he is not even what is meant by the Ego, for the Ego also has been formed by surroundings or circumstances, and will vanish again like everything else. Then what remains? There remains behind the body, and behind the Ego, or the individual person, what is called the Purusha or the Atman, the Self, and that Self is to be recognised either as identical with what was in earlier times conceived and called the Divine, the Eternal, the Unconditioned, namely, Brahman, or as Purusha, perfect, independent, and absolute in itself, blissful in its independence and in the complete aloofness from everything else. The former was, as we saw, the view of the Vedanta, the latter is the view of the Samkhya-philosophy. Both may have had the same roots, but they differ in their later growth. The view which the Vedanta took of man has sometimes been mistaken for human apotheosis. But people forget that for these philosophers there were no *theoi* left whose company man could have joined, and whose eminence they could have reached. The Divine which they meant was the Divine in man, and what they wanted was reconciliation between the Divine within and the Divine without. Their Moksha or Nirvana was not meant for *Vergotterung*, not even for the *Vergottung* of Eckhart; it was meant for complete freedom, freedom from all conditions and limitations, selfdom, in fact, whether as recovery of the Divine as Brahman, or as Atman, or as something beyond all names that had ever been given to the Divine, as the eternal Sub-

ject, undetermined by any qualities, satisfied and blissful in his own being and in his own thinking.

Whatever we may think of these two solutions of the world's great riddle, we cannot but admire their originality and their daring, particularly if we compare them with the solutions proposed by other philosophers, whether of ancient or modern times. None of them seems to me to have so completely realised what may be called the idea of the soul as the Phoenix, consumed by the fire of thought and rising from his own ashes, soaring towards regions which are more real than anything that can be called real in this life. Such views cannot be criticised as we criticised ordinary systems of religion or morality. They are visions, if you like, but they are visions which, to have seen is like having been admitted to the vision of another world; of a world that must exist, however different in its eternal silence from what we and from what the ancient seers of India imagined it to be.

The most curious thing is that such views could be held by the philosophers of India without bringing them into conflict with the representatives of the ancient religion of the country. It is true that the Samkhya-philosophy was accused of atheism, but that atheism was very different from what we mean by it. It was the negation of the necessity of admitting an active or limited personal god, and hence was carefully distinguished in India from the atheism of the Nastikas or nihilists, who denied the existence of anything transcendent, of anything beyond our bodily senses, of anything divine. To call the Samkhya atheistic, and the Vedanta not, would be philosophically most unfair, and it does the Indian priesthood great credit that they treated both systems as orthodox, or at all events as not prohibited, provided always that the students had, by a previous severe discipline, acquired the strength and fitness necessary for so arduous a task.

How different the world of thought in India was from our own, we may see by an extraordinary defence set up for the so-called atheism of the Samkhya-philosophy. It seems to us perfectly absurd, but it was by no means so, if we consider the popular superstitions of the Hindus at the time. It was a common belief in India that man could,

by severe penance, raise himself to the status of a god, or Deva. There are ever so many legends to that effect. This might no doubt be called apotheosis; and it was expressly stated that it was in order to put an end to such vain desires of becoming personal gods that Kapila ignored or left out of question the existence of such theomorphic or anthropomorphic beings as could ever excite the rivalry of men. We are hardly prepared for such explanations, and yet in India they seem quite *bona fide*.

Vedanta and Samkhya

WE have thus finished our account of the Vedanta and of the Samkhya-philosophy. At first sight no two philosophies would seem to be so different from each other, nay, to start from such opposite points of view as the Vedanta and the Samkhya. The Vedantist of the school of Samkara looks upon the whole world, including animate and inanimate nature, including the small gods and the still smaller men, as a phenomenal manifestation of an unknown power which he calls Brahman. There is nothing beside it, nothing that can be called real except this one invisible Brahman. Then came the question, But whence this phenomenal world? or rather, as he starts with the idea of there being but one real being from eternity to eternity, How could that eternal Brahman ever give rise to the world, not only as its efficient, but also as its material cause, if indeed there is anything material in the objects known to the Vedantist? Under the circumstances thus given, but one answer is possible, That Brahman is the world, and that the world, so far as it is Brahman, but so far only, is real. The phenomenal world, such as we see it and live in it, is changeful, ever passing away, and consequently never, in the Vedantic sense of that word real. We never see it or know it, as it really is, until we have become Vedantists. It is impossible to think that this eternal Being, whatever name be given to it, could ever change or be changed. This view of the universe as a development of Brahman was possibly the original view taken by Badarayana, and it was clearly that of Ramanuja, and his followers, who explain the world as an evolution (Parinama). But this was not Samkara's theory. He accepts the two facts that the

world is changing and unreal, and yet that the real cause of it, that is, Brahman, is incapable of change.

Vedanta, Avidya, and Aviveka

HENCE nothing remains but to ascribe the changeful phenomenal character of the world to something else, and, according to the Vedanta, to ignorance, not, however, to our individual ignorance, but to some primeval ignorance directed towards Brahman as manifested and seen. This ignorance or Avidya, again, is not to be called real, it is nothing by the side of Brahman, nothing therefore that could ever have dominion over Brahman. All such views are excluded by the postulate that Brahman is free, is one and all; though here again, other Vedantists differ from Samkara, and represent Avidya as an actual power (Sakti) of Brahman, or as Maya, i.e. illusive power, which in fact performs, or is answerable for what we call creation. We should of course ask at once, Whence comes that Avidya or that Maya, and what is it? How can it be anything, if not again Brahman, the only thing that exists? The answer given by Samkara, which satisfied his mind, if not the minds of other Vedantists, was that we know as a fact that Avidya or Nescience is there, but we also know that it is not there, as soon as we see through it, in fact, as soon as we are able to annihilate it by Vidya or knowledge, such as is given to us by the Vedanta-philosophy. The Vedantist holds that nothing that can be annihilated can claim true reality for itself. Therefore Avidya, though it is, must not be called something real. The great difficulty how Brahman could ever be affected by Avidya, which is a weakness or a defect, is avoided by looking upon Brahman, while affected by Avidya or seen through Avidya, as for the time under a cloud or forgetful of itself, but never really unreal. We ourselves also, that is the individual souls, can be in full reality nothing but Brahman, though for a while we are divided from it, because forgetful of Brahman through Avidya. While that state of Avidya lasts the true Brahman, neuter, may become to us Brahma, masculine, may become the creator and ruler of the world, and, as such, receive worship from his creatures. But as soon as the cloud of Avidya is lifted, this creator also re-

cedes and is restored at once to his true state and dignity. He, the so-called Isvara, or Lord, or Creator, becomes what he is and always has been, the whole Brahman; and we ourselves also remember and thereby recover our true Brahmahood, or selfhood, not as if we had ever been divided from it, but only as having been blinded for a while by Avidya so as to forget ourselves, our true Self, that is Brahman.

Samkhya, Aviveka

THE Samkhya takes what seems a very different attitude towards the problem of the world. These attitudes towards the world form indeed the kernel of every philosophy. If we call the Vedanta monistic, the Samkhya is decidedly dualistic. It accepts the whole objective universe as real, and calls it Prakriti, a word often translated by Nature, but in reality untranslatable, because the idea which it represents has never arisen in our philosophy. Prakriti may be called the undeveloped matter or *Urstoff*, containing in itself the possibilities of all things. By itself it has no consciousness, it simply grows or develops into consciousness when seen by Purusha. And it develops not only into an objective or material world, but at the same time, into what we should call the subjective or intellectual world, supplying the instruments of perception and thought, both what perceives and what is perceived. The question whence it came is never asked, as little as we could ask that question with regard to Brahman. It is, it has been, and it has had no beginning. But in order to account for the world of experience, it is supposed that this undeveloped Prakriti is always operative, so long as it is noticed or perceived by a Purusha (Self), and always passing through a process of evolution. This is an important condition. Prakriti is at work so long only as it is perceived by a Purusha or a true Self. This would come very near to the recognition of the subjectivity of all our knowledge and to the recognition that the world exists for us in the form of knowledge only. If we call Prakriti matter, the Samkhya philosopher saw clearly enough that dead, dull, inert matter alone would not account for the world. Therefore he makes Prakriti, under the eye of a Purusha,

develop into Buddhi, commonly translated by perception, but really a kind of perception that involves something like what we should call intellect (*nous*). What as far as I can see, is really meant by Buddhi in this place is the lighting up of Prakriti or dull matter by intelligence, so as to render it perceptive, and also perceptible. It is the Indian 'Let there be light.' In this stage Prakriti is called Mahat, the great, possibly in order to indicate its importance in the great development of the universe. It cannot be taken here in an exclusively psychological sense, though it supplies, no doubt, the possibility of the intelligence of the individual also. In the cosmical sense the development of the world is often spoken of as Samashti, in the psychological sense, and as applied to each individual it goes by the name of Vyashti. Thus Vijnana-Bhikshu (Samkhya-Sutras I, 63) remarks: As, according to passages of Sruti and Smriti, such as (Chhand. Up. VI, 2, 3) 'Let me multiply myself, let me procreate,' the creation of the elements, &c., is preceded by Abhimana (i.e. Ahamkara or subjectivity), it follows that this Abhimana is really the cause of the creation of the world, as preceded by an activity of Buddhi, i.e. the cosmical Buddhi, and not simply the personal organ of deciding, as Buddhi is generally explained when part of the individual or psychological development. For shortness sake, it is sometimes said that Abhimana or Ahamkara is the cause of creation, for in the end all the Vikaras or evolutes serve one and the same purpose. Buddhi exists in human nature as the power of perception, and it is then, though not quite correctly, identified with Manas or Antahkarana, the mental activity going on within us, which combines and regulates the impressions of the senses, as we shall see hereafter. But as a cosmic force, Buddhi is that which gives light as the essential condition of all knowledge, and is afterwards developed into the senses, the powers of light and thought, two ideas often comprehended by the root Budh, to awaken or to perceive. Budh means literally to awake. And as a sleeping person is dull and inert to the world, but begins to perceive as soon as he is awake, Prakriti also is inert till it is awakened (Prabuddha), and thus becomes Buddhi, perceiving or perception.

This Buddhi, however, which, as we must always

remember, is here conceived as a development of Prakriti, and as, as yet, neither subjective nor objective, requires a new development before it can serve for conscious intellectual work. Perception, according to the Samkhya, cannot work without Ahamkara, literally I-making or Egoism, but philosophically used with a much larger meaning, namely, if I am right, as that which produces the sense of subject, and in consequence of object also. Nature, in spite of being lighted up or rendered capable of perceiving and being perceived, requires, even after it has reached the stage of Buddhi, the division of the whole world, that is, of itself, into subject and object, before any real perception can take place. Subjectivation, therefore, would seem to be the nearest approach, though naturally there can be no subjectivation without simultaneous objectivation.

After this development of Prakriti into Buddhi, and its differentiation as subjective and objective, the next step is that it produces the Tanmatras, the elements of the senses as well as of the sense-objects, such as sight and light, hearing and sound, smelling and odour, tasting and savour, feeling and touch. All these, the faculties as well as the corresponding qualities of sense-perception, are modifications of the same Prakriti, and therefore in one sense the same thing, only viewed from different points of view, as we should say, as subjective and objective, and as changed at last into the material reality of the sentient powers on one side, and the objective world on the other. Lastly, all this development remains without real consciousness, till it attracts the attention of some Purusha, Spirit or Self, who by becoming conscious of Prakriti and all its works, produces what is the only reality of which we have any conception, the phenomenal reality of a self-conscious soul. I hope I have understood this train of thought rightly, but there is much that requires fuller light. Does Kapila really look upon perception and thought as an instrument, ready made by Prakriti for the use of the Purusha, but remaining inert, like a telescope, till it is looked through by the Purusha, or is it the first glance of Purusha at Prakriti in its state of Avyakta or chaos, that gives the first impulse to the activity of Prakriti, which impulse

is generally ascribed to the working of the Gunas ? Much may be said for either view. I do not feel competent to pronounce so decided an opinion as others have done on this subject.

If the Vedantist explains what we call Creation as the result of Avidya or Nescience, the Samkhya explains it by the temporary union between Purusha and Prakriti. This union is said to arise from a want of discrimination (Aviveka), and it is not in the highest sense a real union, because it vanishes again by discriminating knowledge (Viveka), nay, it is actually said to have the one object only of evoking at last in the Purusha a revulsion, and in the end a clear recognition of his complete independence, and his freedom from Prakriti (Karika 66). Thus the creation of the phenomenal world and our position in the phenomenal world are due to Nescience (Avidya) with the Vedantist, but to a want of discrimination (Aviveka) with the Samkhya philosopher (S.S.I, 55), and this want of discrimination is actually called by the Vedantic term of Avidya in the Yoga-Sutras II, 24. Where then, we may well ask, is the difference between the two views of the universe ? There is a difference in the mode of representation, no doubt, but in the end both Vedanta and Samkhya look upon what we call reality as the result of a temporary error, call it nescience, illusion, want of discrimination, or anything else. If, therefore, philosophers like Vijnana-Bhikshu recognised this original similarity in the tendencies both of the Vedanta and the Samkhya, it is hardly fair to blame them as having mixed and confounded the two. No doubt these two philosophies diverged in their later development, but they started with the same object in view, and they advanced for a time in the same direction. If the Vedantists desired to arrive at what is called Atma-anatma-viveka, discrimination between Atman and Anatman, the Samkhyas looked forward to Prakriti-purusha-viveka, discrimination between Purusha and Prakriti. Where then is the difference ? If their later defenders forgot their common interest and laid greater stress on the points of difference than on the points of similarity between them, it was but right that those who could see deeper, should

bring to light whatever features there were left of the original family likeness between the two philosophies.

Atman and Purusha

GREATER, however, than the difference between Nescience, Avidya, and want of discrimination, Aviveka, as the causes of the world, according to Vedanta and Samkhya, is that between the Brahman of the Vedanta, and the many Purushas of the Samkhya. According to Samkara the individual souls are not, according to Kapila they are. According to the former there is in reality but one Atman or Self, as it were, one sun reflected in the countless waves of the world-ocean; according to the latter there are many Purushas, as many as there are divine, human, animal, and vegetal souls, and their plurality is conceived as eternal, not as phenomenal only. On this point, therefore, there is a radical difference; and this is due, as it seems to me, to a want of accurate reasoning on the part of the Samkhyas. Such a peculiarity must not be slurred over in an account of the Samkhya-philosophy, but it is fair to point out what the reason of this aberration may have been. From a higher point of view the Purusha of Kapila is really the same as the Brahman or the Atman of the Vedanta, the absolute subject. It differs only in that the Purusha was never conceived as the material cause of the universe, while Brahman was, though, of course, with the important proviso that everything material was due to Nescience. Apart from that, if the Purusha was meant as absolute, as eternal, immortal, and unconditioned, it ought to have been clear to Kapila that the plurality of such a Purusha would involve its being limited, determined or conditioned, and would render the character of it self-contradictory. Kapila has certainly brought forward every possible argument in support of the plurality of individual Purushas, but he has forgotten that every plurality presupposes an original unity, and that as trees in the last resort presuppose the tree, as men are descended from man, call him Adam or Manu or any other name, many Purushas, from a metaphysical point of view, necessitate the admission of one Purusha, just as the many gods had to be recognised as in reality the One God without a second, and at last as mere

mistakes of Brahman. In this way Vijana-Bhikshu was right that Kapila did not differ so much from Badarayana as it would seem, because, if the Purushas were supposed to be many, they would not be Purushas, and being Purusha they would by necessity cease to be many. It may be said that this is going beyond Kapila, but surely we have a right to do so.

It is necessary, at all events, that we should see all this clearly, just as Vijana-Bhikshu and other philosophers saw it clearly, in order to perceive the unity that underlies the apparent diversity in the philosophy of India. Nor should we ever forget that our philosophical Sutras, whatever their age, whether of the fourteenth century A.D. or the fifth century B.C., are but the last outcome of the philosophical activity of a whole country, and that we are entirely ignorant of their historical antecedents. We should remember that the grammatical Sutras of Panini are contradicted again and again by grammatical forms which have fortunately been preserved to us in the earlier Brahmanas and Mantras of the Vedic period. We have no such remnants of an earlier period of philosophy anterior to the Sutras, with the exception of the as yet unsystematised Upanishads, and possibly of some of the more ancient parts of the Mahabharata ; but in other respects we are left without any earlier facts, though not without a firm conviction that such perfect systems as we find in the Sutras cannot have sprung up in a day, still less from one brain, but that they must have passed through many changes for better or for worse, before they could assume that final and permanent form in which they are now presented to us in literature. The Sutras are, in fact, the final outcome of ages of inquiry and discussion.

It would seem then to follow from Vijnana-Bhikshu's remarks, that in India a philosopher might at one and the same time have been a follower of the Vedanta as well as of the Samkhya, if he could only see that, where the two follow different roads, they started nevertheless from the same point and were proceeding towards the same goal. If this is seen and accepted in a historical spirit, it can do no harm, though no doubt there is danger of the distinctive features of each system becoming blurred, if we dwell too

much on what they share in common or on what they may have shared in common at an earlier period of their growth. In one respect Vijnana-Bhikshu, to mention him only, has certainly seen more rightly by not resorting at once to the idea that actual borrowing must have taken place, whenever Vedanta and Samkhya shared the same ideas. We should always remember that there must have been a period of unrestricted growth of philosophical thought in ancient India, and that during that period philosophical ideas, whether true or false, were common property and could be freely adopted by different schools of philosophy. It was in the Sutras that these schools became sterilised and petrified.

On one point Vijnana-Bhikshu may have gone too far, yielding to a temptation which does not exist for us. To him not only Vedanta and Samkhya, but all the six Darsanas or system of philosophy were orthodox, they were all Smriti, though not Sruti. Hence his natural desire to show that they did not on any essential points contradict each other. After he had reconciled to his own satisfaction the conflicting tenets of Vedanta and Samkhya, and had certainly, at least to my mind, succeeded in discovering the common background of both of them, he attempted to do the same for the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. These two, as he says, as they represent the Self as endowed with qualities, might seem to be contradicted by the Vedanta and Samkhya which show that the Self, or the Purusha, cannot be endowed with qualities; but this is not so. Nyaya and Vaiseshika are intended, as he thinks, as a first step only towards the truth; and though they admit the Self to be qualified by pain and joy, they teach that the Self is at all events different from the body. This is what marks the first advance toward a right understanding of the Self, not only as different from the body, but as unaffected by pain and joy, as neither suffering nor enjoying, as neither thinking nor acting in any way. To the followers of the Nyaya-philosophy also, Brahman, the Absolute, is Anirvachaniya, undefinable or inexpressible. The full light, however, of the Samkhya-doctrine might dazzle the beginner, and hence, according to Vijnana-Bhikshu, the usefulness of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika, as

slowly preparing him for the acceptance of the highest truth. There does not, however, seem to be any ancient evidence to support this view of Vijnana-Bhikshu's, that the Nyaya and Vaiseshika were intended as a preparation only, still less that they existed as systems before the doctrines of the Samkhya began to influence the thinkers of India. The Samkhya is indeed mentioned in the Mahabharata (XII, 111, 98) as the highest truth, but the other systems are never represented as merely preparations for it. They present themselves as independent philosophies, quite as much as the other Darsanas: nor do I remember any passage where Gotama and Kanada themselves represent their teaching as a mere step leading to the higher knowledge of Vedanta or Samkhya, nor any utterance of Badarayana or Kapila to the effect that such preparation was required.

Origin of Avidya

THE question which the Samkhya may seem to have left unanswered, but which is really unanswerable, is, How this Aviveka, this failure of Purusha to recognise himself as distinct from Prakriti, could ever have arisen, and how and by what stages the development of Prakriti may be supposed to have taken place which led in the end to the delusion of Purusha and made him look on the senses, on the Manas (central sense), on the Aham or ego, nay on Buddhi or intellect, on everything, in fact, within his experience, as belonging to him, as his own? What Kapila wishes to teach is that nothing is in reality his own or belongs to him except his Self, or, as he calls it, the Purusha. Here we can observe a real difference between Samkhya and Vedanta. And while in all these discussions Badarayana had only to appeal to the Veda in support of any one of his statements, Kapila, with all his regard for Aptavachana, had evidently meant to reason out his system by himself, though without any declared antagonism to the Vedas. Hence the Sutras of Kapila received the name of Manana-sastra, institute of reasoned truth.

The Sastra

If then it is asked how Kapila came to know anything

about Prakriti or *Urstoff* which, as superintended by Purusha, is said to stand for the whole of creation, and how we ourselves can know anything about its various developments, beginning with Buddhi or intellect, and going on from Buddhi to Ahamkara, the making of the I or Ego, or subjectivity as inseparable from objectivity, and from Ahamkara to the Tanmatras or subtle substances, &c., we have to confess with the author of the Samkhya-sara that there was nothing but the Sastra itself to depend on in support of what may be felt to be very crude and startling assertions¹. Sastra sometimes stands for Veda, but it cannot well be taken in that sense here. It seems rather to point to the existence of a treatise, such as the Samkhya-karika or the original text of the Samkhya-Sutras, or the whole body of Samkhya-philosophy, as handed down from time immeorial in various schools in India. At first sight, no doubt, it seems strange to us to derive Buddhi or Intellect from Prakriti, nature, or from Avyakta, the undeveloped. But we must remember that all these English renderings are very imperfect. Prakriti is very different from nature or *phusis* though there is hardly a more convenient term to render it by. In the Samkhya-philosophy Prakriti is a postulated something that exists, and that produces everything without being itself produced. When it is called Avyakta, that means that it is, at first, chaotic, undeveloped, and invisible.

Development of Prakriti, Cosmic

IN place of this one Prakriti we often read of eight Prakritis, those beginning with Buddhi or the Mahat being distinguished as produced as well as producing, while the first, the Avyakta, is producing only, but not produced. This need not mean more than that the seven modifications (Vikaras) and *forms* of Prakriti are all effects, and serve

¹ For the actual succession in the evolution of Ahamkara from the Mahat, and of the Mahat from Prakriti, &c., the Shastra alone, we are told, can be our authority, and not inference, because inference can only lead us to the conclusion that all effects must have a cause, while there is no inference to prove either the succession beginning with the elements, or that beginning with the mind in the way in which the Samkhya-philosophy teaches. Then what is meant by Shastra here?

again as causes, while the Avyakta itself, the undeveloped Prakriti, has no antecedent cause, but serves as cause only for all other forms of Prakriti.

Retrospect

AFTER going through the long list of topics which form the elements of the Samkhya-philosophy, it may be well to try to give a more general view of Kapila's system. Whether we begin with the beginning, the postulated Prakriti, or with the end, the phenomenal world as reflected by the Indriyas and the Manas, it is but natural that Kapila should have asked himself the question how what was postulated as the beginning, the undeveloped Prakriti, could account for all that was to follow, or how all that did follow could be traced back to this postulated Prakriti. Given the undeveloped Prakriti, he imagined that it was due to the disturbance of the equilibrium of its three constituents (Gunas) that it was first awakened to life and light or thought, to physical and intellectual activity. Some such impulse is required by all metaphysicians a *proton kinoun*. This first step in the development of Prakriti, this first awakening of the inert substance, is conceived by Kapila as Buddhi, the lighting up, and hence, so long as it is confined to Prakriti, described as Prakasa, or light, the chief condition of all perception. After Prakriti has thus been lighted up and become Buddhi, or potential perception, another distinction was necessary in this luminous and perceiving mass, in this so-called Mahat or Buddhi, namely, the differentiation between perceiver and what is perceived, between subject and object. This was the work assigned, I believe, to Ahamkara, which I should prefer to translate by subjectivation (*Subjektivierung*, Garbe) rather than by Ego or Egoism.

This step from Buddhi to Ahamkara has been compared to Des Cartes' *Cogito ergo sum*¹, but is it not rather *Sum, ergo cogito*, as showing that being itself would be impossible unless it were first lighted up, and differentiated into subject and object; that *esse*, in fact, is *percipi*, or even *percipere*?

¹ Davies, Hindu Philosophy, p. 18.

When the evolution of the Avyakta has gone so far, the question arises, how this process of perception could take place, how perception is possible subjectively, how it is possible objectively. If we begin with the objective side, the answer of Kapila is that there must be Tanmatras (This-only), potential *perceptibilia*, which are not the potentialities of everything in general, but of this and this only (Tan-matra). These five potentialities are Sound, Touch, Odour, Light, and Taste. They are not yet what is actually heard, seen, &c., nor what actually hears and sees, but they contain the possibilities of both. As there is no hearing without sound, the Samkhyas seem to have argued, neither is there any sound without hearing. But there is in the Tanmatras the potentiality of both. Hence, according to the division produced by Ahamkara into subject and object, the five Tanmatras are realised as the five subjective powers of perception, the powers of hearing, touching, smelling, seeing, and tasting, and corresponding to them as the five objects of sense, the objects of sound, touch, odour, sight, and taste. In their final form the five potential Tanmatras stand before us in their material shape, subjectively as ear, skin, nose, eyes, and tongue, objectively as ether, air, light, water, and earth (the five Mahabhutas). These five supply all possible and real forms under which perception can and does take place.

It should be remembered, however, that in order to account for perception such as it really is, another, a sixth sense, is necessary, in addition to the five, which is called Manas, generally translated by mind, but really a kind of central organ of perception, acting as a door-keeper, meant to prevent the crowding in of perceptions, to arrange them into percepts, and, as we should say, into concepts also, being in fact the *conditio sine qua non* of all well-ordered and rational thought. One might feel inclined to translate Manas by brain, if brain had not become so unscientific a term in our days. It might also be called the point of attention and apperception, but even this would hardly help us to a clear view of what Kapila really meant by Manas. Only we must guard against taking this Manas, or mind, for the true Self. Manas is as much a mere instrument of knowledge and a product of Prakriti as the

five senses. They all are necessary for the work of perception, conception, and all the rest, as a kind of clockwork, quite different from the highest Self, whether it is called Atman or Purusha. The Purusha watches the clockwork, and is for a time misled into believing in his identity with the workings of Prakriti.

This is but a poor attempt to make the Samkhya view of being and knowing intelligible, and I am far from maintaining that we have gained, as yet, a full insight into the problems which troubled Kapila, or into the solutions which he proposed. What I feel is, that it is not enough simply to repeat the watchwords of any ancient philosophy, which are easily accessible in the Sutras, but that we must at least make an attempt to bring those ancient problems near to us, to make them our own, and try to follow the ancient thinkers along the few footsteps which they left behind.

There is an illustration in the Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi 36, which suggests a very different view of the process of knowing, and deserves to be taken into consideration: 'As the seniors of a village,' they say, 'collect taxes from the householders and hand them over to the governor of the district, who again remits them to the treasurer, and the treasurer to the king, thus do the outer senses, when they have perceived anything, hand it on to the inner sense, the Manas, the organ which determines what there is and then hands it over to Ahamkara, and the Ahamkara, after appropriating it, to the Buddhi, the supreme Lord.' Here Buddhi, though supreme, is decidedly different from the cosmic Buddhi that springs from the Avyakta and leads to Ahamkara; nor is it easy to see how these two Buddhis, or rather that one Buddhi in its two functions, could have been admitted by one and the same philosopher.

Is Samkhya Idealism ?

THERE is another point on which it is difficult to come to a clear understanding. We are asked whether the Hindus fully realised the fact that we are conscious of our sensations only, and that all we call bodies, or the outside or objective world, is no more than the result of an irresistible inference of our mind, which may be called Avidya. We

are conscious, no doubt, that we are not ourselves the cause of our sensations, that we do not make the sky, but that it is given us. But beyond that, our world is only an inductive world, it is, so to say, our creation; we make the sky concave or blue, and all that remains, after deducting both the primary and secondary qualities, is Prakriti as looked at by Purusha, or, as we should say, *das Ding an sich* which we can never know directly. It is within us, or under our sway, that this Prakriti has grown to all that it is, not excluding our own bodies, our senses, our Manas, our Tanmatras, our Ahamkara, our Buddhi. Was this the view taken by the Samkhyas ? Did they see that the Sankara, the development of the world, takes place within us, is our growth, though not our work, that the light which, as Buddhi emerges from Prakriti, is the light within us that has the power of perceiving by its light; that both the Aham, the Ego, and the Tvam, the Non-Ego, determine not only ourselves, but the whole world, and that what we call the real, the sensuously perceiving and perceived world, is no more than the development of thoughtless nature as reflected through the senses on our enchanted Self ? The riddle of the world which the Samkhya-philosophy has to solve would then be no more than to account for the mistaken interest which the Self takes in that reflex, the consciousness which he assumes of it, the fundamental error by which, for a time at least, he actually identifies himself with those images. This identifying process would, from this point of view, really take the place of what we call creation. The closing of the mental eyelids would be the dropping of the curtain and the close of the drama of the world ; and this final recognition of our cosmic misconception would lead the Self back from the stage of the world to himself, would undo all creation, and put an end to that suffering which is the result of bondage or finiteness.

It sometimes seems to me as if such views had been at the bottom of all Hindu philosophy, though forgotten again or obscured by a belief in that reality which determines our practical life (Vyavahara). By admitting this blending of cosmic and psychological views, much in the Samkhya-philosophy would cease to be obscure, the Buddhi

of the world and the Buddhi of ourselves would indeed become one, and the belief in the reality of things, both objective and subjective, might truly be explained as due to Aviveka, the absence of discrimination between the Self and the imagery of nature. It would become intelligible why Prakriti should be supposed to play her part so long only as it was noticed by Purusha ; it would explain why Prakriti, by itself, was taken as Achetana, objective, thoughtless, and the Purusha only as subjective, conscious and thinking ; why in its solitude Purusha was conceived as not active, but Prakriti as always active ; why Purusha should sometimes mean the eternal Self, and sometimes man such as he is or imagines himself to be, while interested in the world, believing in the world and yet with a constant longing after a higher and truer state, freedom from the world, freedom from pain, freedom from all cosmic being, freedom as alone with himself.

Purusha and Prakriti

BUT if we may credit the founders of the Samkhya, whether Kapila or Asuri or Panchasikha, with such advanced views, if they really had made it quite clear to themselves that human beings cannot have anything but their own knowledge, we can understand why they should have represented the whole process of perception and combination, all joy and pain, and, in consequence, all willing also, as belonging, not to the Purusha or the Self, but to a stranger, to the Manas, and indirectly to Prakriti, while the Purusha, when he seems to see, to combine, to rejoice, to suffer, and to will, does so by misapprehension only, like a spectator who is carried away by his sympathies for Hecuba, but who in the end dries his tears and stops his sighs, leaves the theatre of the world, and breathes the fresh air of a bright night. The Samkhya uses this very simile. The whole development of Prakriti, it is said, takes place only when Purusha is looking on the dancer, that is, on Prakriti, in all her disguises. If he does not look, she does not dance for him, and as soon as he turns his eyes entirely away from her, she altogether ceases to try to please him. She may please others who are still looking at her, and so far it may be said that she is never

annihilated, because there will always be new Purushas to be enchanted and enchained for awhile, but at last to be set free by her.

State of Purusha, when Free

OFTEN has the question been asked, What then becomes of the Purusha, after the spell of Prakriti has been broken, and he has ceased to take any interest in the phantasmagoria of the world, thrown on him by the Manas and all the products of Prakriti that support the Manas. But this is a question which no philosophy can be expected to answer. All that can be said is that Purusha, freed from all Prakritic bonds, whether ignorance or knowledge, joy or sorrow, would remain himself, would be what he alone can be, unrestricted, not interfered with, free and independent, and hence, in the highest sense of the word, perfect and happy in himself. This ineffable state of bliss has naturally shared the fate of similar conceptions, such as the oneness with Brahman, the *Nihisreyasa* or *Non plus ultra*, and the Nirvana of the Buddhists. In the eyes of less advanced thinkers, this unfathomable bliss assumed naturally the character of paradisiacal happiness painted in the most brilliant and even sensuous colours, while to the truly enlightened it represented tranquillity (*Santi*), perfect rest, and self-satisfaction. While I agree with Dr. Dahlmann¹ that the Buddhist idea of Nirvana was the same, originally, as that of the higher bliss of the Vedanta and Samkhya-philosophy, I cannot believe that it was borrowed by the Buddhists from either of those systems. Nirvana was one of the ideas that were in the air in India, and it was worked out by Buddha as well as by Kapila and Badarayana, but by each in his own fashion. The name itself, like many technical terms of Buddha's teaching, was no doubt Brahmanic. It occurs in the Vedanta, though it is absent in the Samkhya-Sutras. We see in the Buddhist Suttas how it was used by the Buddhists, at first, in the simple sense of freedom from passion, but was developed higher and higher, till in the end it became altogether

¹ Nirvana, eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Buddhismus von Joseph Dahlmann, S.J. Berlin, 1896.

negative. If it had been simply taken over by Buddha from some individual teacher of an established philosophy, it would betray its origin, while we see it spring up as naturally in Buddha's philosophy as in that of Badarayana and Kapila. They all took their materials from the same stratum of thought, and elaborated them into systems, probably about the same time. But in spite of Dr. Dahmann's very learned and very able pleading, I must say once more that I cannot yet see any evidence for supposing that either Buddha borrowed direct from Kapila or that Kapila borrowed from Buddha.

Kapila does not enter into a minute analysis of his Nirvana, or, as he calls it, Kaivalya, aloneness. His object was to show how pain arose and how pain can be absolutely removed. If freedom from limitation and pain is happiness, that happiness can be secured by the Samkhya just as much as by the Vedanta and the Buddhist-philosophy; but though the Vedantist admits happiness (Ananda) by the side of existence and perception (Sach-chit), as peculiar to the highest Brahman, he does not attempt to explain what kind of happiness he means; and some Vedanta philosophers have actually objected to Ananda or happiness as a positive predicate of the highest Brahman. Negatively, however, this happiness may surely be defined as freedom from pain, freedom from all limits or fetters, and therefore perfect bliss.

Meaning of Pain

It would seem extraordinary, and wholly unworthy of a great philosopher, if Kapila had had eyes for the ordinary sufferings only which are entailed on all the sons of men. He must have known that there is happiness also for them, and something between suffering and happiness, the even tenour of a man's life. Kapila meant something else by pain. He seems to have felt what Schelling felt, that sadness cleaves to all finite life, but that is very different from always being intent on getting rid of the sufferings inherent in life on earth. Kapila evidently meant by Duhkha or pain something more than physical or even mental suffering, namely the consciousness of being conditioned, limited, or fettered, which is inseparable from this life. But what-

ever suffering he may have meant, the method suggested by him for its removal is certainly bold and decided. All this suffering, he tells us, is not, as we imagine, our suffering. Like the whole evolution of Prakriti, this suffering also belongs to Prakriti and not to ourselves, not to the Purushas.

Purusha

IN order to explain the world, we have to admit not only Prakriti, rising in the form of Buddhi, Ahamkara, and Manas to the height or the depth of individual existence, perception, and action, but likewise another quite independent being, the Purusha, the real or the better and truer Self, and therefore very much the same as the Atman of the Vedanta. Both Purusha and Atman, it should be remembered, are absent in Buddha's teaching, and by their removal the idea of Nirvana has become almost meaningless. But on this point also we must wait for further light.

With Kapila the Purusha or Self always remains, after as well as before his release. It is true he is only the looker on of all that takes place through Prakriti, looking as it were into a glass in which all the doings of Prakriti are mirrored. For a time by some strange want of discernment, this Purusha, always one of many Purushas, forgets his true nature and identifies himself with this image of Prakriti. He imagines therefore that he himself sees and hears, that he himself suffers and rejoices, that he himself is an I, really possessing all that the world offers to him, and unwilling to give it up again, whether in life or in death. His very body, however, his organs of sense, nay his mind and his individuality, are neither he, nor his; and if he can only learn the wisdom of Kapila, he is forever above the body, above all sensation, above all suffering. Nay Prakriti even, which has no soul, but acts only as impelled by her nature when looked at by Purusha, ceases her jugglery as soon as Purusha turns away.

Prakriti an Automaton?

IT might possibly help us to understand the relation between Purusha and Prakriti better, if we saw in Prakriti an automaton, such as Des Cartes described, performing all

the functions which we consider our own and which are common to man and animals, as in fact a mere mechanism, and if we took the rational soul, the Purusha, as the *chose pensante*, superadded to the automaton. It was Professor Huxley who showed that, as a consequence of this assumption, all our mental conditions might be regarded as simply the symbols (Pratibimba) in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism. In the same way all the changes of Prakriti, from mere sensation to conceptual thought, might be taken as including pain and joy and consequent action, the working of Prakriti, independent of the looker on, although that looker on in his enchanted state imagines that he is himself doing what in reality Prakriti is doing for him. This is beautifully illustrated by the simile of the dancing-girl to which we referred before, but who is here represented not only as intent on pleasing and beguiling Purusha, but as trying herself to open his eyes and make him free from her charms and fetters. We thus get a new application of the simile mentioned before.

Prakriti's Unselfishness

WE read in the Karikas 59-62: 'As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage ceases to dance, so does Nature (Prakriti) cease, when she has made herself manifest to Purusha.

60. In many ways Prakriti serves Purusha, who yet does nothing for her in return; she is noble minded and cares only for the welfare of him who is so ungrateful to her.

61. There is nothing more modest, I think, than Prakriti, who does not expose herself again to the gaze of Purusha after she knows that she has been gazed at.

62. No Purusha is therefore really chained, nor does he become free, or wander; Prakriti alone, dependent as she is on different Purushas, wanders from birth to birth, is bound, and is freed.'

In fact it would seem that Prakriti, in enchanting or binding Purusha, has no object in view except that Purusha should in the end perceive his fetters, and by discrimination become free from them (Karika 59).

Here is indeed the Gordian knot of the whole Samkhya-

philosophy. We believe for a time in our own physical nature and in the nature by which we are surrounded, and so long as we do this, we suffer. We are exposed to all kinds of pain, till our eyes are opened and we learn that it is Prakriti that sees and acts, that kills and is killed, that suffers, while we imagine that we ourselves do and suffer all this. As soon as this insight has been gained, as soon as Purusha has distinguished between himself and what is not himself, liberation is achieved at once, and the dance of life is ended for ever, at least so far as the liberated Self is concerned. Until that final liberation has been accomplished and everything like body has been completely removed, transmigration continues, and the Purusha is supposed to be clothed in what is called the Linga-sarira, or subtle body. Whatever we may think of the truth of such a system we cannot help admiring its consistency throughout, and its boldness and heroism in cutting the Gordian knot.

Gross and Subtle Body

THE idea of a subtle body by the side of our gross body is very natural; and we know that among the Greeks also Pythagoras claimed a subtle ethereal clothing for the soul apart from its grosser clothing when united with the body. But the exact nature of that subtle body and its relation to the grosser body is by no means as clear as we could wish it to be.

Both Samkhyas and Vedantists agreed in admitting the necessity of a subtle body in order to make the process of migration after death intelligible. In the Vedanta the name of that body, or vehicle, or Asraya for the journey of the soul from existence to existence is Sukshma-sarira, the subtle body. The Vedantists look upon this thin and transparent vehicle of the soul as a seminal or potential (Vija or Sakti) body, which at death leaves the coarse material body, without being injured itself. This subtle body arises, according to the Vedanta, from the so-called Upadhis (conditions), and consists of the senses of the body (Dehendriyas), both perceptive (Buddhindriyas) and active (Karmendriyas), and of Manas (mind), of Buddhi (intellect), Vedana (sensation), implying beyond itself the

Vishayas, objects required for sensation and presupposed already by Manas. Its physical life is dependent on the Mukhya Prana, the vital spirit, and on the five Pranas, the specialised spirits. Its Indriyas or senses are not to be taken as the external organs of sense, such as ears, eyes, &c., but as their functions only (Vritti). This subtle and invisible body or Sukshma-sarira remains, according to the Vedanta, till true knowledge arises, and the individual soul recovers its true being in Brahman. The Vedantists are, however, by no means consistent in their views on these two bodies, the subtle and the coarse body (Sukshmam and Sthulam Sariram), or on the process by which the one affects or controls the other. At the final dissolution of the coarse body we are told that the Indriyas are absorbed in the Manas, the Manas in the Mukhya Prana, this in the Jiva, the individual, and this in the subtle body; but neither the Upanishads nor the Vedanta-Sutras are always quite consistent and clear in their views on the subject, and it seems to me useless to attempt to reduce their various guesses to one uniform theory.

In the Samkhya-philosophy this Sukshma-sarira appears as Linga-sarira, or the sign-body. The Sthula-sarira or coarse material body consists, according to some Samkhya teachers, of the five or four coarse elements (Bhutas), according to others of the element of the earth only, and is made up of six coverings, hair, blood, flesh, sinews, bones and marrow. The subtle or inner body, sometimes called the vehicle, or the Ativahika-sarira, is formed of eighteen elements¹, of (1) Buddhi, (2) Ahamkara, (3) Manas, (4-8) the five Tanmatras or Sukshma-bhutas, and (9-18) the ten senses. This body is of course invisible, but without it the coarse body would be useless. It forms what we should call our personality, and causes the difference in the characters of individuals, being itself what it has been made to be by former works. All fitness for reward and punishment attaches to it, not to the Purushas who are all alike

¹ Karika 40, and Samkhya-Sutras III, 9. Why the Linga-sarira should be said to consist of seventeen and one (Saptadasaika) elements, is difficult to say, unless Eka is taken for the Purusha who, for the time being, identifies himself with the subtle body.

and unchanging, and it likewise determines by means of its acquired dispositions the gross bodies into which it has to enter from life to life, till final freedom is obtained by the Purusha; and not only the gross body, but the subtle body also is reabsorbed in Prakriti.

The Atheism of Kapila

WE have still to say a few words about the charge of atheism brought against the Samkhyas. It seems certainly strange that at this early time and surrounded as he no doubt was by sacrifices and hymns addressed to the innumerable Vedic Devas, nothing should have been said by Kapila either for or against these beings. Most likely at his time and before his time, the different Devas of the popular religion had already been eclipsed in the minds of thoughtful people by one Diety, whether Prajapati, Visvakarman, or Brahman. Both Prajapati and Brahma are mentioned in the Tattva-samasa-bhashya. But even such a supreme Deva or Adhideva is never asserted or denied by Kapila. There is a place in his system for any number of subordinate Devas, but there is none for God, whether as the creator or as the ruler of all things. There is no direct denial of such a being, no out-spoken atheism in that sense, but there is simply no place left for him in the system of the world, as elaborated by the old philosopher. He had, in fact, put nearly everything that belonged to God into Prajapati, only that this Prakriti is taken as purely objective, and as working without a conscious purpose, unless when looked at by Purusha, and then working, as we are told, for his benefit only.

This has sometimes been illustrated by what must have been a very old fable, viz., that of a cripple who could not walk, meeting another cripple who could not see. As they could not live by themselves, they lived together, the lame one mounting on the shoulders of the blind one. Prakriti, we are told, was the blind, Purusha the lame traveller.

We must remember, however, that Prakriti, though blind, is always conceived as real, because the Samkhya-philosophy looks upon everything that is, as proceeding out of something that is real (Satkaryavada). And here we see again, the fundamental difference between the Samkhya and the

other philosophies, as Vachaspati-Misra has pointed out in his commentary on the Samkhya-karika 9. The Buddhist takes the real world as the result of nothing, the Vedantist takes the unreal world as proceeding from something real, Naiyayika and Vaiseshika derive what does not yet exist from what does exist, while the Samkhyas derive what is from what is¹.

If it be asked how the unconscious Prakriti began to work and attract the attention of Purusha, Kapila has an answer ready. The Gunas, he says, are first in a state of equipoise, but as soon as one of the three preponderates, there is tension, and Prakriti enters on the course of her unceasing labours, beginning with the emanation of Buddhi, and ending with the last of the twenty-four Tattvas.

There is this difference also between the atheism of Kapila and that of other atheistic systems of philosophy, that Kapila nowhere puts himself into a hostile attitude towards the Divine idea. He nowhere denies distinctly the existence even of the purely mythological gods, such as Indra, which is strange indeed; nor does he enter on any arguments to disprove the existence of one only God. He simply says—and in that respect he does not differ much from Kant—that there are no logical proofs to establish that existence, but neither does he offer any such proofs for denying it. We know that Kant, honest thinker as he was, rejected all the logical proofs of the existence of Deity as insufficient, and based the arguments for his belief in God on purely ethical grounds. Though we have no right to assume anything of the kind with regard to Kapila, when brought face to face with this great religious and moral problem, the existence of a supreme God, we ought to mark his impartiality and the entire absence, in the whole of his philosophy, of anything like animus against a belief in God. The Devas he could hardly have seriously believed in, we should say, and yet he spares them and allows them to exist, possibly with the reservation that people, in worshipping them, were unconsciously approaching the true Purusha. We should not forget that with many people atheism meant, and means, a denial of Devas

¹ Garbe, Samkhya-philosophie, p. 202.

rather than the denial of the one, only God, the First Cause of the world. This whole question, however, will be better discussed when we reach the Yoga-philosophy and have to examine the arguments produced by Patanjali against Kapila, and in support of the admission of a Supreme Being, generally called Isvara, the Lord.

Immorality of the Samkhya

It has also been said that Kapila's system is not only without a God, but likewise without any morality. But though it is quite true that, according to Kapila, Purusha in his perfect state is non-moral, neither merit nor demerit, virtue nor vice, existing any longer for him, he is certainly not allowed to be immoral. The Samkhya, like the Vedanta and other systems of Indian philosophy, implies strong moral sentiment in the belief in Karman (deed) and transmigration. Kapila also holds that deeds, when once done, can never cease, except at the time of Moksha, but produce effect after effect, both in this life and in the lives to come. This is one of the unalterable convictions in the Hindu mind. There is, besides the admission of virtue and vice, the dispraise of passion and the praise of dispassion. These are represented as forms of Buddhi, as Rupas or Bhavas, forms or states, inhering in Buddhi, and therefore following the Linga-sarira from birth to birth. Nay, it is distinctly added that going upward is due to virtue, going downward to vice, so that virtue, as a preliminary, is really indispensable to final liberation. It may be true that in this way morality is reduced to mere calculation of consequences, but even such a calculation, which is only another name for reasoning, would serve as a strong incentive to morality. Anyhow there is no ground for saying that Kapila's system ignores ordinary morality, still less that it encourages vice.

Samkhya Parables

THERE is one more feature of the Samkhya that deserves to be mentioned, because it is not found in the other Indian philosophies, but may be supposed to have suggested to the Buddhists their method of teaching by parables. A whole chapter of the Sutras, the fourth, is assigned to a collection of stories, each of which is meant to illustrate some doctrine

of Kapila's. Some are very much to the point, and they can be appealed to by one word, so as to recall the whole lesson which they were meant to teach. The first is meant to illustrate the complete change that comes over a man when he has been taught his true nature by means of the Samkhya. 'As in the case of the son of a king.' The story which follows is that a young prince who was born under an unlucky star, was taken out of his capital and brought up by a Sabara, a kind of wild man of the woods. When he grew up he naturally thought that he himself was a Sabara, and lived accordingly. But a minister, who had found out that the prince was alive, went to him secretly and told him that he was the son of the king, and not a Sabara. At once the prince gave up the idea that he was a savage, believed that he was a prince, and assumed a truly royal bearing. In the same manner a man who has been told his true character by his teacher, surrenders the idea that he is a material and mortal being, and recovers his true nature, saying 'As a son of Brahman I am nothing but Brahman, and not a being different from him in this phenomenal world.'

The commentator adds an extract from the Garuda-Purana which must have been borrowed from a Samkhya source :

'As everything that is made of gold is known as gold, if even from one small piece of gold one has learnt to know what gold is, in the same way from knowing God the whole world becomes known.

As a Brahman possessed by an evil spirit, imagines that he is a Sudra, but, when the possession is over, knows that he is a Brahman, thus the soul, possessed by Maya, imagines that it is the body, but after Maya has come to an end, it knows its own true being again, and says, I am a Brahman.'

The seventh illustration is 'like a cut-off hand,' and is meant to teach that, as no one takes his hand again after it has once been cut off, no one should identify himself with anything objective, after having once surrendered the illusion of the objective. The sixteenth, to which I called attention many years ago as connected with old Aryan folklore, is meant to teach that even an accidental negli-

gence may be fatal to our reaching the highest goal, as in the case of the 'frog-wife.'

The story is that of a king who, while hunting, had seen a beautiful girl in a forest. She became his wife on condition that he should never let her see water. He gave the promise, but once when the queen, tired after playing, asked him for some water, he forgot his promise, and brought her some, whereupon the daughter of the frog-king became a frog (Bheki), and disappeared in the lake. Neither nets nor anything else was of any avail for bringing her back, the king had lost her for ever. Thus true knowledge also will disappear by one act of negligence, and will never return.

This system of teaching by parables was very popular with the Buddhists, and it is just possible that the first impulse may have come from the followers of Kapila, who are so often called Krypto-buddhists or Prachchhanna-Buddhas.

I have called attention already to the fact that these illustrative parables, though they do not occur in the Karikas and in the Tattva-samasa, must have existed all the time in the Parampara of the Brahmans, because they appear in the modern Sūtras, that is in the sixteenth century. Like the Sūtras referring to these stories, other Sūtras also may occur in our modern collection of Samkhya-Sūtras, which existed for centuries, as handed down by tradition, but were omitted in the Karikas and even in the Tattva-samasa.

CHAPTER VII

Yoga and Samkhya

THE relation of the Yoga to the Samkhya-philosophy is not easy to determine, but the Bhagavad-gita V, 4, goes so far as to say that children only, not learned people, distinguish between Samkhya and Yoga at all, as it were between faith (knowledge) and works. We find the Samkhya and Yoga represented, each in its own Sūtras, which are ascribed to different authors, Kapila and Patanjali¹, and they are spoken of in the dual as the two old systems (Mahabh. XII, 104, 67); but we also find a philosophy called Samkhyayoga (Svetasv. Up. II, 13), and this not as a Dvandva, as it were, Samkhya and Yoga, but as one philosophy, as a neuter sing., representing Yoga and Samkhya together as one, or possibly as Yoga belonging to the Samkhya. Thus we read again in the Bhagavad-gita V, 5, that he who understands Samkhya and Yoga to be one, understands aright. Yoga, in the sense of ascetic practices and meditations, may no doubt have existed in India in very ancient times. It is called Puratana (old), (B. G. IV, 3), and this is probably what the author of the Bhagavad-gita (IV, 1), meant, when he made the Bhagavat say to Arjuna :

‘I declared this imperishable Yoga to Vivasvat, Vivasvat told it to Manu, Manu to Ikshvaku. Thus royal sages came to know it, having received it through tradition; but this Yoga was lost here by long lapse of time.’

A similar oral tradition descending from Prajapati to Manu, and from Manu to the people (to Ikshvaku, according to Samkara) is mentioned already in the Chhandogya Upanishad (III, 11; VIII, 15).

It is much the same with the other philosophies, and we are left in doubt as to whether the three couples, Samkhya

¹ The identification of these two names with the name of one person Kapya Patanchala, who is mentioned in the Satapatha-brahmana, once proposed by Professor Weber, has probably long been given up by him. See also Garbe, Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 26.

and Yoga, Nyaya and Vaiseshika, nay even Purva-and Uttara-Mimamsa, were amalgamations of systems which had originally an independent existence, or whether they were differentiations of former systems. Samkhya and Yoga might easily have formed one comprehensive system, because their divergence with regard to the existence of an Isvara, or Lord, was not so essential a point to them as it seems to us. Those who wanted an Isvara might have him as a first and super-eminent Purusha ; while those who had gone beyond this want, need not have quarrelled with those who still felt it. The Nyaya and Vaiseshika show clear traces of a common origin ; while the two Mimamsas, which in character are more remote from one another than the other systems, seem to sanction, by their names at least, the suspicion of their former unity. But the deplorable scarcity of any historical documents does not enable us to go beyond mere conjectures ; and though the names of Kapila, Vyasa, and Gotama may seem to have an older air than those of Patanjali, Jaimini, and Kanada, we must not in such matters allow ourselves to be guided by mere impressions. The often-cited passage from the Vedanta-Sutras II, 1, 3, *Etena Yogah pratyuktah*, 'By this the Yoga is refuted,' proves of course no more than the existence of a Yoga-philosophy at the time of Badarayana ; it cannot be used to prove the existence of the Yoga-Sutras, such as we possess them, as previous to the composition of the Vedanta-Sutras.

Meanings of the word Yoga

IN the Bhagavad-gita Yoga is defined as Samatva, equality (II, 48). It has been repeated again and again that Yoga, from Yuj, to join, meant originally joining the deity, or union with it. Even Indian authors occasionally favour that view. A moment's consideration, however, would have shown that such an idea could never have entered the mind of a Samkhya, for the simple reason that there was nothing for him that he could have wished to join. Even the Vedantist does not really join Brahman, though this is a very common misconception ; nay, a movement of the soul towards Brahman is distinctly guarded against as impossible. The soul is always Brahman, even though it does not know

it, and it only requires the removal of ignorance for the soul to recover its Brahmahood, or to become what it always has been. Yuj, from meaning to join, came, by means of a very old metaphor, to mean to join oneself to something, to harness oneself for some work. Thus Yuj assumed the sense of preparing for hard work, whether preparing others or getting ready oneself. And as people with us use the expression to go into harness, i.e. to prepare for work, or to buckle-to, i.e. to get ready for hard work, Yuj, particularly in the Atmanepada, came to mean to exert oneself. Possibly the German *Angespannt* and *Anspannung* may have been suggested by the same metaphor, though the usual explanation is that it was suggested by a metaphor taken from the stretching of the bow. In Sanskrit this Yuj is often used with such words as Manas, Chittam, Atman, &c., in the sense of concentrating or exerting one's mind; and it is in this sense only that our word Yoga could have sprung from it, meaning, as the Yoga-Sutras tell us at the very beginning, I, 2, the effort of restraining the activities or distractions of our thoughts (Chitta-vritti-nirodha), or the effort of concentrating our thoughts on a definite object.

Yoga, not Union, but Disunion

A false interpretation of the term Yoga as union has led to a total misrepresentation of Patanjali's philosophy, Rajendralal Mitra, p. 208, was therefore quite right when he wrote: "Professor Weber, in his History of Indian Literature (pp. 238—9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, "One very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." "The idea of absorption," he continues rightly, "into the supreme Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory." "Patanjali, like Kapila," he adds, "rests satisfied with the isolation of the soul, and does not pry into the how and where the soul abides after separation." But when he charges the professor with not having read the Yoga he goes a little too far, and he ought to have known,

from his own experience, that it is small blame to a man who writes a complete history of Indian literature, if he has not read every book on which he has to pronounce an opinion. Even the best historian of German literature can hardly have read every German author of any eminence, much less can the first historian of Sanskrit literature.

Rajendralala Mitra, however, is quite right so far that Yoga, in the philosophy of Patanjali and Kapila, did not mean union with God, or anything but effort (Udyoga, not Samyoga), pulling oneself together, exertion, concentration. Yoga might mean union, but the proper term would have been Samyoga. Thus we read in the Bhagavad-gita II, 50:

Buddhiyukto jahatiha ubhe sukritadushkrite,

Tasmad yogaya yujyasva, yogah karmasu kausalam.
'He who is devoted to knowledge leaves behind both good and evil deeds ; therefore devote yourself to Yoga, Yoga is success in (all) actions.'

That Indian scholars were well aware of the double meaning of Yoga, we may see from a verse in the beginning of Bhojadeva's commentary on the Yoga-Sutras, where he states that, with a true Yogin, Yoga, joining, means really Viyoga, separation, or Viveka, discrimination between Purusha and Prakriti, subject and object, self and nature, such as it is taught in the Samkhya : Pumprakrityor viyogo-pi yoga ityudito yaya, 'By which (teaching of Patanjali) Yoga (union) is said to be Viyoga (separation) of Purusha and Prakriti.'

Yoga as Viveka

WE saw that this Viyoga or Viveka was indeed the highest point to which the whole of the Samkhya-philosophy leads up. But granted that this discrimination, this subduing and drawing away of the Self from all that is not Self, is the highest object of philosophy, how is it to be reached, and even when reached, how is it to be maintained? By knowledge chiefly, would be the answer of Kapila (by Jnanayoga); by ascetic exercises delivering the Self from the fetters of the body and the bodily senses, (by Karmayoga) adds Patanjali. Patanjali by no means ignores the Jnanayoga of Kapila. On the contrary, he presupposes

it; he only adds, as a useful support, a number of exercises, bodily as well as mental, by which the senses should be kept in subjection so as not to interfere again with the concentration of all thoughts on the Self or the Purusha¹. In that sense he tells us in the second Sutra that Yoga is the effort of restraining the activity or distractions of our thoughts. Before we begin to scoff at the Yoga and its minute treatment of postures, breathings, and other means of mental concentration, we ought first of all to try to understand their original intention. Everything can become absurd by exaggeration, and this has been, no doubt, the case with the self-imposed discipline and tortures of the Yogins. But originally their object seems to have been no other than to counteract the distractions of the senses. We all consider the closing of the eyelids and the stopping of the ears against disturbing noises useful for serious meditation. This was the simple beginning of Yoga, and in that sense it was meant to be a useful addition to the Samkhya, because even a convinced Samkhya philosopher who had obtained Jnanayoga or knowledge-yoga would inevitably suffer from the disturbances caused by external circumstances and the continual inroads of the outer world upon him, i.e. upon his Manas, unless strengthened to resist by Karmayoga or work-yoga the ever present enemy of his peace of mind. More minute directions as to how this desired concentration and abstraction could be achieved and maintained, might at first have been quite harmless, but if carried too far they would inevitably produce those torturing exercises which seemed to Buddha, as they do to most people, so utterly foolish and useless. But if we ourselves must admit that our senses and all that they imply are real obstacles to quiet meditation, the attempts to reduce these sensuous affections to some kind of quietude or equability (Samatva) need not surprise us, nor need we be altogether incredulous as to the marvellous results obtained by means of ascetic exercises by Yogins in India, as little as we

¹ I prefer, even in the Samkhya-philosophy, to render Purusha by Self rather than by man, because in English *man* cannot be used in the sense of simply subject or soul. Besides, Atman, Self, is often used by Patanjali himself for Purusha, cf. Yoga-Sutras III, 21 ; II, 41.

should treat the visions of St. Francis or St. Teresa as downright impositions. The real relation of the soul to the body and of the senses to the soul is still as great a mystery to us as it was to the ancient Yogins of India, and their experiences, if only honestly related, deserve certainly the same careful attention as the stigmata of Roman Catholic saints. They may be or they may not be true, but there is no reason why they should be treated as *a priori* untrue. From this point of view it seems to me that the Yoga-philosophy deserves some attention on the part of philosophers, more particularly of the physical school of psychologists, and I did not feel justified therefore in passing over this system altogether, though it may be quite true that, after we have once understood the position of the Samkhya-philosophy towards the great problem of the world, we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga. We must never forget that, although our Samkhya-Sutras are very modern, the Samkhya as such, is not, and is always presupposed by the Yoga. It has its roots in a soil carefully prepared by centuries of philosophical cultivation, and has but little in common with the orgiastic ecstasies which we see among savage tribes of the present day. The Hindus also, before they became civilised and philosophers, may or may not have passed through such a phase. But how little of true similarity there really exists between the Yoga and Tapas of the Hindus, and the sweating processes of the American Indians in their steam-booths, may easily be seen from the excellent Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology, by J. W. Powell, 1892-3, p. 117 seq.; p. 823 seq., to mention no other and more painful reports.

Before we enter upon an examination of the peculiar teaching of the Yoga-philosophy, a few words with reference to the sources on which we have to depend for our information may be useful.

Patanjali, Vyasa

THE Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy are ascribed to Patanjali, who is also called Phanin or Sesha, the divine serpent. He may have been the author or the representative of the Yoga-philosophy without being necessarily the author of

the Sutras. His date is of course uncertain, though some scholars have, with great assurance, assigned him to the second century B.C. It may be so, but we should say no more. Even the commonly received identification of the philosopher Patanjali with Patanjali, the grammarian and author of the Mahabhashya, should be treated as yet as a hypothesis only. We know too little about the history of Sanskrit proper names to be able to say whether the same name implies the same person. That is not the case in any other country, and can hardly be true in India considering how freely the names of the gods or of great Rishis were taken, and are still taken, as proper names. It has actually been asserted that Vyasa, the author of a late commentary on Patanjali's Yoga-Sutras, is the same person as Vyasa, the collector of the Vedas, the reputed author of the Mahabharata and of the Vedanta-Sutras. But there are ever so many Vyasas living even now, and no solid argument could possibly be derived from the mere recurrence of such a name. There are works ascribed to Hiranyagarbha, Harihara, Vishnu, &c.; then why not to Patanjali? It is of course as impossible to prove that Patanjali the philosopher and Patanjali the grammarian were not the same person, as to prove that they were; but if style of language and style of thought are any safe guides in such matters, we ought certainly to hesitate, and should do so in any other literature, before taking the grammarian and the philosopher Patanjali as one and the same person. It would no doubt be a great help if we could transfer the date of the grammarian, the second century B.C., to the author of our Yoga-Sutras, but on that point also it seems to me better to wait till we get some more tangible proof. In the present state of knowledge, or rather ignorance, of all dates to be assigned to the philosophical Sutras, it is the duty of every scholar to abstain from premature assertions which only encumber and obstruct the way to further discoveries.

Second Century B. C.

THE second century would certainly be most welcome as a date for any of our extant philosophical Sutras, but that is no excuse for saying that the Yoga-philosophy was

reduced to the form of Sutras in that century, because the grammarian Patanjali, has been referred to that date. Besides, even the date assigned to the grammarian Patanjali is a constructive date only, and should not for the present be considered as more than a working hypothesis. The fact that these Yoga-Sutras do not enter on any controversy might certainly seem to speak in favour of their being anterior to the other Sutras; but we saw already why we could no more build any chronological conclusions on this than we should think of proving the anteriority of our Samkhya-Sutras by the attacks on its atheistical doctrines which occur in the Sutras of the other philosophical systems. I think we must be satisfied with the broad fact that Buddha was later than the classical Upanishads, and that our philosophical Sutras are later than Buddha, because they evidently refer to his doctrines, though not to his name. As to popular tradition, it is no doubt of little value, particularly in India; still I doubt whether tradition could have gone so completely wrong as to prophesy in the Sankshepa-Samkara-Vijaya¹ and elsewhere that Jaimini, Vyasa, Patanjali, and Samkara would appear on earth to uproot all heresies, if they had lived before the great heresy of Buddha. Patanjali is said to have been a portion of Sankarshana or Ananta, the hooded serpent Sesha, encircling the world, and it may be for the same reason that he is sometimes called Phanin (Phanibhartri). This is the kind of useless information which tradition gives us.

Chronology of Thought

IN India we must learn to be satisfied with the little we know, not of the chronology of years, but of the chronology of thought; and taking the Yoga, in its systematic form, i.e. in the Patanjali-Sutras, as post-Buddhistic, we can best understand the prominence which it gives both to the exercises which are to help toward overcoming the distracting influences of the outer world, and to the arguments in support of the existence of an Isvara or Divine Lord. This marked opposition became intelligible and necessary as directed against Kapila as well as against Buddha; and

¹ Yoga Aphorisms, p. lxvi.

in reading the Yoga-Sutras it is often difficult to say whether the author had his eye on the one or the other. If we took away these two characteristic features of the Yoga, the wish to establish the existence of an Isvara against all comers, and to teach the means of restraining the affections and passions of the soul, as a preparation for true knowledge, such as taught by the Samkhya-philosophy, little would seem to remain that is peculiar to Patanjali.

But though the Sutras are post-Buddhistic, there can be no doubt that not only the general outlines of the Samkhya, but likewise all that belongs to the Karmayoga or work-yoga was known before the rise of Buddhism. Thus, if we turn to the Mahabharata, we find that the twenty-four *principia*, with Purusha as the twenty-fifth, are often mentioned, though arranged and described in different ways. Then we read again (Anugita XXV): 'That which sages by their understanding meditate upon, which is void of smell, of taste, of colour, touch or sound, that is called Pradhana (Prakriti). That Pradhana is unperceived; a development of this unperceived power is the Mahat; and a development of the Pradhana (when it has) become Mahat, is Ahankara (egoism). From Ahankara is produced the development, namely, the great elements, and from the elements respectively, the objects of sense are stated to be a development.'

As to the Yoga-practices or tortures we know that, after practising the most severe Tapas for a time, Buddha himself declared against it, and rather moderated than encouraged the extravagant exercises of Brahmanic ascetics. His own experience at the beginning of his career had convinced him of their uselessness, nay, of their danger. But a moderately ascetic life, a kind of *via media*, remained throughout the idea of Buddhism, and we can well understand that the Brahmans, in trying to hold their own against the Buddhists, should have tried to place before the people an even more perfect system of asceticism. And, lest it should be supposed that the Samkhya-philosophy, which was considered as orthodox or Vedic, had given its sanction to Buddha's denial of an Atman and Brahman, which was far more serious than the denial of an Isvara, Lord, it would have seemed all the more necessary to protest

decidedly against such denial, and thus to satisfy the ingrained theistic tendencies of the people at large, by showing that the Samkhya, by admitting Purusha, admitted a belief in something transcendent, and did by no means, according to Patanjali at least, condemn a belief even in an Isvara, or Lord. In that sense it might truly be said that the Yoga-philosophy would have been timely and opportune, if it came more boldly forward, after the rise of Buddhism, not so much as a new system of thought, but as a reinvigorated and determined assertion of ancient Samkhya doctrines, which for a time had been thrown into the shade by the Buddhist apostasy. In this way it would become intelligible that Buddhism, though sprung from a soil saturated with Samkhya ideas, should have been anterior to that new and systematic development of Samkhya-philosophy, which we know in the Sutras of Kapila or in the Karikas or even in the Tattva-samasa; that in fact, in its elements, the Samkhya should be as decidedly pre-Buddhistic as in its final systematic form it was post-Buddhistic. That the existence side by side of two such systems as those of Kapila and Buddha, the one deemed orthodox, the other unorthodox, gave matter for reflection to the people in India we see best by a well-known verse which I quoted many years ago in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature (p. 102): 'If Buddha knew the law and Kapila not, what is truth? If both were omniscient, how could there be difference of opinion between the two?'

The Yoga-Philosophy

THE Yoga-Sutras, or the Yoganusasana¹, called also by the

¹ It is not much of an argument, but it may deserve to be mentioned, that the title given by Patanjali to the Yoga-Sutras, Atha Yoganusasana, 'Now begins the teaching of the Yoga,' and not Atha Yogajijnasa, reminds us of the title which the grammarian Patanjali gives to his Mahabhashya, Atha Sabdanusasana, 'Now begins the teaching of Words or of the Word.' This title does not belong to Panini's Sutras, but to the Mahabhashya; and it is curious that such a compound as Sabdanusasana would really offend against one of Panini's rules (II, 2, 14). According to Panini there ought to be no such compound, and though he does not give us the reason why he objects to this and other such-like compounds,

same name which was given to the Samkhya-Sutras, viz. Samkhya-pravachana, both being considered as expositions of the old Samkhya, may have been contained originally in some such text-book as the Tattva-samasa. The Sutras were published and translated by Ballantyne, 1852, a translation continued by Govindadeva-sastrin in the *Pandit*, vol. III, Nos. 28-68. A more useful edition, but not always quite correct translation, was given by Rajendralala Mitra in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1883, 'Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali, with the commentary of Bhoja Raja.' Vijnana-Bhikshu, whose commentary on Kapila's Samkhya-Sutras was mentioned before², and who is chiefly known by his *Yoga-varttika*, is the author also of the *Yoga-sara-samgraha*, an abstract of the Yoga, which has been edited and translated by Ganganatha Jha, Bombay, 1894, and may be consulted with advantage by students of philosophy. Colebrooke's essay on the Yoga, like all his essays, is still most useful and trustworthy; and there are in German the excellent papers on the Samkhya and Yoga by Professor Garbe in Buhler's *Grundriss*. Garbe speaks well of a dissertation by P. Markus, *Die Yoga-philosophie nach dem Rajamartanda darjestellt*, which, however, I have not been able to obtain.

we can easily see that Sanskrit did not sanction compounds which might be ambiguous, considering that Word-teaching might be taken in the sense of teaching coming from words as well as teaching having words for its object. It is true that this apparent irregularity might be removed by a reference to another rule of Panini (II, 3, 66), yet it is curious that the same, if only apparent, irregularity should occur both in the Mahabhashya and in the Yoga-Sutras, both being ascribed to Patanjali.

² Other works ascribed to the same author are :

The Brahma-mimamsa-bhashya, called Vijnanamrita.

The Samkhya-karika-bhashya, ascribed to him, but really composed by Gaudapada (see Ganganatha, p. 2).

The Yoga-varttika.

The Isvara-gita-bhashya, from the Kurma-purana.

The Prasnopanishad-aloka.

An explanation of Prasastapada's commentary on the Vaiseshika-Sutras, called Vaiseshika-varttika.

There are printed editions of the Samkhya-pravachana-bhashya, the Yoga-varttika, and the Samkhya-sara.

Misconception of the Objects of Yoga

It was almost impossible that the Yoga-philosophy, as represented by European scholars, should not have suffered from its close association with the Samkhya, properly so called. All its metaphysical antecedents were there. Yoga is indeed, as the Brahmans say, Samkhya, only modified, particularly in one point, namely, in its attempt to develop and systematise an ascetic discipline by which concentration of thought could be attained, and by admitting devotion to the Lord God as part of that discipline. Whether this was done, as is generally supposed, from mere theological diplomacy is a question we should find difficult to answer, considering how little we know of the personal character of Patanjali or of the circumstances under which he elaborated his theistic Samkhya-philosophy. There is an entire absence of animosity on his part, such as our own philosophers would certainly have displayed in accusing another philosopher of atheism and in trying to amend his system in a theistic direction. No doubt there must always have been a majority in favour of a theistic philosophy of the universe as against an atheistic, but whether Patanjali may be fairly accused of having yielded to the brutal force of numbers, and curried favour with the many against the few is quite another question. It is certainly extraordinary to see the perfect calmness with which, with very few exceptions, Kapila's atheism is discussed, and how little there is of the *ad populum* advocacy in support of a belief in God and a personal God. Nor does Kapila, like other atheistic philosophers, display any animosity against the Divine idea and its defenders. He criticises indeed the usual arguments by which theists make and unmake their God, if they represent Him as the creator and ruler of the world, and charge him at the same time with cruelty, by making him responsible for the origin of evil also. But all this is done by Kapila in a calm and what one might almost call a businesslike manner; and in answering Kapila's arguments, Patanjali also preserves the same Samatva or even temper. He imputes no *motives* to his antagonist, nor does he anywhere defend himself against any possible suspicion that in showing the necessity of a personal God, an Isvara, he was defending the interests of the Brahman priesthood.

After all, Isvara was not even a popular name for God, or the name of any special god, though it occurs as a name of Rudra, and in later times was applied even to such gods as Vishnu and Siva, after they had been divested of much of their old mythological trappings.

Devotion to Isvara, Misconceptions

IN this respect also we have something to learn from Hindu philosophers. Considering the importance of the subject, it is useful to see how little heat was expended on it either by Kapila or by Patanjali. If we remember how the two philosophies were in popular parlance distinguished from each other as Samkhya with and Samkhya without a Lord, we should have expected to see this question treated in the most prominent place. Instead of which we find Patanjali, at the end of the first chapter, after having described the different practices by which a man may hope to become free from all worldly fetters, mentioning simply as one of many expedients, I, 23, 'Devotion to the Lord,' or, as it is generally translated, 'devotion to God.' Devotion or Pranidhana (lit. placing oneself forward and into) is explained by Bhoja as one of the forms of resignation, as worship of Him, and as the surrender of all one's actions to Him. If a man, without wishing for any rewards consisting in worldly enjoyments, makes over all his cares to Isvara as the highest guide, that, we are told, is Pranidhana. Patanjali then goes on, 'As it has been said that Samadhi or complete absorption can be obtained through devotion to the Lord, the next that has to be explained in order, is the nature of that Lord, the proof, the majesty, the name of Him, the order of His worship, and the fruit thereof.' In I, 24 Patanjali goes on to say: 'Isvara, the Lord, is a Purusha (Self) that has never been touched by sufferings, actions, rewards, or consequent dispositions.' The commentary adds: 'Sufferings are such as Nescience, Avidya, &c.; actions are either enjoined, forbidden, or mixed; rewards are the ripened fruits of actions manifested in birth (genus, caste) and life, while dispositions (Asaya, *Anlage*) are so-called because they lie in the soil of the mind till the fruit has ripened, they are instincts (Samskara) or impressions (Vasana). If the Lord is called a Purusha, that means that

He is different from all other Purushas (Selves), and if He is called Lord, that means that He is able by His work alone to liberate the whole world. Such power is due to the constant prevalence of goodness (a Guna) in Him, who has no beginning, and this prevalence of goodness arises from His eminent knowledge. But the two, knowledge and power, are not dependent on each other, for they are eternally abiding in the very *substance* of Isvara. His very relation to that goodness is without beginning, because the union of Prakriti and Purusha, that is, the creation would, from a Yoga point of view, have been impossible without the will of such an Isvara. While the Chitta or mind in ordinary Purushas or Selves undergoes, while in the body, modifications tending towards happiness, unhappiness, and delusion, and, if remaining without blemish, good, and full of virtue, becomes conscious of the incidence of the pictures mirrored on the mind, it is not so with Isvara. His highest modification is of goodness alone, and he remains steadfast in enjoyment through eternal union with it. Therefore he alone is Isvara, eminent above all other Purushas. Again, even for one who has gained freedom, a return of sufferings, &c., is possible, and has to be guarded against by such means as are inculcated in the Yoga; but he, the Isvara, as he is always such as he is, is not like a man who has gained freedom, but he is by nature free. Nor should one say that there may be many such Isvara. Though there be equality of Purushas, *qua* Purushas, yet as their aims are different, such a view would be impossible. And though there be a possibility of more or less, yet the most eminent would always be the Isvara or the Lord, he alone having reached the final goal of lordship.

The Patanjala-bhashya dwells very strongly on this difference between the liberated soul and the Lord; for 'the liberated or isolated souls,' it says, 'attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to Isvara there never was and never can be such bondage. The emancipated implies bondage, but this can never be predicated of the Lord.'

We need not point out here the weak points of this argument, and the purely relative character of the great-

ness and separateness claimed for the Isvara, as compared with other Purushas, but it may be well to try to compare our own ideas of God, when put into clear and simple language, with the ideas here propounded. Patanjali seems to me to come very near to the Homoiousia of man with God, though he does not go quite as far as the Vedantin who claims for the Atman perfect Homousia with Brahman. His Isvara may be *primus inter pares*, but as one of the Purushas, he is but one among his peers. He is a little more than a god, but he is certainly not what we mean by God.

What is Isvara?

As Kapila had declared that the existence of such a being as Isvara did not admit of proof, Patanjali proceeds in the next Sutra to offer what he calls his proofs, by saying: 'In Him the seed of the omniscient (or omniscience) attains infinity.' It would be difficult to discover in this anything like a proof or a tenable appeal to any Pramana, without the help of the commentary. But Bhoja explains that what is meant here is that there are different degrees of all excellences, such as omniscience, greatness, smallness, and other Aisvaryas, and that therefore there must be for all of them a point beyond which it is impossible to go. This Niratisaya point, this *non plus ultra* of excellence, is what is claimed for Isvara or the Lord.

Though this could hardly be considered as a convincing argument of the existence of a Being endowed with all such transcendent excellences as are here postulated, it shows at all events an honest intention on the part of Patanjali. Patanjali's argument reminds us to a certain extent of the theistic argument of Cleanthes and Boethius. What he means is that where there is a great and greater, there must also be a greatest, and this is Isvara, and that where there is good and better, there must be best.

Nor does he flinch in trying to answer the questions which follow. The question is supposed to have been asked, how this Isvara, without any inducement, could have caused that union and separation of himself and Prakriti which, as we saw, is only another name for creation. The answer is that the inducement was his love of beings, arising from

his mercifulness, his determination being to save all living beings at the time of the Kalpapralayas and Mahapralayas, the great destructions and reconstructions of the world. This, of course, would not have been admitted by Kapila.

Next Patanjali proceeds to explain the majesty of Isvara by saying, in I, 26,—

‘He is the superior (Guru) even of the former ones, being himself not limited by time.’

By the former ones are meant, as we are told, the ancients, the first creators, such as Brahma and others, and by superior is meant instructor and guide, so that it would seem difficult to assign a higher position to any divine being than by placing him thus above Brahma and other accepted builders of the world. Next follows his name, I, 27 :

‘His name is Pranava.’

Pranava might etymologically mean breathing forth or glory. It is assigned as a name to the sacred syllable Om, possibly a relic of a time beyond our reach. It is said to have been the name of Isvara from all eternity, just as the name of father or son. This may be true, but it does not satisfy us. However old the name Pranava and the syllable Om may have been, they must have had a beginning, but in spite of all the theories of the Brahmans, there is not one in the least satisfactory to the scholar. Om is their sacred syllable, which has to be repeated a hundred or a thousand times in order to draw the mind away from all disturbing impressions and to concentrate it on the Supreme Being. But why it is so we cannot tell. It may be a mere imitation of the involuntary outbreathing of the deep vowel o, stopped by the labial nasal, and then drawn in; or it may be the contraction of a pronominal stem Avam, ‘that,’ corresponding to Ayam, ‘this,’ and it is certainly used in the sense of Yes, much as *hoc illud* was used in French when contracted to *oui*. But however that may be, it is called Pranava, ‘praise or breathing forth,’ and cannot be explained any further etymologically. It is a name, as Bhoja says, not made by anybody, and if it has any historical or etymological justification, this is at all events not known to us. Still we cannot go quite so far as Rajendralala Mitra, who sees in it an Indianised form of the

Hebrew *Amen* ! First of all, Amen does not mean God, and how should such a word have reached India during the Brahmana period?

Patanjali continues by telling us in Sutra I, 38, that repetition of the syllable Om and reflection on its meaning are incumbent on the student of Yoga. And this, as Bhoja adds, as a means to concentrate our thoughts, and to attain to Samadhi, the chief end of the whole Yoga-philosophy. In that sense he adds, I, 29:

‘Thence also obtainment of inward-turned thought, and absence of obstacles.’

Inward-turned thought (Pratyakchetana) is explained as a turning away of our senses from all outward objects, and turning them back upon the mind. The obstacles to Samadhi are mentioned in the next Sutra, I, 30, as

‘Disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldliness, error, not having a settled standpoint, and not keeping it; these are the obstacles causing unsteadiness of mind.’

I, 31. ‘With them arise pain, distress, tremor of limbs, and disturbance of the regular inbreathing and outbreathing.’

I, 32. ‘To prevent all this, there is constant fixing of the mind on one subject (Tattva)’

I, 33. ‘And likewise from a reviving friendliness, pity, complacency, and indifference towards objects of happiness, unhappiness, virtue and vice, there arises serenity of mind.’

The commentator adds, ‘If one sees happy people, one should not envy them; if one sees unhappiness, one should think how it could be removed; if one sees virtuous people, one should rejoice and not say, Are they really virtuous? if one sees vicious people, one should preserve indifference, and show neither approval nor aversion. Thus does the mind become serene and capable of Samadhi. But all these are only outward helps towards fixing the mind on one subject, and of thus in time obtaining Samadhi.’

I have given this extract in order to show how subordinate a position is occupied in Patanjali's mind by the devotion to Isvara. It is but one of the many means for steadying the mind, and thus realising that Viveka or discrimination between the true man (Purusha) and the objective world (Prakriti). This remains in the Yoga as it was in the

Samkhya, the *summum bonum* of mankind. I do not think, therefore, that Rajendralala Mitra was right when in his abstract of the Yoga (p. lii) he represented this belief in one Supreme God as the first and most important tenet of Patanjali's philosophy. 'The leading tenets of the Yogins,' he says, 'are first, that there is a Supreme God-head who is purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation; but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the father, creator, or protector of the universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected.'

Rajendralala Mitra does not stand alone in this opinion, and the very name of Sesvara-Samkhya, theistic Samkhya, given to the Yoga, would seem to speak in his favour. But we have only to look at the Sutras themselves to see that originally this belief in a personal God was by no means looked upon as the most characteristic feature of Patanjali's system.

Rajendralala Mitra is right, however, in stating the tenet, second in importance, to have been that there are countless individual souls or Purushas which animate living beings, and are eternal. They are pure and immutable; but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in the course of an ever-recurring metempsychosis.

The Isvara, with the Yogins, was originally no more than one of the many souls, or rather Selves or Purushas, but one that has never been associated with or implicated in metempsychosis, supreme in every sense, yet of the same kind as all other Purushas. The idea of other Purushas obtaining union with him could therefore never have entered Patanjali's head. According to him, the highest object of the Yogin was freedom, aloneness, aloofness, or self-centredness. As one of the useful means of obtaining that freedom, or of quieting the mind previous to liberating it altogether, devotion to the Isvara is mentioned, but again as one only out of many means, and not even as the most efficacious of all. In the popular atmosphere of India this

belief in one Supreme Being may have been a strong point in favour of Patanjali's system, but from a philosophical point of view, Patanjali's so-called proofs of the existence of God would hardly stand against any criticism. They are mere *parerga*, or side issue. We must remember that Kapila had committed himself to no more than that it is impossible to prove the existence of Isvara, this Isvara not being synonymous with God, in the highest sense of the word, but restricted to a personal creator and ruler of the world. Such a confession of an inability to prove the existence of an Isvara does not amount to atheism, in the current sense of that word, and thus only can we explain the fact that Kapila himself was considered orthodox by friends and foes. In the Vedanta-philosophy the question of the real existence of a personal Isvara never arises, though we know how saturated that philosophy is with a belief in the existence of Brahman, the absolute Divine Essence of which the active or personal Isvara or the Lord is but a passing manifestation, presented by Brahma, masc., a mere phase of Brahman, neuter. The Samkhya, in attempting to explain the universe, such as it is, both in its subjective and objective character, has no need to call in the assistance of a personal Isvara. What we mean by the objective world is, according to Kapila, the work or outcome of Prakriti, when animated by Purusha, not of Brahman. His system is therefore without a creator or personal maker of the world, but if we called it therefore atheistic, we should have to apply the same name to Newton's system of the world and Darwin's theory of evolution, though we know that both Newton and Darwin were thoroughly religious men. Darwin himself went so far as to maintain most distinctly that his system of nature required a Creator who breathed life into it in the beginning, and even those Darwinians who look upon this admission of Darwin's as a mere weakness of the moment, would strongly object to be called irreligious or atheists. Kapila might easily have used the very words of Darwin, and this is very much what Patanjali actually did in his Yoga-Sutras. His supreme Purusha, afterwards raised into an Adi-Purusha, or First Being, satisfied the human craving after a First Cause, and, so far as I can see, it was this natural craving

rather than any vulgar wish to curry favour with the orthodox party in India that led to Patanjali's partial separation from Kapila. We certainly need not suppose that the recognition of Kapila's orthodoxy was a mere contrivance of theological diplomacy on the part of the Brahmans, and that these defenders of the faith were satisfied with an insincere recognition of the supreme authority of the Vedas. I confess that with what we know of the religious life of India and the character of the Brahmans at all times, it seems to me very difficult to admit the idea of such a compromise. Besides, Kapila appeals, as we saw, to the Veda in good earnest, particularly when it supports his own views, as in V, 12, when he wants to prove 'that the world arises from primitive matter,' and appeals to the Veda, that is, to such passages as Svetasvatara Upanishad IV, 5, and Brihad. Ar. Up. I, 4, 7, that can be made to support his view. The two oldest representatives of the Samkhya-philosophy, the Tattva-samasa and the Karikas¹, do not even allude to the difficulty arising from the Isvara question, which seems to me an important argument in favour of their antiquity. The charge of atheism became more popular in later times, so that in the Padma-purana the charge of atheism is brought not against the Samkhya only, but against the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophies also, nay even against the Purva-Mimamsa. Two systems only escape this charge, the Uttara-Mimamsa and the Yoga; and in the case of the Uttara-Mimamsa, its explanation by Samkara is stigmatised as no better than Buddhism, because it perverts the meaning of passages of the Veda, which teach the identity of the individual soul with the highest soul (Brahman without qualities), and recommends the surrender of good works, and complete indifference towards this world and the next.

Kapila's Real Arguments

BUT it is but fair that we should hear what Kapila himself has to say. And here it is important again to observe that Kapila does not make a point of vehemently denying

¹ Hall, Preface to Samkhya-sara, p. 39, note, and Introduction to Samkhya-pravachana.

the existence of an Isvara, but seems likewise to have been brought to discuss the subject, as it were, by the way only, while engaged in discussing the nature of sensuous perception (I, 89). He had been explaining perception as cognition arising from actual contact between the senses and their respective objects. And here he is stopped by the inevitable opponent who demurs to this definition of perception, because it would not include, as he says, the perceptions of the Yogins. Kapila replies that these visions of the Yogins do not refer to external objects, and that, without denying their reality, he is dealing with the perceptions of ordinary mortals only. But the controversy does not end here. Another opponent starts up and maintains that Kapila's definition of perception is faulty, or at all events not wide enough because it does not include the perception of the Isvara or Lord. It is then that Kapila turns round on his opponent, and says that this Isvara, this, as it is pretended, perceptible Isvara, has never been proved to exist at all, has never been established by any of the three legitimate instruments of knowledge or *Pramanas*. This may seem to us to amount to a denial of an Isvara, but *Vijnana-Bhikshu* remarks with a great deal of truth, that if Kapila had wished to deny the existence of God, he would have said *Isvarabhavat*, and not *Isvarasiddheh*, that is, because Isvara does not exist, and not, as he says, because Isvara has not been proved to exist. Anyhow this is not the tone of a philosopher who wants to preach atheism, and in what follows we shall see that it is the manner rather than the matter of the proof of an Isvara which is challenged by Kapila and defended by his antagonist. Taking his stand on the ground that the highest blessedness or freedom consists in having renounced all activity, because every activity presupposes some kind of desire, which is of evil, he says 'that every proof in support of an Isvara as a maker or Lord, a *Sat-kara*, would break down. For if he were supposed to be above all variance and free, he could not have willed to create the world; if he were not so, he would be distracted and deluded and unfit for the supreme task of an Isvara.' Then follows a more powerful objection, based on the fact that the *Veda* speaks of an Isvara or Lord, and therefore he must exist. Kapila does not spurn

that argument, but, as he has recognised once for all the Veda as a legitimate source of information, he endeavours to prove that the Vedic passages relied on in support of the existence of a maker of the world, have a different purpose, namely the glorification of a liberated Self or Purusha, or of one who by devotion has attained supernatural power (I, 95). This is explained by Aniruddha as referring either to a Self which is almost, though not altogether, free, because if altogether free, it could have no desire, nor even the desire of creation; or to a Yogin who by devotion has obtained supernatural powers. Vijnana-Bhikshu goes a step further, and declares that it refers either to a Self that has obtained freedom from all variance and disturbance, or to the Self that is and has remained free from all eternity, that is, to the Adi-purusha, the First Self, who in the theistic Yoga-philosophy takes the place of the Creator, and who may, for all we know, have been the origin of the later Purushottama.

Aniruddha thereupon continues that it might be said that without the superintendence of some such intelligent being, unintelligent Prakriti would never have acted. But this also he rejects, if it is meant to prove the existence of an active creator, because the superintendence of the Purusha of the Samkhyas over Prakriti is not an active one, but arises simply from proximity, as in the case of a crystal (I, 96). What he means is that in the Samkhya the Purusha is never a real maker or an agent. He simply reflects on Prakriti, or the products of Prakriti are reflected on him; and as anything reflected in a crystal or a mirror seems to move when the mirror is moved, though it remains all the time quite unmoved, thus the Purusha also seems to move and to be an agent, while what is really moving, changing, or being created is Prakriti. The Purusha therefore cannot be called superintendent, as if exercising an active influence over Prakriti, but Prakriti is evolved up to the point of Manas under the eyes of Purusha, and the Purusha does no more than witness all this, wrongly imagining all the time that he is himself the creator or ruler of the world. In support of this Aniruddha quotes a passage from the Bhagavad-gita (III, 27) : 'All emana-

tions of Prakriti are operated by the Gunas ; but the Self deluded by Ahamkara imagines that he is the operator.'

Another objection is urged against the Samkhya view that the Purusha is not a doer or creator, namely that, in that case, a dead body also might be supposed to perform the act of eating. But no, he says, such acts are performed not by a dead or inactive Atman, as little as a dead body eats. It is the individual Purusha (Jiva) that performs such acts, when under the influence of Prakriti (Buddhi, Ahamkara, and Manas), while the Atman or Purusha remains for ever unchanged.

A last attempt is made to disprove the neutrality or non-activity of the Atman, that is, the impossibility of his being a creator, namely the uselessness of teaching anything, supposing the Self to be altogether without cognition. To this the answer is that though the Atman is not cognitive, yet the Manas is. The Atman reflects on the Manas, and hence the illusion that he himself cognises, while in reality he does no more than witness the apprehension of the Manas. Thus when it is said, 'He is omniscient and omnipotent,' *he* (in spite of the gender) is meant for Prakriti, as developed into Manas, and not for the Purusha who in reality is a mere witness of such omniscience and omnipotence (III, 56), deluded, for a time, by Prakriti.

The Theory of Karman

IN another place where the existence of an Isvara, or active ruler of the world, is once more discussed in the Samkhya-Sutras, the subject is again treated not so much for its own sake, as in order to settle the old question of the continuous effectiveness of works (Karman). The reward of every work done, according to Kapila, does not depend on any ruler of the world; the works themselves are working on for evermore. If it were otherwise, we should have to ascribe the creation of the world, with all its suffering, to a Lord who is nevertheless supposed to be loving and gracious.

Madhava in his *Sarva-darsana-samgraha* (translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 228) uses the same argument, saying: 'As for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," what has been proclaimed by beat of drum

by the advocates of His existence, this has well nigh passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does He act thus *before* or *after* creation? If you say before, we reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be no need, as long as there is no creation, for any desire to free living beings from pain (which is the main characteristic of compassion); and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God created the world through compassion, and on the other hand that He compassionated it after He had created it.'

And again, as every activity presupposes desire, the Lord, whether working for Himself or for others, would *ipso facto* cease to be free from desires. This argument is examined from different points of view, but always leads to the same result in the end; that is to say, to the conviction that the highest state of perfection and freedom from all conditions is really far higher than the ordinary conception of the status of the popular Hindu deities, higher even than that of an Isvara, if conceived as a maker and ruler of the universe. This concept of the liberated Purusha or Atman has in fact superseded the concept of the Isvara, and to have made this quite clear would have been, on the part of Kapila, by far the most effective defence against the charge of atheism. The conscience of Kapila and of the ancient Samkhyas was evidently satisfied with a belief in a Purusha in which the old concepts of the divine and the human had been welded into one, without claiming even the aid of an Adi-purusha, a first Purusha, which was a later expedient.

Nor must it be forgotten that other philosophies also besides the Samkhya have been suspected or openly accused of atheism for the same reason. It is easy to understand why almost every philosophy, whether Indian or European, if it endeavours to purify, to dehumanise, and to exalt the idea of the Godhead, can hardly avoid the suspicion of denying the old gods, or of being without a belief in the God of the vulgar. It is well known that on that ground even the early Christians did not escape the suspicion of atheism.

Even Jaimini's Purva-Mimamsa, though based on the belief that the Veda is of superhuman origin, and though

entirely devoted to the interpretation of the Vedic sacrifice, has been charged with atheism, because it admitted the independent evolution of works, which was supposed to imply a denial of God; nor did the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems, as we saw, escape the same suspicion. It may be that the recognition of the authority of the Veda was considered sufficient to quiet the theological conscience; but there is certainly, so far as I can see, no passage in the Nyaya and Vaiseshika-Sutras where an Isvara is clearly denied or postulated either as the author or as the controller of the infinitesimally small elements or atoms of which the world is by them supposed to consist. There is one passage in the Nyaya Sutras in which the question of a divine Lord is discussed in the usual way, namely Book V, Sutras 19-21, but otherwise we hear nothing of what the Isvara is meant to be or to do.

These attacks, as met by the Nyaya philosophers, may be looked upon as purely academic, but the tone in which they are met, for instance, by later philosophers such as Madhava in his *Sarva-darsana-samgraha*, shows that they at all events took them seriously. As specimens of Indian casuistry some extracts from Madhava's chapter on the Nyaya may here be of interest. I quote from the translation by Cowell and Gough (p. 171): 'It is quite true,' he says, 'that none of the three *Pramanas* can prove the existence of a Supreme Being. Perception cannot, because the Deity, being devoid of form, must be beyond the senses. Inference cannot, because there is no universal proposition or middle term that could apply. The Veda cannot, because we Naiyayikas have ourselves proved it to be non-eternal. All this we admit to be quite true, that is, we admit that a Supreme Isvara cannot be established by proof. But is there not, on the other side, the old argument that the mountains, seas, &c., must have had a maker, because they possess the nature of being effects, quite as much as a jar (or, as we should say, a watch)? And that they are effects can easily be proved by the fact that they possess parts, these parts existing in intimate relation, and again by the fact that they possess a limited magnitude half-way between what is infinitely great and infinitesimally small. Nor has any proof ever been produced on the opposite side

to show that the mountains had no maker. For if any one should argue that the mountains cannot have had a maker because they were not produced by a body, just as the eternal ether—this pretended inference would no more stand examination than the young fawn could stand the attack of the full-grown lion, for you have not even shown that what you say about the eternal ether is a real fact. We therefore abide by our old argument that the mountains have the nature of effects and if they had no maker, they could not be effects, that is, produced, not by themselves alone, but by concurrent causes, one of them being a maker. A maker is a being possessed of a combination of volition, desire to act, a knowledge of proper means, setting in motion all other causes, but itself moved by none (the Aristotelian *kinoun akneton*).'

But though yielding to this argument, the objector asks next, what object this maker or Isvara could have had in view in creating the world. A feeling of compassion, if he had any, should surely have induced him to create all living beings happy, and not laden with misery, since this militates against his compassion. Hence he concludes that it would not be fitting to admit that God created the world. Hereupon the Nyaya philosopher becomes very wroth and exclaims: 'O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased to close for a moment thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following suggestions. His action in creating is indeed caused by compassion only, but the idea of a creation which shall consist of nothing but happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good and evil actions (Karman) of the beings who are to be created.'

In answer to this, the atheistic opponent returns once more to the authority of the Veda and says: 'But then, how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God, and then again God's existence by the Veda].'

But the theistic interpreter and defender of the Nyaya is not silenced so easily, and replies: 'We defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each" which you call

"reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known? It cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no possibility of *His* being produced; nor can it be in regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any Yogin endowed with transcendent faculties (Tivra, &c.).

Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, liberation, is obtained; thus everything is clear.'

Everything may be clear to one accustomed to the Indian way of arguing; but from our point of view it would certainly seem that, though the Nyaya does not teach the non-existence of an Isvara, it is not very successful in proving by its logic the necessity of admitting a maker or ruler of the world, that is, an Isvara.

The Four Books of Yoga-Sutras

If now we turn to the Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali we find that the first book, the Samadhi-pada, is devoted to an explanation of the form and aim of Yoga, and of Samadhi, meditation or absorption of thought; the second, the Sadhana-pada, explains the means of arriving at this absorption; the third, Vibhuti-pada, gives an account of the supernatural powers that can be obtained by absorption and ascetic exercises; while the fourth, the Kaivalyapada, explains Kaivalya to be the highest object of all these exercises, of concentration of thought, and of deep absorption and ecstasy. Kaivalya, from Kevala, alone, means the isolation of the soul from the universe and its return to itself, and not to any other being, whether Isavara, Brahman, or any one else.

That this is the right view of the case is confirmed by the remarks made by Vijnana-Bhikshu in his Yoga-sara-samgraha, p. 18. Here we are told that even when there is some imperfection in the employment of the above means (faith, energy, memory, absorbing meditation, and

knowledge), the two results (absorption and liberation) can be brought very near by the grace of the Parama Isvara, the Highest Lord, and secured by devotion to Him.

By Parama-Isvara or the Highest Lord is here meant that particular Purusha (Self) who was never touched by the five troubles, nescience and the rest, nor by virtue or vice and their various developments, or by any residue (results of former deeds) in general. Vijnana-Bhikshu abstains from saying much more on the Lord, because, as he says, he has treated of this Being very fully in his remarks on the Brahma-Sutras I, 1. He probably refers to his commentary on the Vedanta; and he is evidently quite convinced that, however different the roads followed by the Vedantins and Samkhya-yogins may be, the Divine idea of both schools is much the same. He only adds that the powers and omniscience of the Isvara are equalled or excelled by none, that he is the spiritual chief and father of all the gods, such as Brahma, Vishnu, and Hara, that he imparts spiritual vision (Jnana-chakshus) through the Vedas, and that he is the inner guide, and called Pranava. Devotion to Him is said to consist in contemplation and to end in direct perception. Steadfastness with regard to Isvara is represented as the principal factor in abstract meditation and in liberation, because it leads to greater nearness to the final goal, steadiness with regard to the human self being secondary only. This devotion to Isvara is also declared to put an end to all the impediments, such as illness, &c. (I, 30); and a passage is quoted from the Smriti, 'For one desiring liberation the most comfortable path is clinging to or resting on Vishnu; otherwise, thinking only with the mind, a man is sure to be deceived.'

True Object of Yoga

It is clear throughout the whole of this chapter on Isvara that devotion to him is no more than one of the means, though, it may be, a very important one, for the attainment of liberation, the highest goal of the Yoga. But it is not that highest goal itself, but only a means towards it, nor could it be accepted as the most important feature of the Yoga. The really important character of the Yoga consists in its teaching that, however true the Samkhya-philo-

sophy may be, it fails to accomplish its end without those practical helps which the Yoga-philosophy alone supplies. The human mind, though fully enlightened as to its true nature, would soon be carried away again by the torrent of life; the impressions of the senses and all the cares and troubles of every-day life would return, if there were no means of making the mind as firm as a rock. Now this steadying of the mind, this Yoga, is what Patanjali is chiefly concerned with.

Chitta

WE saw that in the second Sutra he explained Yoga as Chitta-vritti-nirodha, that is, restraining or steadying the actions and distractions of thought. Vritti, which I translate by action, has also been rendered by movement or function; while Chitta, which I give as thought, has often been translated by mind or the thinking principle. It is curious that the Yoga should have employed a word which, as far as I know, was not a recognised technical term of the Samkhya. In the Samkhya, the term would be Manas, mind, but Manas in a state of activity, and, of course, as a development of Ahamkara and Buddhi. It has to be taken here as a psychological term, as a name for thought, as carried on in real life, and indirectly only of the instrument of thought. As I had to use mind for Manas in the Samkhya-philosophy, it would be difficult to find a better rendering of the word when used by Yoga philosophers. Of course Manas is always different from Buddhi, in so far as it is a modification of Buddhi, which itself has passed through Ahamkara or the differentiation of subjectivity and objectivity. But for practical purposes, what is meant by Chitta is simply our thought or our thinking, and though mind, with us also, has been defined very differently by different philosophers, and is used most promiscuously in common parlance, its etymological relationship with Manas pointed it out as the most convenient rendering of Manas, provided always that we remember its being a technical term of the Yoga-philosophy, as we have to do whenever we render Prakriti by nature. Nirodha, restraint, does not mean entire suppression of all movements of thought, but at first concentration only, though it leads

in the end to something like utter vacuity or self-absorption. In all the functions of the Manas it must be remembered that the real self-conscious seer or perceiver is, for the time being, the Purusha or Self. It is he who is temporarily interested in what is going on, though not absorbed in it except by a delusion only. Like the moon reflected in the ripples of the waters, the Self appears as moving in the waves which break against it from the vast ocean of Prakriti, but in reality it is not moving. We saw that the mind, when receiving impressions from the outer world, was supposed in Hindu philosophy to assume for the time being the actual form of the object perceived, but, when once perfect in Yoga, it perceives nothing but itself.

Functions of the Mind

THE principal acts and functions of the mind are described as right notion, wrong notion, fancy, sleep, and remembering, and they may be either painful or not.

Right notions are brought about by the three Pramanas, so well known from different systems of Indian philosophy, as sensuous perception, inference, and testimony, Vedic or otherwise. It is significant that Patanjali should have used Agama instead of the Aptavachana of the Samkhya, for Agama means distinctly the Veda, and thus would establish once for all what is called the orthodox character of the Yoga.

Wrong notions require no explanation. They are illustrated by our mistaking mother-of-pearl for silver, a rope for a snake, &c. A state of doubt also when we are uncertain whether what we see at a distance is a man or the trunk of a tree, is classed among wrong notions.

Fancy is explained as chiefly due to words ; and a curious instance of fancy is given when we speak of the intelligence of the Self or Purusha, or of the head of Rahu, the fact being that there is no intelligence belonging to Self, but that the Self is altogether intelligence, just as Rahu, the monster that is supposed to swallow the moon, is not a being that has a head, but is a head and nothing else.

Sleep is defined as that state (Vritti) of the mind which has nothing for its object. The commentator, however,

explains that in sleep also a kind of perception must take place, because, otherwise, we could not say that we had slept well or badly.

Remembering is the not wiping out of an object that has once been perceived. While true perception, false perception, and fancy take place in a waking state, a dream, which is a perception of vivid impressions, takes place in sleep, while sleep itself has no perceptible object. Remembering may depend on true or false perceptions, on fancy, and even on dreams.

Exercises

Now all these actions or functions have to be restrained, and in the end to be suppressed, and this is said to be effected by exercises (Abhyasa) and freedom from passions (Vairagya), I, 12.

Indian philosophers have the excellent habit of always explaining the meaning of their technical terms. Having introduced for the first time the terms exercise and freedom from passion, Patanjali asks at once: 'What is Abhyasa or exercise?' Abhyasa is generally used in the sense of repetition, but he answers that he means hereafter to use this term in the sense of effort towards steadiness (Sthiti) of thought. And if it be asked what is meant by steadiness or Sthiti, he declares that it means that state of the mind, when, free from all activity (Vritti), it remains in its own character, that is, unchanged. Such effort must be continuous or repeated, as implied by the term Abhyasa (I, 13).

This Abhyasa is said to become firmly grounded, if practised for a long time thoroughly and unintermittingly (I, 14).

Dispassion, Vairagya

NEXT follows the definition of dispassion (Vairagya), as the consciousness of having overcome (the world) on the part of one who has no longer any desire for any objects whatsoever, whether visible or revealed (I, 15).

Here visible (Drishta) stands for perceptible or sensuous objects, while Anusravika may be translated by revealed, as it is derived from Anusrava, and this is identical with

Sruti or Veda. Perhaps Anusrava is more general than Veda, including all that has been handed down, such as the stories about the happiness of the gods in paradise (Devaloka), &c. The consciousness of having subdued or overcome all such desires and being no longer the slave of them, that, we are told, is Vairagya or dispassionateness, and that is the highest point which the student of Yoga-philosophy hopes to reach.

It is interesting to see how deeply this idea of Vairagya or dispassionateness must have entered into the daily life of the Hindus. It is constantly mentioned as the highest excellence not for ascetics only, but for everybody. It sometimes does not mean much more than what we mean by the even and subdued temper of the true gentleman, but it signifies also the highest unworldliness and a complete surrender of all selfish desires. A very good description of what Vairagya is or ought to be is preserved to us in the hundred verses ascribed to Bhartrihari (650 A.D.), which are preceded by two other centuries of verses, one on worldly wisdom and the other on love. Many of these verses occur again and again in other works, and it is very doubtful whether Bhartrihari was really the original author of them all, or whether he only collected them as Subhashitas.¹ Anyhow they show how the philosophy of Vairagya had leavened the popular mind of India at that distant time, nor has it ceased to do so to the present day. It was perhaps bold, after Bhartrihari, to undertake a similar collection of verses on the same subject. But as the Vairagya-sataka of Jainacharya seems in more recent times to have acquired considerable popularity in India, a few extracts from it may serve to show that the old teaching of Patanjali and Bhartrihari has not yet been forgotten in their native country.

‘Death follows man like a shadow, and pursues him like an enemy; perform, therefore, good deeds, so that you may reap a blessing hereafter.’

‘Frequent enjoyment of earthly prosperity has led to your

¹ His work is actually called Subhashita-trisati, see Report of Sanskrit and Tamil MSS., 1896-97, by Seshagiri Sastri, p. 7.

sufferings. Pity it is that you have not tried the "Know Yourself."

'Live in the world but be not of it, is the precept taught by our old Rishis, and it is the only means of liberating yourself from the world.'

'The body is perishable and transitory, while the Self is imperishable and everlasting; it is connected with the body only by the link of Karman; it should not be subservient to it.'

'If, through sheer negligence, you do nothing good for your fellow creatures, you will be your own enemy, and become a victim to the miseries of this world.'

'Better to do less good, with purity of heart, than to do more with jealousy, pride, malice, or fraud. Little, but good and loving work, is always valuable, like a pure gem, the essence of a drug, or pithy advice.'

'If you are unable to subject yourself physically to penances, to undergo austerities, and engage in deep contemplation, the proper course to liberate your soul from the hard fetters of Karman would be to keep the passions of your heart under control, to check your desires, to carry out your secular affairs with calmness, to devote yourself to the worship of God, and to realise in yourself the "Permanent Truth," bearing in mind the transitory nature of the universe.'

'To control your mind, speech, and body, does not mean to be thoughtless, silent or inactive, like beasts or trees; but, instead of thinking what is evil, speaking untruth, and doing harm to others, mind, speech, and body should be applied to good thoughts, good words, and good deeds.'

Dispassionateness, as here taught for practical purposes chiefly, reaches its highest point in the eyes of the Yoga-philosopher, when a man, after he has attained to the knowledge of Purusha, has freed himself entirely from all desire for the three Gunas (or their products). This is at least what Patanjali says in a somewhat obscure Sutra (I, 11)¹. This Sutra seems intended to describe the highest state within reach of the true Vairagin, involving indifference not only to visible and revealed objects, but likewise

¹ Garbe, Grundriss, p. 49.

towards the Gunas, that is, if I am not mistaken, the twenty-four Tattvas, here called Gunas¹, because determined by them. The knowledge of the Purusha implies the distinction between what is Purusha, the Self, and what is not, and therefore also between Purusha and the Gunas of Prakriti. Vijnana-Bhikshu explains it by Atmanatmavivekasakshatkarat, i.e. from realising the difference between what is Self and what is not Self, and not as a possessive compound: the sense, however, remaining much the same. It is curious that Rajendralala Mitra should have rendered Purushakhyateh by 'conducive to a knowledge of God.' From a purely philosophical point of view Purusha may be translated by God, but such a translation would be misleading here, particularly as the Sutra 23, on the devotion to the Lord, follows so soon after. It would have been better also to translate 'arising from,' than 'conducive to.'

Meditation With or Without an Object

PATANJALI next proceeds (I, 17) to explain an important distinction between the two kinds of meditative absorption (Samadhi), which he calls Samprajnata and Asamprajnata. This seems to mean that there is one kind of meditation when our thoughts are directed and fixed on a definite object, and another when there is no definite object of meditation left. Here the spirit of minute distinction shows itself once more, for though these two kinds of meditation may well be kept apart, and the former be considered as preliminary to the latter, the numerous subdivisions of each hardly deserve our notice. We are told that what is called conscious meditation may have for its object either one or the other of the twenty-four Tattvas or the Isvara, looked upon as one of the Purushas. The twenty-

¹ These Gunas are more fully described in II, 19, where we read that the four Gunas or Gunaparvani are meant for (1) Visesha, i.e. the gross elements and the organs; (2) Avisesha, i.e. the subtle elements and the mind; (3) the Lingamatra, i.e. Buddhi; (4) the Alimga, i.e. Prakriti as Avyakta. In the commentary to I, 45, the same classes of Gunas are described as Alimga, a name of Pradhana, Visishtalimga, the gross elements (Bhutani); Avisishtalimga, the subtle essence and the senses; Lingamatra, i.e. Buddhi, and Alimga, that is, the Pradhana.

four Tattvas are called unconscious, the twenty-fifth or Purusha is conscious. When meditation (Bhavana) has something definite for its object it is called not only Prajnata, known, or, as referred to the subject, knowing, but also Savija, literally with a seed, which I am inclined to take in the sense of having some seed on which it can fix, and from which it can develop. The Asamprajnata-samadhi, or meditation without a known object, is called Avija, not having a seed from which to spring or to expand. Indian commentators, however, take a different view.

Those who in their Samadhi do not go beyond the twenty-four Tattvas, without seeing the twenty-fifth, the Purusha, but at all events identify themselves no longer with the body, are called Videhas, bodyless; others who do not see the Purusha yet, but only existence, are called Prakritilayas, absorbed in Prakriti.

This again is not quite clear to me, but it is hardly necessary that we should enter into all the intricate subdivisions of the two kinds of meditation, such as Savitarka, argumentative, Savichara, deliberative, Sananda, joyous, and Sasmita¹, with false conceit. They may become important in a more minute study of the Yoga, but they can hardly be of interest to speculative philosophers except so far as they furnish another proof of a long continued study of the Yoga-philosophy in India before the actual composition of the Sutras.

The Asamprajnata-samadhi, or meditation without a known object, or, it may be, unconscious meditation, is explained as being preceded by a repetition of negative perception, and as the end of all previous impressions. I, 18.

This Sutra has been differently explained by different European and Indian commentators. It may mean that there is a residue of previous impressions, or that there is not. The Samskaras, which I have rendered by previous impressions, are everything that has given to the mind its peculiar character, its flavour, so to say, or its general disposition,

¹ Asmita is different from Ahamkara, and means the misconception that I am (Asmi) what I am not, such as Prakriti, Buddhi, Ahamkara, Manas, &c.

'Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem
Testa diu.'

It may be intended that these Samskaras are either all wiped out, or that there is but a small residue of them, manifested in the final act of the stopping all functions of the mind.

In summing up what has been said about the different kinds of Samadhi, Patanjali says (I, 19) once more that in the case of the Videhas and Prakritilayas (as already explained before) the object or, if you like, the cause of Samadhi is the real world (Bhava), but that for other Yogins there are preliminary conditions or steps to Samadhi, namely, faith, energy, memory, concentration, and knowledge succeeding each other. Every one of these Samadhis is again carefully defined, and some more helps are mentioned in the next Sutra (I, 21), where we read that Samadhi may be said to be near or within reach when the zeal or the will is strong. These strong-willed or determined aspirants are again divided (I, 22) according as the means employed by them are mild, moderate, or excessive. Thus we get nine classes of Yogins, those who employ mild means, with mild, with moderate, or with excessive zeal; those who employ moderate means, with mild, with moderate, or with excessive zeal; and those who employ excessive means with mild, with moderate, or with excessive zeal.

Such divisions and subdivisions which fully justify the name of Samkhya, enumeration, make both the Samkhya- and Yoga-philosophies extremely tedious, and I shall in future dispense with them, though they may contain now and then some interesting observations.

Isvara Once More

AFTER an enumeration of all these means of Yoga to be employed by the student, follows at last the famous Sutra I, 23, which has always been supposed to contain, in answer to Kapila, the proof of the existence of a Deity, and which I translated before by 'Devotion to the Lord.' The commentator calls it simply an easy expedient, an alternative. Nor is it right, with Rajendralala Mitra, to translate this Sutra at once by 'Devotion to God.' Isvara, as we saw,

is not God in the sense in which Brahma might be called so. He is a God, the highest God, but always one of many Purushas; and though he was looked upon as holy (I, 25) and omniscient, he never seems to have risen to the rank of a Creator, for which there is really no room in the Samkhya system. Though it is true, no doubt, that the orthodox Yogins derived great comfort from this Sutra as shielding Patanjali against the charge of atheism, it would be impossible to look upon it as a real proof in support of the existence of God, or as more than a somewhat forced confession of faith.

Other Means of Obtaining Samadhi

THE benefits arising from this devotion to the Lord are not essentially different from those that are to be obtained from other Upayas or means of attaining Samadhi, as may be seen from Sutras I, 29 to I, 33 translated before. Nor is this devotion even the last or the highest Upaya, for Patanjali goes on immediately after to mention other means equally conducive to concentrated meditation or absorption in the thought of one object. Expedients, such as the expulsion and retention of the breath, follow next, the so-called Pranayamas, which we can well believe, may have been really useful as contrivances to draw away the thoughts from all subjects except the one chosen for meditation, generally one of the Tattvas. But this opens far too large a subject for our purpose in this place. We approach here to the pathological portion of the Yoga, the so-called Hatha or Kriya-yoga, a subject certainly far more important than has generally been supposed, but a subject for students of pathology rather than of philosophy, unless, as is now the fashion, we include the so-called physico-psychological experiments under the name of philosophy. One thing may certainly be claimed for our Sutras; they are honest in their statements as to the discipline that can be applied to the mind through the body, and even if they could be proved to have been mistaken in their observations, their illusions do not seem to me to have been mere frauds, at least in the days of Patanjali, though it is far from my purpose to undertake a defence of all the doings and sayings of modern Yogins or Mahatmans.

Next to the moderation or restraint of the breathing, follow descriptions of how the mind, by being directed to the tip of the nose, cognises a heavenly odour, and the same with all the other senses, which therefore are supposed to have no longer any inclination towards outward objects, having everything they want in themselves. We are next told of the perception of an inward luminous and blessed state, which produces a steadiness and contentedness of the mind when directed towards objects which no longer appeal to the passions (I, 37). No wonder that even objects seen in dreams or in sleep are supposed to answer the same purpose, that is, to fix the attention. In fact any object may be chosen for steady meditation, such as the moon without, or our heart within, provided always that these objects do not appeal to our passions.

All these are means towards an end, and there can be no doubt that they have proved efficacious; only, as so often happens, the means have evidently encroached in this case also, on the aims, and to such an extent that Yoga has often been understood to consist in these outward efforts rather than in that concentration of thought which they were meant to produce, and which was to lead on to Kaivalya or spiritual separateness and freedom. This true Yoga is often distinguished as Raja-yoga or royal Yoga from the other called Kriya-yoga or working Yoga, which is sometimes called Hatha-yoga, though it is not clear why. Though some of these bodily exercises are represented as serving as a kind of staircase on which the mind ascends step by step, we are told at other times that any step may be useful, and that some may be skipped or taken for passed.

Now, if we ask what is the result of all this, we are told in Sutra 41 that a man who has put an end to all the motions and emotions of his mind, obtains with regard to all objects of his senses conformation grounded in them (*sic*), or steadiness and consubstantiation, the idea being that the mind is actually modified or changed by the objects perceived (I, 41). As a crystal, when placed near a red flower, becomes really red to our eyes, in the same way the mind is supposed to become tinged by the objects perceived. This impression remains true as grounded in the

object, and our mind should always be centred on one object of meditation.

Having mentioned in a former Sutra that Samadhi (here called Samapatti) may be either Savitarka or Savichara, he now explains (I, 42) that when meditation is mixed with uncertainties as to word, meaning, or knowledge, it is called Savitarka. Thus, supposing that our meditation was centred on a cow, the question would be whether we should meditate on the sound cow, Sk. Go, or on the meaning of it (Begriff), that is the genus cow, or the idea or picture (Vorstellung) conveyed by it. Such a meditation would be called Savitarka. Its opposite is Nirvitarka when all memory vanishes and the meaning alone, without any form, remains, or, as the commentator puts it, though not much more clearly, when the knowing mind (Prajna), tinged with the form of its object, forgets its own subjective form of knowing, and becomes, as it were, one in form with the object.

After Samadhi, both Savitarka and Nirvitarka, has been described, the next division is into Savichara and Nirvichara. They are defined as having reference to subtle objects (I, 44), that is, to the Tanmatras, essences, and the senses, and thus we learn that the former, the Savitarka Samadhi, had to deal with material objects only. Subtle objects include Prakriti also, and there is nothing subtle beyond it, for the Purusha is neither subtle nor non-subtle.

If we look upon the Nirvichara Samadhi as the highest of the Samadhis, then there would follow on the completion of that meditation contentment or peace of the Self (Atman). Knowledge in this state is called Ritambhara, right or truth-bearing, quite different from the knowledge which is acquired by inference or by revelation. And from this knowledge springs a disposition which overcomes all former dispositions and renders them superfluous.

Samadhi Aprajnata

THIS knowledge therefore would seem to be the highest goal of the true Yogin; but no, there is still something beyond knowledge, and that is what was called before Aprajnata Samadhi, meditation without any object, or pure

ecstasy. This restores the Purusha to his own nature, after he has been delivered from all the outside disturbances of life, and particularly from the ignorance that caused him to identify himself for awhile with any of the works of Prakriti (Asmita).

Kaivalya, Freedom

THIS short account of what is contained in the first chapter of the Yoga-Sutras contains almost all that can be of interest to European philosophers in the system of Patanjali, and it is not impossible that it may have originally formed a book complete in itself. It shows us the whole drift of the Yoga in its simplest form, beginning with the means of steadying and concentrating the mind on certain things, and more particularly on the twenty-four Tattvas, as taken over from the Samkhya, and leading on to a description of meditation, no longer restricted to any of the Tattvas, which is tantamount to a meditation which does not dwell on anything that can be offered by an ideal representation of what is called the real world. It is really meditation of each Purusha on himself only, as distinct from all the Tattvas of Prakriti. This is Kaivalya or the highest bliss in the eyes of the true Yogin, and it may well be called the highest achievement of Jnana-yoga, i.e. Yoga carried on by thought or by the will alone. Outward helps, such as the Pranayama, the in-and out-breathing, are just alluded to, but that is almost the only allusion to what in later times came to be the most prominent part of the practical or Kriya-yoga, namely, the postures and other ascetic performances (Yogangas), supposed to prepare the mind for its own higher efforts. The above-mentioned Isvara-pranidhana, 'Devotion to the Lord,' is classed here as simply one of the Yogangas or accessories of Yoga, together with purification, contentment, penance, and mumbling of prayers (II, 32), showing how little of real philosophical importance was ascribed to it by Patanjali. It helps towards Samadhi, meditation, it is a kind of worship (Bhakti-visesha) addressed to Bhagavat; but that is all the commentator has to say in recommendation of it. There is nothing to show that Patanjali imagined he had thereby given a full and satisfactory answer to the most

momentous of all questions, the existence or non-existence of an individual Creator or Ruler of the world.

It is quite possible that some of my readers will be disappointed by my having suppressed fuller details about these matters, but it seems to me that they really have nothing to do with philosophy in the true sense of the word; and those who take an interest in them may easily consult texts of which there exist English translations, such as the second and third books of the Yoga-Sutras, and better still the Hathaprayoga, translated by Shrinivas Iyengar, Bombay, 1893; On the Vedantic Raj-Yoga, by Sabhapati Svami, edited by Siris Chandra Basu, Lahore, 1880; the Gheranda-samhita, Bombay, 1895, and several more. There is also a very useful German translation by H. Walter, 'Svatmarama's Hatha-yoga-pradipika, Munchen, 1893.

Yogangas, Helps to Yoga

It is true that considerable antiquity is claimed for some of these Yogangas, or members of Yoga. Siva himself is reported to have been their author, and names such as Vasishtha and Yajnavalkya are quoted as having described and sanctioned eighty-four postures, while Gorakshanatha reckoned their true number as 8,400,000¹. I take a few specimens from Rajendralala Mitra's Yoga Aphorisms, p. 103:

'1. Padmasana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby; the chin should be bent down on the chest, and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called Padmasana, lotus-seat, and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.

2. Virasana. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture Virasana.

3. Bhadrasana. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet, and there is Bhadrasana, fortunate-seat.

4. Svastikasana. Sitting straight with the feet placed

¹ See Rajendralal Mitra, Yoga Aphorisms, p. 102.

under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikasana, cross-seat.

5. Dandasana. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs, stick-seat.

This will, I believe, be considered enough and more than enough, and I shall abstain from giving descriptions of the Mudras (dispositions of upper limbs), of the Bandhas or bindings, and of the rules regarding the age, sex, caste, food and dwelling of the performer of Yoga. To most people these minute regulations will seem utterly absurd. I do not go quite so far, for some of these facts have, in a general way, been recorded and verified so often that we can hardly doubt that these postures and restraints of breathing, if properly practised, are helpful in producing complete abstraction (Pratyahara) of the senses from their objects, and a complete indifference of the Yogin towards pain and pleasure, cold and heat, hunger and thirst¹. This is what is meant by the complete subjugation of the senses (Parama vasyata indriyanam, II, 55) which it is the highest desire of the Yogin to realise, and this not for its own sake, but as an essential condition of perceiving the difference between the Purusha, the seer, and Prakriti, the spectacle, presented to Purusha through the agency of the Manas as developed from Prakriti. Professional students of hypnotism would probably be able to account for many statements of the followers of Kriya-yoga, which to a reader without physiological knowledge seem simply absurd and incredible.

Vibhutis, Powers

THE third chapter of Patanjali's Yoga-Sutras is devoted to a description of certain powers which were supposed to be obtainable by the Yogin. They are called Vibhutis, or simply Bhutis, Mahasiddhis, Riddhis, or Aisvaryas. Here also we are able to watch the transition from rational beginnings to irrational exaggerations, the same tendency which led from intellectual to practical Yoga. That transition is clearly indicated in the Yogangas or accessories of Yoga. In II, 29 we find eight of these accessories men-

¹ Cf. N. C. Paul, Yoga-Philosophy.

tioned, viz., restraints (Yama), subduing (Niyama), postures (Asana), regulation of breathing (Pranayama), abstraction (Pratyahara), firmness (Dharana), contemplation (Dhyana), and absorption (Samadhi), but in III, 4 three only are chosen as constituting Samyama, firmness, namely Dharana, Dhyana, and Samadhi, the other five being treated as merely outward helps. Dharana, firmness in holding, is explained (III, 1) as the confinement of the Manas to one place, and this place is said to be the tip of the nose, the navel, the ether, the sky or some other place. By this all other Vrittis or motions of the Manas are stopped, and the mind can be kept fixed on one object. The next, Dhyana, is contemplation of the one object to the exclusion of all others; while the third, real Samadhi, absorption, arises when the mind, lost in its work, illuminates one object only. This Samadhi, of which absorption or meditation is a very poor rendering, is explained etymologically as that by which the mind, Samyag adhiyate, is thoroughly collected and fixed on one point without any disturbing causes (III, 3).

Samyama and Siddhis

THE Samyama, which comprises the three highest helps to Yoga, is called internal (III, 7) in contradistinction from the other helps, but, in itself, it is still but an outside help of the so-called objectless (Nirvija) state (III, 8). It is difficult to find a word for Samyama, firm grasp being no more than an approximative rendering. It is this Samyama, however, which leads on to the Siddhis, or perfections. These are at first by no means miraculous, though they become so afterwards, nor are they the last and highest goal of Yoga-philosophy, as has often been supposed both by Indian and by European scholars. Patanjali, before explaining these Siddhis, endeavours to show that every thing exists in three forms, as not yet, as now, and as no more, and that it is possible from knowing one to know the other states. Thus a jar is not yet, when it exists only as clay; it is now, when it is the visible jar, and it is no more, when it has been broken up and reduced to dust again. So in all things, it is said, the future may be known from the present and the present accounted for by the past.

This is expressed by Patanjali in Sutra III, 16. So far all is clear; but it is difficult to see why Samyama is required for this, and how it is to be applied to what is called the threefold modification. Knowledge of the past from the present, or of the future from the present, is hardly miraculous yet; though, when we are told that a Yogin by means of Samyama knows what is to come and what is past, it sounds very much like a claim of the gift of prophecy, and certainly became so in time. The same applies in a still higher degree to the achievements by means of Samyama claimed by the Yogins in the following Sutras. Here (III, 17) because a man has learned to understand the meanings and percepts indicated by words, a Yogin by applying Samyama to this gift, is supposed to be able to understand the language of birds and other animals. In fact we get more and more into superstitions, by no means without parallels in other countries, but for all that, superstitions which have little claim on the attention of the philosopher, however interesting they may appear to the pathologist. Then follow other miraculous gifts all ascribed to Samyama, such as a knowledge of former existences, a knowledge of another's mind, or thought-reading, though not of the merely casual objects of his thoughts, a power of making oneself invisible, a fore-knowledge of one's death, sometimes indicated by portents. By Samyama with respect to kindness, a man may make himself beloved by everybody. This is again natural, but soon after we are landed once more in the supernatural, when we are told that he may acquire the strength of an elephant, may see things invisible to ordinary eyes, may, by meditating on the sun, acquire a knowledge of geography, by meditating on the moon, a knowledge of astronomy, by meditating on the Polar star, a knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and by meditating on the navel, a knowledge of anatomy. He may actually suppress the feelings of hunger and thirst, he may acquire firmness, see heavenly visions, in fact know everything, if only he can bring his will or his Samyama to bear on the things which produce such effects. More of these Siddhis are mentioned from IV, 38 to 49, such as the soul entering another body, ascension to the sky, effulgence, unlimited

hearing, lightness like that of cotton, conquest of all elements, conquest of the organs, conquest of time, omniscience, &c. These matters, though trivial, could not be passed over, whether we accept them as mere hallucinations to which, as we know, our senses and our thinking organ are liable, or whether we try to account for them in any other way. They form an essential part of the Yoga-philosophy, and it is certainly noteworthy, even from a philosophical point of view, that we find such vague and incredible statements side by side with specimens of the most exact reasoning and careful observation.

Miracles

IN reading the accounts of the miracles performed by Yogins in India we have in fact the same feeling of wonderment which we have in reading of the miracles performed by the Neo-platonists in Alexandria. The same writer who can enter into the most abstruse questions of philosophy¹ will tell us with perfect good faith how he saw his master sitting in the air so many feet above the ground. One instance of the miracles supposed to have been wrought by a Yogin in India must suffice. A writer with whom I have been in correspondence, the author of a short life of his teacher, Sabhapati Svamy, born in Madras in 1840, relates not only visions which the young student had—these might be accounted for like other visions—but miracles which he performed in the presence of many people. We are told that it was in the twenty-ninth year of his age that Sabhapati, thirsting for Brahmajnana or knowledge of Brahman, had a vision of the Infinite Spirit, who said to him: ‘Know, O Sabhapati, that I the Infinite Spirit am in all creations, and all the creations are in me. You are not separate from me, neither is any soul distinct from me: I reveal this directly to you, because I see that you are holy and sincere. I accept you as my disciple, and bid you rise and go to the Agastya Asrama, where you will find me in the shape of Rishis and Yogins.’ After that, in the dead of the night, for it was one o’clock in the morning when he saw the divine vision, Sabhapati left his wife and

¹ M. M., Theosophy, Lect. xiii.

two sons, went out of his house and travelled all the night till he reached the temple of Mahadeva, also called Vedaśreni-Svayambhu-sthalaṃ, seven miles from Madras. There he sat for three days and three nights immured in deep contemplation, and was again commanded in a vision to proceed to the Agastya Asrama. After many perils he at last reached that Asrama and found there, in a large cave, a great Yogin, two hundred years old, his face benign and shining with divinity. The Yogin had been expecting him ever since Mahadeva had commanded him to proceed to the Agastya Asrama. He became his pupil, acquired Brahmajñāna and practised Samādhi till he could sit several days without any food. After seven years his Guru dismissed him with words that sound strange in the mouth of a miracle-monger: 'Go, my son, and try to do good to the world by revealing the truths which thou hast learned from me. Be liberal in imparting the truths that should benefit the Grihasthas (householders). But beware lest thy vanity or the importunity of the world lead thee to perform miracles and show wonders to the profane.' Sabhapati seems afterwards to have taught in some of the principal cities and to have published several books, declining, however, to perform any miracles. In 1880 he was still living at Lahore. But though he himself declined to perform any of the ordinary miracles, he has left us an account of a miracle performed by one of the former members of his own Asrama. About 180 years ago a Yogin passed through Mysore and visited the Rajah who received him with great reverence and hospitality. Meanwhile the Nawab of Arcot paid a visit to Mysore, and they all went with the Yogin to his Asrama. The Nawab, being a Mussulman, asked: 'What power have you that you arrogate to yourself divine honour, and what have you that you call yourselves divine persons?' A Yogin answered, 'Yes, we possess the full divine power to do all that God can do'; and the Yogin took a stick, gave divine power to it, and threw it in the sky. The stick was transformed into millions of arrows, and cut down the branches of the fruit trees to pieces, thunder began to roar in the air, and lightning began to flash, a deep darkness spread over the land, clouds overcast the sky, and rain began to fall in

torrents. Destruction was impending; and in the midst of this conflict of the elements, the voice of the Yogin was heard to say: 'If I give more power, the world will be in ruins.' The people implored the Yogin to calm this universal havoc. He willed, and the tempest and the thunder, and the rain and the wind, and the fire and all were stopped, and the sky was as serene and calm as ever¹.

I do not say that the evidence here adduced would pass muster in a Court of Law. All that strikes me in it is the simplicity with which everything is told, and the unhesitating conviction on the part of those who relate all this. Of course, we know that such things as the miracle here related are impossible, but it seems almost as great a miracle in human nature that such things should ever have been believed, and should still continue to be believed. This belief in miracles evidently began with small beginnings, with what Patanjali describes as a foretelling of the future by a knowledge of the present or the past. What could be foretold might soon be accepted as the work of the prophet who foretold it, and from prophecy even of recurrent events, there is but a step to prophesying other events also, whether wished for, feared, or expected. Prophets would soon begin to outbid prophets, and the small ball of superstition would roll on rapidly till it became the avalanche which we know it to be, and to have been at all times and in all countries.

Apart from that, however, we must also remember that the influence of the mind on the body and of the body on the mind is as yet but half explored; and in India and among the Yogins we certainly meet, particularly in more modern times, with many indications that hypnotic states are produced by artificial means and interpreted as due to an interference of supernatural powers in the events of ordinary life. But all this is beyond our province, however interesting it may be to modern psychologists, and it was only in order to guard against being supposed to be unwilling even to listen to the statements of those who

¹ Om, a treatise on Vedantic Raj Yoga Philosophy, by the Mahatma Giana Guroo Yogi Sabhapati Sovarni, edited by Siris Chandra Basu, Student, Government College, Lahore, 1880.

believe in Kriyayoga that I have given so much space to what I cannot help considering as self-deception, leading in many cases to a systematic deception of others.

Yoga, in its early stages, knew little or nothing of all this. It was truly philosophical, and the chief object it had in view was to realise the distinction between the experiencer and the experienced, or as we should call it, between subject and object. We are told again and again that our ordinary, though false, experience arises from our not distinguishing between these two heterogeneous factors of our consciousness, and Yoga, when perfect, represented the achievement of this distinction, the separation or deliverance of the subject from all that is or ever was objective in him; the truth being that the Purusha never can be the immediate experiencer or perceiver of pain or pleasure, but can only see them as being reflected on the Manas or mind, this mind not being, in truth, his, the Purusha's, but simply the working of Prakriti, the ever objective. In enumerating the means by which this distinction can be realised, Patanjali always gives the preference to efforts of thought over those of the flesh. If he does not discard the latter altogether, we ought to remember that only by practical experiments could we possibly gain the right to reject them altogether.

True Yoga

BUT though Patanjali allows all these postures and tortures as steps towards reaching complete abstraction and concentration of thought, he never forgets his highest object, nay he allows that all the Siddhis, or miraculous powers, claimed by the Yogins, are useless and may even become hindrances (III, 37) in the career of the true aspirant after Viveka, distinction, Moksha, freedom, and Kaivalya, aloneness. One sometimes doubts whether all the Sutras can really be the work of one and the same mind. Thus while in the course of Patanjali's speculations, we could not but give him credit for never trying to locate the mind or the act of perceiving and conceiving in the brain, or in something like the pineal gland, we find him suddenly in III, 34, claiming the muscle of the heart as the seat of the consciousness of thought (Hridaye Chittasamvit). While the human body as such

is always regarded as dark and as unclean, so that the Yogin shrinks from contact with his own, much more from contact with other bodies, we are suddenly told (III, 46) that by Samyama or restraint, colour, loveliness, strength and adamantine firmness may be gained for the body.

However, the general drift of the Yoga remains always the same, it is to serve as a Taraka (III, 54), as a ferry, across the ocean of the world, as a light by which to recognise the true independence of the subject from any object ; and as a preparation for this, it is to serve as a discipline for subduing all the passions arising from worldly surroundings. In the last Sutra of the third book, Patanjali sums up what he has said by a pregnant sentence (III, 55) : 'Kaivalya (aloneness) is achieved when both the mind and the Self have obtained the same purity.' This requires some explanation. Instead of Mind, Patanjali says simply Sattva, which the commentator renders by Chittasattva, and defines as the entering of thought (Chitta) into its own causal form, after the removal of the misconception of activity. This seems not quite exact, for if we took Sattva as the Guna Sattva, we should be told that a Guna cannot have a cause, while the Manas has a cause, and is to be reabsorbed into its cause or causes (Ahamkara, Buddhi, Prakriti), as soon as its Guna, here the Sattva, has become perfectly Santa or quieted.

The Three Gunas

I have tried to explain the meaning of the three Gunas before, but I am bound to confess that their nature is by no means clear to me, while, unfortunately, to Indian philosophers they seem to be so clear as to require no explanation at all. We are always told that the three Gunas are not qualities, but something substantial (Dravyani). In everything that springs from nature, and therefore in the Manas also, there are these three Gunas (IV, 15) striving for mastery¹. Sattva of the mind is goodness, light, joy, and

¹ Yatharthas trigunas tatha chittam api trigunam, 'As the object is threefold, the thought also is threefold.' The mind in fact is doubly affected by the Gunas, first as having them or being them, then as being tinged once more by the Gunas of the objects perceived (IV, 16).

its purification means its not being overcome by the other two Gunas of Rajas, passion, or Tamas, darkness (II, 47). From this purification springs first Saumanasya, serenity, from this Ekagrata, concentration, from this Indriyajaya, subjugation of the organs of sense, and from this at last Atmadarsanayogyata, fitness for beholding the Self, or in the case of the Purusha, fitness for beholding himself, which is the same as Kaivalya, aloneness.

In the fourth and last chapter Patanjali recurs once more to the Siddhis, perfections, natural or miraculous, and tells us that they may be due not only to Samadhi, meditation in its various forms, but also to birth, to drugs, to incantations, and to heat (Tapas) or ardour of asceticism, &c. By birth is meant not only birth in this or in a future life, as a Brahman or Sudra, but also rebirth, such as when Nandisvara, a Brahman, became a Deva, or when Visvamitra, from being a Kshatriya, became by penance a Brahman. This is accounted for as being simply a removal of hindrances, as when a husbandman, wishing to irrigate his field, pierces the balk of earth that kept the water from flowing in.

Samskaras and Vasanas

THOUGH, as a rule, whatever a man does has its results, whether good or bad, the act of a Yogin, we are told, is neither black nor white, it produces no fruit, because it is performed without any desire.

As the results of actions we have Vasanas, impressions, or Samskaras, dispositions. They show themselves either in what remains, often dormant, and is then called memory¹, or in the peculiar genus, of man, bird, cow, Brahman or Sudra, in the locality and in the time when a man is born. These remainders never cease, so that the animal propensities may lie dormant for a time in a Brahman, but break out again when he enters on a canine birth. They are not said to be without beginning, because desires and fears can only arise when there are objects to be feared or desired (IV, 10). Impressions are caused by perceptions, perceptions spring from desire, desire from nescience. The

¹ This kind of memory comes very near to what we call instinct, propensity, or untaught ability.

result of them all is the body with its instincts, their habitat the mind, their support, or that on which they lean, the same as the support of perception, i. e. the objective world. Hence it is said that they sprout, like seeds, but that by Knowledge and Yoga they can be annihilated also like seeds, when roasted. In connexion with this the question is discussed, how anything can ever be completely destroyed, how what exists can be made not to exist, and how what does not exist can be made to exist. I doubt, however, whether Rajendralala Mitra can be right (III, 9, IV, 12) when he discovers here something like the theory of ideas or *logoi* in the mind of Patanjali, and holds that the three ways or *Adhvans* in which objects present themselves to the mind, or affect the mind, as past, present and future, correspond to the admission of *universalia ante rem*, the ideas or types, the *universalia in re*, the essence, and the *universalia post rem*, the concepts in our minds. I confess I hardly understand his meaning. It should never be forgotten that the mind is taken by Patanjali as by itself unconscious (not as *Svabhasa*, self-illuminated, IV, 18) and as becoming conscious and intelligent for a time only by the union between it and the *Purusha*, who is pure intelligence. The *Manas* only receives the consciousness of perception which comes in reality from the *Purusha*, so that here we should have the etymological, though somewhat fanciful, definition of consciousness (*con-scientia*) as well as of the Sanskrit *Sam-vid*, i.e. knowing along with the mind, i.e. apprehending the impressions of the mind (*Svabuddhi-Samvedanam*). But though *Chitta* is the work of the *Manas*, not directly of the *Buddhi*, this *Chitta*, when seen by the seer (*Purusha*) on one side and tinged with what is seen on the other, may be spoken of as the thought of the *Purusha*, though it is so by a temporary misconception only. This *Chitta* again is coloured by many former impressions (*Vasana*). It may be called the highest form of *Prakriti*, and as such it serves no purpose of its own, but works really for another, the *Purusha*, whom it binds and fascinates for a time with the sole purpose, we are told, of bringing him back to a final recognition of his true Self (IV, 24).

Kaivalya

If that is once achieved, the *Purusha* knows that he him-

self is not experiencer, neither knower nor actor; and the Manas or active mind, when beginning to feel the approach of Kaivalya, turns more and more inward and away from the world, so as not to interfere with the obtainment of the highest bliss of the Purusha. Yet there is always danger of a relapse in unguarded moments or in the intervals of meditation. Old impressions may reassert themselves, and the mind may lose its steadiness, unless the old Yoga-remedies are used again and again to remove all impediments. Then at last, perfect discrimination is rewarded by what is called by a strange term, Dharmamegha, the cloud of virtue, knowledge and virtue being inseparable like cause and effect. All works and all sufferings have now ceased, even what is to be known becomes smaller and smaller, the very Gunas, i.e. Prakriti, having done their work, cease troubling; Purusha becomes himself, is independent, undisturbed, free, and blessed.

Is Yoga Nihilism ?

THIS is the end of the Yoga-philosophy, and no wonder that it should have been mistaken for complete nihilism by Cousin and others. But first of all, the play of Prakriti, though it has ceased for our Purusha, who has gained true knowledge, is supposed to be going on for ever for the benefit of other innumerable Purushas; and as long as there are any spectators, the spectacle of Prakriti will never cease. Secondly, the Purusha, though freed from illusion, is not thereby annihilated. He is himself, apart from nature, and it is possible, though it is not distinctly stated, that the Purusha in his aloneness may continue his life, like the Jivanmukta of the Vedanta, maintaining his freedom among a crowd of slaves, without any fear or hope of another life, unchanged himself in this ever-changing Samsara. However, we need not attempt to supply what Patanjali himself has passed over in silence. The final goal whether of the Yoga, or of the Samkhya, nay even of the Vedanta and of Buddhism, always defies description. Nirvana in its highest sense is a name and a thought, but nothing can be predicated of it. It is 'what no eye has seen and what has not entered into the mind of man.' We know that it is; but no one can say what it is, and those

who attempt to do so are apt to reduce it to a mere phantasmagoria or to a nothing.

Though I hope that the foregoing sketch may give a correct idea of the general tendency of the Yoga-philosophy, I know but too well that there are several points which require further elucidation, and on which even Indian expositors hold different opinions. What we must guard against in all these studies is rejecting as absurd whatever we cannot understand at once, or what to us seems fanciful or irrational. I know from my own experience how often what seemed to me for a long time unmeaning, nay absurd, disclosed after a time a far deeper meaning than I should ever have expected.

The great multitude of technical terms, though it may be bewildering to us, could not be entirely suppressed, because it helps to show through how long and continuous a development these Indian systems of thought must have passed, before any attempt was made, as it was by Patanjali and others, to reduce them to systematic order. There remains with me a strong conviction that Indian philosophers are honest in their reasonings, and never use empty words. But there remains much to be done, and I can only hope that if others follow in my footsteps, they will in time make these old bones to live again. These ancient sages should become fellow-workers and fellow-explorers with ourselves in unknown continents of thought, and we ought not to be afraid to follow in their track. They always have the courage of their convictions, they shrink from no consequences if they follow inevitably from their own premisses. This is the reason why I doubt whether the admission of an Isvara or lord by Patanjali, in contradistinction to Kapila who denies that there are any arguments in support of such a being, should be put down as a mere economy or as an accommodation to popular opinion. Indian philosophers are truthful, and Patanjali (II. 36) says in so many words that *truth is better than sacrifice*¹. They may err, as Plato has erred and even Kant, but they are not *decepti deceptores*, they do not deceive or persuade themselves, nor do they try to deceive others.

¹ Satyapratishthayam kriyaphalasrayatvat.

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